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To Members of the Forty-fifth Colorado General Assembly: 
As directed by the terms of House Joint Resolution 
No. 25 (1963), the Legislative Council is submitting 
herewith its report and recommendations concerning revi-
sion of Colorado's substantive criminal law. The report 
covers the specific offenses defined in Chapter 40 of the 
revised statutes; however, because of the complexity and 
scope of the assignment, the committee was not able to give 
full study and consideration to a number of other important 
subjects. 
The committee appointed by the Legislative Council 
to make this study submitted its report on November 23, 
. 1964, at which time the report was approved by the Legisla-
tive Council for transmission to the General Assembly. 
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Representative C. P. Lamb, Chairman 
Colorado Legislative Council 
341 State Capitol 
Denver, Colorado 
Dear Mr. Chairman: 
Transmitted herewith is the report and recommenda-
tions of the Legislative Council's Criminal Code Committee, 
appointed pursuant to House Joint Resolution No. 2~ (1963). 
This report includes the committee's preliminary revision 
of the substantive criminal laws of th• state of Colorado. 
Because of the scope and complexity of the field 
of criminal law, the committee did not have sufficient 
time to consider non-substantive criminal law, including 
such subjects as arrest and arraignment, sentencing, _parole 
and probation, and criminal responsibility. The committee 
therefore is recommending that further interim consideration 
be given this subject, with a final report thereon being 




Edward J. Byrne, Chairman 
Criminal Code Committee 
FOREWORD 
This study was made under the provisions of House Joint 
Resolution No. 25 (1963). This resolution directed the Legislative 
Council to appoint a committee to study Colorado criminal statutes and 
their application, including but not limited to such subjects as 
crimes against the person, crimes against property, crimes against 
public health and safety, arrest and arraignment, sentencing, parole 
and probation, narcotics control, and criminal insanity. 
The Legislative Council committee appointed to make this 
study included Senator Edward J. Byrne, Denver, chairman; Representa-
tive William E. Myrick, Englewood, vice chairman; Senator Vernon A. 
Cheever, Colorado Springs; Senator William B. Chenoweth, Denver; 
Senator James E. Donnelly, Trinidad; Senator Dale P. Tursi, Pueblo; 
Representative Joseph R. Albi, Denver; Representative Robert S. 
Eberhardt, Denvei:; Re.presentative Don Friedman, Denver; Representative. 
John Kane, Northglenn; and Representative Walter R. Stalker, Joes. 
Representative C. P. Lamb, Legislative Council Chairman, served as an 
ex officio committee member. 
The Council's committee in turn appointed an advisory commit-
tee whose members represented a cross section of knowledge and interest 
in criminal law. This advisory committee included Judge Addison M. 
Gooding, 14th Judicial District; Judge Mitchel B. Johns, 2nd Judicial 
District; Judge Henry E. Santo, 2nd Judicial District; Judge Francis 
L. Shallenberger, 13th Judicial District; Judge Max c. Wilson~ 11th 
Judicial District; District Attorney Fred E. Sisk, 16th Judicial Dis-
trict; Assistant District Attorney David J. Hahn, 18th Judicial 
District; Deputy District Attorney Melvin Rossman, 2nd Judicial Dis-
tric•t; Professor Fred Cohen, University of Denver School of Law; 
Professor Austin S. Scott, University of Colorado School of Law; Mr. 
C. J. Berardini, Denver; Mr. Fred E. Dickerson, Denver; Mr. Walter L. 
Gerash, Denver; Mr. William V. Hodges, Sr., Denver; Mr. Robert T. 
Kingsley, Denver; Mr. Dean Mabry, Trinidad; Mr. Vasco Seavy, Pueblo; 
Mr. Robert Swanson, Denver; and Mr. William L. Rice, Denver •. 
Mr. Phillip E. Jones and Mr. Harry O. Lawson, Legislative 
Council senior research analysts, had the primary responsibility for 
the staff work ,on this study, and were assisted by Mr. Myron H. 
Schlechte and Mr. Roger M. Weber, research assistants. Mr. James C. 
Wilson, Jr., Assistant Attorney General assigned to the Legislative 
Reference Office, also assisted the committee. 
Fifteen meetings, including three two-day meetings, were 
held by this committee between April, 1963, and November, 1964. One 
meeting was held to discuss sex offenses and offenders with Doctors 
James Galvin, psychiatrist and former Director of Institutions, 
Bernardo Gaviria, staff psychiatrist, Fort Logan Mental Health Center, 
and Charles Oppegard, psychiatrist and Medical Director, Bethesda 
Hospital· Colorado State Hospital Staff Psychologists George Stark 
and William Ross; and Mr. Frank Dillon, Chief Probation Officer, 2nd 
Judicial District. Also, this same subject was discussed with Mr. 
Edward Grout, Executive Director, Division of Adult Parole, and Dr. 
Mark Farrell, a psychiatrist formerly with the Division of Adult 
vii 
Parole. One meeting was held to discuss tentative drafts of proposed 
definitions of several offenses with the Colorado Bar Association's 
Criminal Laws and Procedure Committee at the Association's 1964 con-
vention in Colorado Springs. 
Professor Austin S. Scott, Jr., University of Colorado School 
of Law, drafted the proposed homicide sections of the committee's 
revised code and the committee is indebted to him for this and other 
valuable aaslstance. The committee also is grateful for the assist-
ance of Denver District Court Judges Mitchel B. Johns and Henry E. Santo: 
Assistant District Attorneys David J. Hahn, James P. Johnson, and 
Mel Rossman: and Messrs. Walter L. Gerash, Robert Kingsley, Dean 
Mabry, William Rice, and Vasco Seavy, all of whom attended the commit-
tee's meetings on their own time and at their own expense. 
November 11, 1964 
viii 
Lrle C. Kyle 
D rector 
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CC1W~ITTEE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Findings 
If a "criminal code" is a catalogue of statutes defining 
major crimes that are placed in appropriate categories and reasonably 
related to fair penalties, and statutes comprehensively defining 
general criminal law, including liability, justification, and respon-
sibility, then Colorado has no criminal code. In place of a codified, 
systematic body of law, Colorado has a collection of laws, narrow in 
scope, separately enacted over a period of years and decades, scat-
tered throughout the majority of 154 chapters,.requiring the supple-
mentation of that vast accumulation of British pre-seventeenth century 
judicial decisions known as common law. 
Chapter 40 of the revised statutes, which includes the larger 
portion of Colorado criminal laws, is a collection of statutes, the 
majority of which are obsolete, unconstitutional, duplicative, or 
highly specialized in scope. It contains many statutes that were 
enacted in other jurisdictions prior to Colorado's admission into the 
union. The model for much of the language of Colorado's present murder 
statute, as well as the classification of murder in degrees, was the 
Pennsylvania statute enacted in 1794. Chapter 40 contains statutes 
enacted upon statehood and statutes enacted prior to the twentieth 
century that have never been amended. Further, it contains statutes 
that have been amended in such a manner as to cause additional dupli-
cations and to make distinctions between other crimes uncertain. Few 
statutes cannot be criticized on the ground of verbosity. 
A person convicted of murder in the first degree, if the 
sent~nce of death is not imposed, becomes eligible for parole after 
serving 10 years,l but a person convicted of second degree murder, a 
lesser grade of murder, may have to serve 15, 20 or more years, before 
becoming so eligible.2 The maximum penalty for de$troying a house 
with fire is 20 years;3 with explosives, 10 years.4 The maximum 
sentence for stealing a dog is 10 years; 5 and for 'killing the dog, six 
month and a $500 fine.6 For driving another's automobile w;thout his 
consent, the maximum sentence is 90 days under one section, 12 months 
under another,8 and 10 years under a third.9 Indeed, there are over 50 
sections defining some type of theft or another. Fourteen years is the 












40-2-3(1) and 39-18-7(3), CRS 1963. 
40-2-3(3) and 105-4-7, CRS 1963. 
40-3-1, CRS 1963. 
40-18-1, CRS 1963 (assuming the value of the house exceeds $500). 
8-2-31, CRS 1963. 
40-18-1, CRS 1963 (assuming the value of the dog does not exceed 
$500). 
40-18-37, CRS 1963. 
13-13-2, CRS 1963. 
40-5-9 and 40-5-2(4), CRS 1963. 
40-5-1(1), CRS 1963. 
40-2-34, CRS 1963. 
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Although a thorough revision of Colorado's criminal laws has 
been advocated by some for many years, it was not until 1959 that a 
legislative effort was made to examine this problem. In that year 
the Legislative Council's Committee on Administration of Justice w~s 
directed to make a report and recommendations on judicial organization 
and administration as well as Colorado's criminal laws. The latter 
subject, however, was not that committee's major concern, but its 
report did contain an examination of the state's sentencing structure, 
licensing and regulation of bail bondsmen, and the recommendation 
that there be created, either on a single or multi-county basis, the 
office of public defender.12 
In 1961, the Legislative Council's Criminal Code Committee was 
created for the sole purpose of examining Colorado's criminal laws. 
The committee spent its two-year life examining the total penal system 
in Colorado, including sentencing, licensing and regulation of bail 
bondsmen, counsel for indigent defendants, inchoate crimes, consolida-
tion of theft offenses, criminal insanity, robbery offenses, control 
of narcotics, and the effect of the then proposed Colorado Rules of 
Criminal Procedure on existing statutes.13 During that time, Legisla-
tive Council staff members addressed themselves to compiling and 
publishing a comprehensive index of all offenses, misdemeanor and 
felony, contained in the revised statutes. This index was prepared to 
provide a basis for revising the substantive criminal code. 
In 1963, the present Criminal Code Committee was created, pur-
suant to House Joint Resolution No. 25 to study criminal statutes and 
their application, including such subjects as crimes against the person, 
crimes against property, crimes against public health and safety, ar-
rest and arraignment, sentencing, parole and probation, narcotics 
control, and criminal responsibility. In effect, this resolution 
directed the Legislative Council to create a committee to examine the 
total penal system. 
In deciding how to carry out its assignment best, the committee 
agreed that its concern should be a major reexamination of the crimes 
defined in Chapter 40, rather than a mere reorganization and reclari-
fication. Although it recognized that the duty to examine other 
facets of criminal law was necessary, it agreed that an attack on the 
substantive provisions should be the first and major concern, and the 
committee proceeded accordingly. 
Comparisons of Colorado criminal statutes defining offenses 
directed against persons and property, and offenses affecting public 
decency, health, and safety, and public administration were made with 
12. 
13. 
Colorado Legislative Council, Judicial Administration in Colorado, 
Research Publication No. 40, A Report of the Legislative Council 
Committee on the Administration of Justice, December, 1960, pp. 
131-160. 
Colorado Legislative Council, Colorado Criminal Law, Research 
Publication No. 68, A Report of the Legislative Council Criminal 
Code Committee, December, 1962. 
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the newly revised codes of Illinois (1962), Louisiana (1942), New 
Mexico (1963), and Wisconsin (1956), and the American Law Institute's 
Model Penal Code (1962). Many of the newly-revised laws enacted in 
these jurisdictions and proposed in the Model Penal Code were adopted 
by the committee, while other proposed changes were drafted by commit-
tee and advisory committee members. The remainder of the sections 
proposed in this code of substantive law are merely restatements of 
the present law, 
Limitation of time has prevented the committee from undertaking 
a reexamination and redrafting of the majority of the provisions 
adopted. Only one meeting was held following the adoption of the com-
plete code. Consequently, the committee is aware that coverage of 
some sections overlap the scope of others, and . that some gaps exist. 
A definition of the offense of wire tapping or eavesdropping is not 
included, and an open act of sexual intercourse is an offense under 
both the proposed adultery and fornication sections and the proposed 
public indecency section. What is presented in this report is a firm 
foundation, an adequate base, upon which the committee recommends 
future effort should rest. 
Limitation of time has also precluded the committee from asses-
sing the relative seriousness of each offense. Proposed statutes were 
adopted without regard to the possible penalty each might provide. 
The committee agreed that the relative seriousness of each offense 
should be assessed only after all offenses were defined. Also, each 
offense should be labeled as to class, and the classification should I 
be dealt with in separate sections. Felonies and misdemeanors were 

















Not Less Than 1 Year 
Not Less Than 1 Year 
Not Less Than l Year 
Not Less Than 1 Year 
Not Less Than l Year 
6 Months or $500 
3 Months or $250 
30 Days or $100 
No Imprisonment or Fine 








12 Months and $1,000 
6 Months and $500 
3 Months and $250 
30 Days and $100 
$100 
No minimum terms of imprisonment for felonies, other than for 
a class I felony. were set by the committee. However, the minimum 
term should be fairly low so as to give the court the maximum choice 
in selecting the penalty to fit the offender. Also, because of the 
possibility of probation, high statutory minimum penalties are almost 
meaningless. 
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The accompanying pages contain the results of the committee's 
work. Comments are presented to explain generally what is and is not 
criminal within the scope of each section, and the reasons for such 
inclusion or exclusion. 
Recommendations 
This committee recommends that a legislative committee be 
created upon the adjournment of the 1965 Regular Session for the pur-
pose of: 
1) Placing in final form the definitions of the specific 
offenses presented in this report and general provisions; 
2) Preparing a rational classification of penalties and 
grading the offenses accordingly; 
3) Discussing the proposed substantive code with interested 
members of the bench, bar, and other groups following its distribution. 
Much can be gained if this committee and the Colorado Bar Association's 
Criminal Laws and Procedure Committee meet en bane well before the 
session in which this recommended committee intends to introduce its 
proposed substantive code; 
4) Examining the vast number of procedural and regulatory 
provisions that provide incidental criminal sanctions. These sanctions, 
for the most part, are misdemeanor offenses and many, through reference 
to the code of substantive criminal law, can be omitted; and 
5) Codifying and, where the Colorado Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure conflict or where injustices or abuses of the present law are 
known to exist, revise Colorado's non-substantive code of criminal law. 
This codification of criminal procedure should encompass arrest and 
bail through venue, information and indictments, and probation and 
sentencing to appeal and parole. The enactment of a new code of sub-
stantive criminal law should be followed by the enactment of a new 
code of criminal procedure. 
xx 
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PART A. OFFENSES DIRECTED AGAINST THE PERSON 
ARTICLE 1. HOMICIDE 
40-1-1. Murder. (1) Any. person who kills another person 
without lawful justification and not under circumstances which reduce 
the killing to voluntary manslaughter commits murder if, while engag~d 
in the conduct which cauaes the death: 
(a} He intends either to kill or do great bodily harm to that 
per.on or another; or 
(b) He •ngag•s in such conduct ~eckleasly under circumstances 
·revealing his extreme indifference to the value of human 
life, even though he has no intent to kill or do great 
bodily harma or 
(c) He is attempting or committing, or is an accomplice in 
attempting or committing, or la in !light after attempting 
or committing, the crime of arson, rape, robbery, mayhem, 
burglary or kidnaping, even though he haa no intent to 
kill or do great bodily harm. 
(2) In order for any such killing to constitute murder, the 
death must occur within a year and a day after the cause of death w11 
inflicted, in -the computation of which the whole of the day on which 
the cause of death was inflicted shall be ·considered the fir,t day. 
(3) If the person charged with murder pleads not guilty, he 
I , 
shall be tried to a jury, which shall first determine his guilt or 
innocence by its unanimous verdict without determining the penalty. 
If the jury finds him guilty of murder, the same court shall conduct 
a separate proceeding, before the same jury which determined his 
guilt, to determine the penalty. At this proceeding the jury shall, 
J 
by a unanimous verdict, fix the penalty at death, or at imprisonment 
in the penitentiary for life, or at imprisonment in the penitentiary 
for an indeterminate term of not less than ten years nor more than 
twenty-five years: provided, that the death penalty shall not be im-
posed upon one who, at the time of the conduct causing death, was 
under the age of eighteen years, nor upon one who has been convicted 
upon circumstantial evidence alone. If the jury is unable to reach 
a unanimous verdict to fix the penalty, the court snall discharge the 
jury and impose the sentence of imprisonment in the penitentiary for 
an indeterminate term of not less than ten years nor more than twenty-
five years. 
(4) If the person charged with murder pleads guilty to the 
charge, the co~rt shall impanel a jury for the sole purpose of impos-
ing one penalty among the three alternative penalties set forth in 
subsection (3): but if the district attorney informs the court that 
he does not seek the death penalty, th~ jury shall, by unanimous 
verdict, fix the penalty at imprisonment in the penitentiary for life 
or for the indeterminate term of years set forth in subsection (3). 
In either case, if the jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict, 
the court shall discharge the jury and impose the sentence of imprison-
ment for the indeterminate term of years set forth in subsection (3). 
(5) In the proceeding to determine the penalty, evidence may 
be presented by the district attorney or the defendant as to any 
matter which the court deems relevant to the imposition of the penalty, 
including the nature and circumstances of the crime, the defendant's 
character, background, history, mental and physical condition, and 
any other of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances set forth in 
subsections (6) and (7). Any such evidence which the court deems to 
have probative value may be received, regardless of its admissability 
- 2 -
under the exclusionary rules of -evidence, provided that the defendant 
is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut hearsay evidence. The jury 
shall not impose the death penalty unless it finds one of the aggravat-
ing circumstances set forth in subsection (6) and further finds that 
there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call 
for leniency. The district attorney and the defendant shall be per-
mitted to present argument for or against the ~eath penalty. 
(6) Aggravating circumstances: 
(a) The murder was committed by a convict under sen-
tence of imprisonment. 
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another 
murder or of a felony involving the use or threat 
of violence to the person. 
(c) At the time the murder was committed the defendant 
also committed another murder. 
(d) ' The defendant knowingly created a great risk of 
death to many persons. 
(e) The murder was committed while the defendant was 
attempting or committing, or was an accomplice in 
attempting or comm_itting, or was in flight after 
attempting or committing, the crime of arson, rape, 
robbery, mayhem, burglary or kidnaping. 
(f) The murder was committed for the purpo~e of avoid-
ing or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an 
escape from lawful custody. 
(g) The murder was committed for pecuniary gain. 
(h) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or 
cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity. 
- 3 -
Comment 
(7) Mitigating circumstances: 
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior 
criminal activity. 
(b) The murder was committed· while the defendant was 
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance. 
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's 
homicidal conduct or consented to it • . 
(d) The murder was committed under circumstances which 
the defendant believed to provide a moral justifi-
cation or extenuation for his conduct. 
te) The defendant was an accomplice in a murder com-
mitted by another person and his participation in 
the homicidal conduct was relatively minor. 
(f} .The defendant acted under duress or under the 
domination of another person. 
(g) At the time of the murder, the capacity of the 
defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of law was impaired as a result of mental 
disease or defect or intoxication, although he was 
not criminally insane. 
(h) Thi youth of the defendant at the time of the crime. 
A major portion of the proposed code contains sections which 
are restatements of existing law put in modern language, but there are 
several sections which radically depart from the present law. The 
proposed murder statute is one of these departures. Following is a 
section-by-section analysis of the proposed murder statute. , 
(1) Murder. The present statute defines murder as the''··· 
unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought •.• " 
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(40-2-1 CRS 1963). Malice is either express malice(" ••• deliberate 
intenti~n unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature which 
is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof ••• " (40-2-2, 
CRS 1963)) or implied malice ( 11 ••• when no considerable provocation 
appears, or when circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and 
malignant heart ••• " (40-2-3, CRS 1963}). 
The committee rejected the use of the phrases "malice afore-
thought" and "abandoned and malignant heart." Malice is not an easy 
word to define. Courts have ruled that malice signifies a condition 
of the mind and heart at the time of the act; the deliberate intent 
unlawfully to kill, but does not necessarily mean ill-will toward the 
person killed or toward any particular person; and a general reckless-
ness of the lives and safety of others, or a condition of the mind 
that shows a heart devoid of social duty and fatally bent on mischief. 
An "abandoned and malignant heart" has often been defined as extreme 
indifference to the value of human life. Not only are these phrases 
archaic, but they often result in confusion among lawyers as well as 
non-lawyers, particularly jurors. The committee did retain, however, 
the deliberate intent and recklessness elements of malice. 
The committee has redefined murder as the killing of a person 
under the following conditions: 
(1) the killing is without lawful justification, and 
(2) not under circumstances which reduce the killing to 
voluntary manslaughter if: 
(a} the actor intended to kill or seriously harm the 
victim or another; or 
(b) the actor without intending to kill or seriously 
harm the victim or another: 
{i} engages in reckless conduct which reveals his· 
extreme indifference to human life, or 
{ii) is attempting, committing, aiding in the attempt 
or commission, or fleeing from the attempt or 
commission of a major felony (arson, rape, rob-
bery, mayhem, burglary, and kidnaping}. 
Es~entially, the three types of homicides contained in the pro-
posed murder draft (intentional, unintentional but caused by reckless 
conduct and extreme indifference to human life, and violent felony -
homicides} are contained in the present murder statute as first degree 
murder. All other homicides committed with "malice aforethought" but 
not denominated as first degree murder are defined as second degree 
murder in the present statute. The· committee felt it was unwise to 
define what murders should be subject to punishment of death and what 
murders should not. (Presently, death can be handed down only if the 
jury decides at the same time the defendant 1) is guilty, and 2) guilty 
of first degree murder.) As a consequence, every person, if found 
guilty of murder under the proposed statute, can be sentenced to death 
provided: 
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(1) the defendant was 18 years old or older at the time he 
inflicted the cause of death (present death penalty cannot 
be imposed if the defendant was 17 years of age or younger 
at the time of his conviction rather than at the time of 
the offense), and 
(2) the defendant was not convicted solely upon circumstantial 
evidence, and 
(3) at least one aggravating circumstance, not offset by miti-
gating circumstances, was present. 
(l)(a) Purposely or Intentionally. A homicide resulting from 
an intention to kill or seriously harm another (whether the victim was 
the intended victim or an innocent bystander) clearly is murder. 
Obviously, such a homicide must have occurred without substantial 
provocation, excuse, or justification. Such a homicide under the 
present law is an act of first degree murder -- "All murder which shall 
be perpetrated by means of poison or lying in wait, torture, or any 
kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing ••• or perpetra-
ted design, unlawfully and maliciously, to effect the death of any 
human being other than him who is killed ••• sha~l be deemed murder of 
the first degree ••• " (40-2-3, CRS 1963). 
(l)(b) Recklessness. A homicide resulting from extreme indif-
ference to human life, coupled with reckless conduct, is also defined 
as murder. Present law, in different language, defines this type of 
homicide also as first degree murder -- "All murder which shall be ••• 
perpetrated by any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others and 
indicating a depraved mind, regardless of human life, shall be deemed 
murder of the first degree ••• " (40-2-3, CRS 1963). -Examples of 
this type of murder include shooting-into an occupied automobile or 
train, and guiding a speedboat through an area expressly reserved for 
swimmers. Although chance is against the specific act causing death, 
extreme indifference to the value of human life is exhibited. If 
recklessness exists but is not considered extreme, the homicide is 
involuntary manslaughter. 
(l){c) Felony-Homicide. Felony-murder is considered first 
degree murder under present law -- "All muraer which shall be ••• 
committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, 
rape, robbery, mayhem or burglary ••• shall be deemed murder of the 
first degree ••• " (40-2-3~ CRS 1963) -- and is also defined as 
murder in the proposed statute. Felony-homicide will only constitute 
murder if it is committed purposely or knowingly, or recklessly where 
the recklessness demonstrates extreme indifference to the value of 
human life. However, recklessness is presumed if the actor is 
attempting, committing, aiding the attempt or commission or fleeing 
from the commission of arson, rape, robbery, mayhem, burglary, and 
kidnaping (kidnaping is not included in the present law; its inclusion 
in the proposed law is based on the similar threat of harm present in 
the other specific and violent offenses). If extreme recklessness 
cannot be proven, the homicide constitutes involuntary manslaughter. 
(2) A Year and a Day. In order for a killing to constitute 
either murder or manslaughter under the present law, it is essential 
the victim.die within one year and one day after the cause of death 
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was inflicted. In computing this period of time, the cause of death 
is considered to be inflicted on the first day (40-2-9, CRS 1963). 
With the exception of changes in language, this proposed section 
contains the same limitation. However, this limitation is not avail-
able under the proposed sections as a bar to prosecution for man-
slaughter. During the days of English common law, the time when this 
bar to prosecution developed, it was difficult for medical experts to 
know for certain the exact cause of a person's death beyond the ex-
piration of a year. Medical science has improved since common law 
days, and now the cause of a death which occurred 20 or 30 years prior 
to death can be detected. Inhalation of mustard and other World War I 
gases, for example, are being listed as the cause of death today of 
many veterans. 
However, the committee did not believe it to be wise to re-
move this limitation. As an intended murder victim continues to live 
beyond the moment of harm inflicted, the chances of his eventual death 
being caused by erroneous or unskillful medical treatment, in addition 
to the inflicted harm, are increased. Also, gross neglect or improper 
treatment by the victim, such as not submitting to a necessary opera-
tion or adopting a new and necessary diet, climate or occupation, can 
contribute to his death. With the passage of time, in~ervening 
factors can and sometimes do affect the victim's longevity. 
(3) Bifurcate Trial. Normally, a court before whom a defend-
ant has been convicted of a non-capital offense felony will investi-
gate the defendant's background, including his prior criminal record, 
if any, his character, and his mental and physical condition. This 
investigation is made to inform thoroughly the court concerning the 
defendant, and is helpful in determining the defendant's sentence. 
Much of this information cannot be submitted during the trial, how-
ever, as it would be considered irrelevant, if not prejudicial, in the 
determination of guilt or innocence. 
Under the present law, the verdict of guilt or innocence, and, 
if the verdict of guilty and guilty of first degree murder, the 
punishment of a defendant is determined by a jury without the assist-
ance of a pre-sentence inquiry. The committee, to inform fully the 
jury in capital cases, recommends that a procedure analogous to that 
of non-capital cases should be included in the murder statute. The 
committee recommends that during the trial all evidence which does 
not have a bearing on the issue of guilt or innocence be excluded 
(present practice). However, upon the completion of the presentation 
of evidence, the jury will retire to deliberate solely upon a verdict 
of guilt or innocence. Upon the jury's verdict of guilty (a verdict 
of not guilty naturally would terminate the proceedings), a special 
and separate trial or hearing would be commenced. During this 
proceeding both defense and prosecution will present any aggravating 
or mitigating evidence which the court would deem relevant to the 
imposition of the penalty, including the nature and circumstances of 
the crime, the defendant's character, background, history, and mental 
and physical condition. 
The same court and jury are retained for this second proceed-
ing so that evidence relating to the crime will not have to be re-
peated. 
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Because of the severity of the maximum penalty allowed for 
murder (the same reason for the special proceeding), the jury must 
unanimously fix the penalty. If the sentence of death or life or the 
indeterminate term of years cannot be agreed upon unanimously, the 
jury is dismissed, and the court then must sentence the defendant, 
prescribing the lowest possible penalty. (Unanimity is presently 
required by the rules of criminal procedure.) 
Similar to the death penalty limitation contained in the 
present law, the jury,under the proposed law, may not set the penalty 
at death for a defendant found guilty solely upon circumstantial 
evidence. The present law also prohibits the imposition of the death 
penalty when the person convicted is 17 years old or younger at the 
time of conviction. This prohibition is included although the age 
has been changed from 17 at the time of conviction to 17 at the time 
of harm inflicted. The former time seems irrelevant. 
(4) Abbreviated Proceeding. Upon the entry of a plea of 
guilty, subject to the provisions of the present statute, the court 
must impanel a jury to decide whether the killing was murder of the 
first and second degree and, if first degree, whether or not the 
death penalty should be chosen as the penalty. 
Under the proposed section, a guilty plea also may be entered, 
and, if so, a jury must be impaneled to determine the penalty 
death, life imprisonment, or a term of ten to 25 years. 
It was the consensus of the committee and its advisors that a 
district attorney knows, immediately prior to the trial, whether or 
not he is prosecuting a capital murder case. This knowledge may be 
based on the defendant's age, type of evidence, or on other facts. 
Thus, the committee felt that if a district attorney were able to 
inform the court that he does not seek the maximum penalty upon the 
entry of a plea of guilty, a jury could decide the penalty somewhat 
quicker, e.g.,by having to debate only two-thirds of the possible 
penalties. In addition, it is conceivable a jury could be impaneled 
quicker, the district attorney not having to examine prospective 
jurors on their attitudes toward capital punishment. Most important, 
however, is the belief that if the defense is aware of the district 
attorney's lack of a desire to seek the death penalty, it is expected 
many "not guilty" pleas that are entered only because of the death 
penalty will be withdrawn and "guilty" pleas entered instead. The net 
effect of amended pleas would be to reduce the court's time, only the 
second part of the trial (sentencing) being necessary. 
(5) Aggravation and Mitigation. This proposed section, not 
comparable to anything contained in the present law. lists aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances that might be present at the time of the 
murder. During the second part of the two-part trial, either the 
defense or the prosecution may present any evidence, including but not 
limited to those items presented in this section, provided the court 
believes the evidence relevant to the imposition of the penalties, 
regardless of the admissability of the evidence under the exclusionary 
rules of evidence. The court must give the defendant an opportunity 
to rebut any hearsay evidence. 
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At least one aggravating circumstance must be present at the 
time of the murder in order for the jury to consider the death penalty. 
However, the presence of at least one mitigating circumstance may 
negate any number of aggravating circumstances. 
40-1-2. Voluntary manslaughter. (1) Any person who, with 
intent to kill or do great bodily harm, kills another without lawful 
justification commits voluntary manslaughter if, while engaged in the 
conduct which causes the deaths 
(a) He is acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting 
from provocation by the person killed, or by another whom 
the offender endeavors to kill but he negligently or acci-
dentally causes the death of the person killed, which 
provocation is sufficient to excite an intense passion in 
a reasonable person; however, if there should appear to 
have been an interval between the provocation given and 
the killing, sufficient for the voice of reason to be 
heard, the killing shall be punished as murder; or 
(b) He is acting in the exercise of his privilege of self-
defense or defense of others or defense of dwelling or 
his privilege to prevent or terminate the commission of 
a felony, in the belief that the circumstances are such 
that, if they in fact existed, would justify the killing, 
but his belief is unreasonable. 
(2) Whoever commits voluntary manslaughter is guilty of a 
class ___ felony. 
Comment 
This section replaces several sections in the present code 
which define the offense of voluntary homicide, an offense not con-
sidered quite as serious as murder in that the killing must occur 
almost immediately after the intention to kill was formed. It is a 
lesser grade of homicide than murder. 
Present Colorado law (40-2-4, CRS 1963) defines voluntary 
manslaughter as the killing of another without lawful justification, and: 
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(1) without malice, express or implied, 
(2) which results from a sudden heat of passion caused by 
provocation that is apparently sufficient to make the pas-
sion irresistible. 
This provocation, in turn, can be caused either by: 
(1) a serious and highly provoking injury inflicted upon the 
actor, sufficient to excite an irresistible passion in a 
reasonable person, or 
(2) an attempt by the victim to commit a serious personal 
injury on the actor. 
The killing must be the result of that sudden, violent impulse of 
irresistible passion; if an interval of time occurs between the pro-
voking act and the killing, sufficient for the actor to collect his 
wits and reflect upon the seriousness of causing another's death, the 
homicide constitu1:es murder and not voluntary manslaughter. 
This section essentially restates the present law, although 
provocation caused by the victim's criminal attempt has been expanded. 
Both the present and the proposed sections require the killing 
to result from provocation which, in turn, must be caused either by 
the infliction or attempt to inflict serious injury upon the actor. 
Completed Act 
Cause of provocation. Present Colorado law states that the 
act or conduct causing provocation must be a serious and highly pro-
voking injury upon the actor. The proposed statute requires only 
"provocation," and it may be caused either by the victim or, in the 
case of a death of an innocent bystander, the intended victim. By 
not requiring an actual and serious injury, the proposed section 
avoids arbitrarily limiting the nature of the circumstances which 
provoke the act. Used in this context, the term "provocation" in-
cludes any act which mentally or emotionally disturbs the actor. 
Degree of provocation. Both present and proposed law require 
that the provocation must be sufficient to excite passion in a reason-
able person. The present law requires the passion to be "irresistible" 
while that proposed here requires "intense 11 passion. Either word may 
indicate "extreme emotional disturbance." 
Result of provocation. Both present and proposed laws require 
that the killing occur as a result of the extreme emotional disturb-
ance. This proposed section requires the killing to result from the 
actor acting under a 11 sudden and intense passion, 11 while the present 
statute requires a "sudden violent impulse of irresistible passion." 
The passion must be sudden in order for the homicide to con-
stitute voluntary manslaughter rather than murder. The intent to kill 
must be formulated quickly after the provocation, and the homicide 
committed immediately thereafter. Present law states that if the 
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length of time between the provocation and the killing is sufficient 
"for the voice of reason and humanity to be heard," the homicide is 
an act of revenge and constitutes murder. According to case law, the 
time interval must be of sufficient length so that one thought could 
follow another. (22 Colo. 53). This "cooling off" provision has 
been included in this section in essentially the same language. 
Attempted Act 
Present law states that if the victim, while attempting to 
commit a serious and personal injury upon the actor is killed, the 
homicide constitutes voluntary manslaughter if, subject to the defense 
contained in 40-2-15, CRS 1963, the homicide was not absolutely neces-
sary. (Section 40-2-15 reads in part, "If a person kills another in 
self-defense it must appear that the danger was so urgent and pressing 
that in order to save his own life or to prevent his receiving great 
bodily harm the killing of the other was absolutely necessary."} To 
be an absolutely necessary homicide, the actor must have tried to 
prevent, either by retreating or by some other method, any further 
combat with the victim prior to his death. Colorado courts have ruled 
that apparent necessity, if well grounded and of such a character as 
·to appeal to a reasonable person, is sufficient to require action and 
justify the application of the doctrine of self defense to the same 
extent as actual or real necessity. (47 Colo. 352). When a person 
has reasonable grounds to believe, and does believe, that danger of 
death or great-bodily harm is imminent, he may kill in order to de-
fend himself, although it may turn out that the belief was false, and 
he was mistaken as to the extent of the real or actual danger. 
This section is essentially a restatement of the present 
statutory defense, as refined by court interpretation. If~ person 
kills to prevent his own death or serious bodily harm, the homicide 
constitutes voluntary manslaughter only if he believes "unreasonablI" 
that the "circumstances are such that, if they in fact existed, wou d 
justify the killing ••• " Homicides caused by unreasonable beliefs 
must be approached as crimes of recklessness or negligence but cannot 
be considered as serious as intentional or purposeful homicides. 
This section also includes homicides caused by the unreason-
able belief of the actor that he has no alternative to the defense of 
another or his home and to the prevention or termination of the com-
mission of any felony offense, which are present justifications. 
40-1-3. Involuntary manslaughter. Any person who kills 
another without intent to do so and without lawful justification com-
mits involuntary manslaughter if his conduct, whether lawful or un-
lawful, which causes the death creates an unreasonable risk of death 
or great bodily harm to some person, and he engages in that conduct 
recklessly but not under circumstances revealing his extreme· indif-
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ference to the value of human life. Whoever commits involuntary 
manslaughter is guilty of a class __ felony. 
Comment 
This section is similar to the present law with the exception 
of the definition of the conduct of the actor; both present and pro-
posed sections require the homicide to be committed without lawful· 
justification and without the intent to com~it the homicide. 
Present Colorado law requires the conduct to be either an 
unlawful act or a lawful act without "due caution or circumspection." 
(40-2-4, CRS 1963). The proposed section differs in that the conduct 
which causes the death: 
(1) must be engaged in recklessly but not under circumstances 
revealing extreme indifference to the value of human life 
(an element of murder), 
(2) can be either lawful or unlawful, and 
(3) must create an unreasonable risk of death or great bodily 
harm to another. 
As explained elsewhere, a homicide is considered murder under 
the proposed murder section if the homicide is the intention of the 
actor or, without intending to kill, the actor engages in reckless 
conduct which reveals or is presumed to reveal his extreme indifference 
to the value of human life. The proposed murder section excludes all 
other types of felony-homicides (other than those which, when committed, 
reveal extreme indifference) which constitute second degree murder 
under present law. These homicides now constitute voluntary mans~ 
laughter. 
It follows that a homicide committed without the intention to 
kill and without extreme recklessness should be treated as a crime 
other than murder. Coverage proposed here includes conduct that is 
presently an element of voluntary manslaughter: 
(1) legal and reckless conduct that causes a homicide; and 
(2) misdemeanor-homicides; 
and conduct that is presently an element of second degree murder: 
(1) felony-homicides, other than those homicides which reveal 
or presume to reveal extreme indifference. 
There is, however, no presumption of recklessness in this 
section if the conduct which causes death is illegals the question 
of whether the actor's conduct demonstrates a "conscious disregard" 
for the safety of another will have to be decided by the trier of 
facts in the light of the particular circumstances of the homicide. 
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40-1-4. Neglig•nt bomi51de. Any person who kills another 
without intent to do so and without lawful justification commits 
negligent ho~icide if his conduct, whether lawful or unlawful, which 
causes the death creates an unreasonable risk of death or great 
bodily harm to some person, and he engages in that conduct negligently. 
Whoever commits negligent homicide is guilty of a class ____ mis-
demeanor. 
Comment 
This section deals with homicides caused by negligent conduct. 
Under present Colorado law, a homicid~ caused by negligence and oc-
curring under certain conditions is criminal; no broad, general negli-
gent homicide statute is contained in the present criminal code. Th••• 
specific crimes ·include: 
and 
"Any person while under the influence of intoxicating liquor ••• 
who causes the death of another by operating or driving an 
automobile ••• in a ••• negligent ••• manner ••• shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the state penitentiary for a period of not 
less than one year nor more than fourteen years." (40-2-10, 
CRS 1963); . · 
"If any lives shall be lost by reason of the willful negli-
gence ••• to observe the provisions of this article if!onstruc-
tion Requirements of Public Buildings?, the person through 
whose default such loss of life was occasioned shall be ••• 
punished by a fine not less than one thousana nor more than 
five thousand dollars, or imprisonment in the penitentiary 
not less than six months nor more than ten years, or by both 
such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court." 
(17-1-6, CRS 1963). 
The scope of this section is therefore dependent upon the 
meaning of the term "negligent conduct.'' The term, as defined in 
proposed section ____ and in the context of this section, means 
that the actor causes the death of another by engaging in conduct 
which constitutes a substantial deviation from the standard of care 
which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation. The actor 
need not know his conduct creates a substantial risk that a homicide 
will follow. A gross deviation from a reasonable person's standard 
of care, which demonstrates that a substantial and unreasonable risk of 
death was consciously created. is "reckless conduct," and is an 
element of involuntary manslaughter. 
The scope of this section has been enlarged to include all 
negligent homicides. It appears there is no need or desirability for 
- 13 -
individual, particularized provisions or offenses addressed to fatally 
negligent conduct in specific areas of activity. 
Presumably, this proposed section, carrying only a misdemeanor 
penalty, would be used for prosecution of the majority of vehicle 
homicides, although crimes of "recklessness" could be used for more 
heinous acts. Presently, most prosecutions for vehicle homicides are 
carried out under the involuntary manslaughter statute, which pro-
vides a simil~r penalty to that proposed here. 
40-1-5. Concealing death of child. Any woman who conceals 
the corpse of any issue of her body with intent to prevent a deter-
mination of whether it was born dead or alive commits the crime of 
concealing the death of a child and is guilty of a class __ _ 
misdemeanor. Nothing herein shall be so construed as to prevent such 
mother from being prosecuted for the murder or manslaughter of such 
child. 
Comment 
This section defin~s an offense which is committed by any 
woman who conceals the body of a child to which she has given birth 
with the intent to prevent a determination of whether it was born 
dead or alive. This section is substantially a restatement of the 
present law, and reflects the following changes: 1) immaterial facts, 
such as whether the child was male or female, have been omitted; 2) 
the definition has been broadened to include legitimate as well as 
illegitimate children; and 3) the required intent has been narrowed 
to require only the intent to prevent a determination of whether the 
child was born dead or alive. Present law contains a broader intent; 
i.e., the intent that the issue of her body does not come to light. 
Both the present and proposed sections specifically state that 
a prosecution under this section does not bar a subsequent prosecution 
for murder, if such is the case. 
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ARTICLE 2. ASSAULTS AND BATTERIES 
40-2-1. Simple assault. Any person who attempts to commit 
a battery or intentionally places another in reasonable apprehension 
of receiving a battery commits simple assault and is guilty of a 
class misdemeanor. ---
Comment 
Under this proposed section, an assault may be committed in 
two ways: 
(1) An assault is defined as an attempt to commit a battery. 
Consequently, there must be an overt acti a substantial step in the 
offender's course of conduct, which is panned to culminate in the 
commission of a battery. An intentional act of force or violence must 
have begun to be executed but not completed. An intentional and com-
pleted act of force or violence against another, of course, constitutes 
a battery. 
(2) An assault is defined also as the intentional placing of 
another in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery. This is 
essentially a restatement of the present definition of assault, i.e., 
an unlawful attempt coupled with a.present ability to commit a violent 
injury on the person of another (40-2-33, CRS 1963). The committee 
noted that several newly-revised criminal codes, including the Wisconsin 
criminal code, define an assault only as an attempt to commit a battery. 
Indeed, the Wisconsin code makes no mention of assault, relying solely 
upon its attempt provisions as a remedy. However, the committee agreed 
that the basis of the present assault offense is the creation of a 
well-founded fear of immediate peril in the mind of the victim. Also, 
the committee was aware of the difficulty in practice of drawing a 
precise line which separates violence that is menaced from violence 
that is begun to be executed. Consequently, it decided that the une-
quivocal appearance of an attempt with force or violence to do such an 
act as will convey to the mind of the victim a "reasonable apprehension" 
of imminent danger of bodily harm should be retained as an essential 
element of assault. The reasonableness of the victim's apprehension is 
a question for the trier of the facts to decide. 
40-2-2. Aggravated assault. Any person who commits simple 
assault with a dangerous weapon commits aggravated assault and is 
guilty of a class ___ felony. 
Comment 
Aggravated assault, as defined in this section, is the doing 
of those acts within the scope of simple assault, coupled with the 
presence and use of a dangerous weapon. 
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Aggravated assault may be either an attempt to commit a 
battery with a dangerous weapon, e.g., shooting at another with an 
intent to injure, or the placing of another in reasonable apprehension 
of receiving a battery with a dangerous weapon, e.g., the pointing at 
another of an unloaded firearm or a firearm that, because of an absence 
of a firing pin or some other necessary part, is incapable of being 
discharged. The shooting at another, if coupled with the intent to 
cause the other's death, should not be prosecuted under this section. 
Such an act constitutes an attempt to murder and should be prosecuted 
under the general criminal attempt provisions. 
This section, by replacing the present assault with a deadly 
weapon provision (40-2-34, CRS 1963), eliminates the requirement of 
the specific intent to commit upon the person of another, with a deadly 
weapon, instrument or other thing, a bodily injury where no consider-
able provocation appears or where the circumstances of the assault show 
an abandoned and malignant heart. Under the present law, the placing 
of another under a reasonable apprehension of receiving an injury with 
the use of a deadly weapon that is incapable of being fired constitutes 
only a simple assault, a misdemeanor offense. 
This section also replaces the present assault with int~nt to 
commit larceny, mayhem, murder, rape or robbery provision (40-2-34, 
CRS 1963). This present section, because of its limited scope, does 
not cover assaults to commit other equally serious offenses, such as 
sodomy, also, lt appears unfair to subject a convicted offender to a 
possible 14-year term of imprisonment for merely placing another in 
reasonable apprehension of being a victim to one of these offenses. 
For these reasons, the committee agreed that an assault to commit any 
of these offenses should be prosecuted under either: 
(1) the proposed simple assault section, ·if the offender 
was not armed with a dangerous weapon and no overt act 
was performed: or 
(2) the proposed aggravated assault section, if the offender· 
was armed with a dangerous weapon and no overt act was 
performed; or 
(3) the general criminal attempt section regardless of 
whether or not the offender was armed with a dangerous 
weapon, if an overt act was performed. 
40-2-3. Simple battery. Any person who intentionally uses 
force or violence upon another or intentionally administers a poison or 
other noxious liquid or substance to another commits simple battery 
and is guilty of a class misdemeanor. ---
Comment 
Under the present law, assault and battery, defined as a 
single offense, is the unlawful beating of another \40-2-35, CRS 1963). 
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Under this proposed· section, a battery is 1) the intentional use of 
force or violence upon another, and 2) the intentional administration 
of a poison or some other toxic item. This section covers all forcible 
and violent contact, irrespective of the degree of force or violence. 
Any forcible contact is sufficient and no physical harm or injury need 
result. force upon another may be achieved by grabbing another's arm 
as well as "beating" him. Administering a poison to another is con-
sidered here as being equally harmful as the use of force or violence. 
If, however, the poison is administered with the intent to cause the 
victim's death, the offender should be prosecuted under the general 
criminal attempt statute for an attempt to commit murder. Thus, a 
battery may be committed either directly or indirectly. A battery must 
be the intention of the offender; no specific intent to injure is re-
quired. Injury or harm caused by the offender's recklessness or 
negligence is outside the scope of this section. Consent of the victim 
is no defense since consent of the victim is not element of the offense 
of simple battery. 
40-2-4. Aggravated battery. Any person who commits a simple 
battery with a dangerous weapon commits aggravated battery and is 
guilty of a class __ _ felony. 
Comment 
Aggravated battery is simple battery committed with a dangerous 
weapon. It is essentially a new offense in that it replaces no present 
section other than mayhem. Aggravated battery is considered a more 
serious offense than simple battery because of the higher probability 
of the offender causing death, serious disfigurement, and_ permanent or 
protracted loss or impairment of a function of a bodily member or 
organ. Aggravated battery must be the intention of the offender; no 
specific intent to injure, etc., is required. Injury or harm caused by 
the offender's reckless or negligent use of a dangerous weapon is out-
side the scope of this section. Also, consent of the victim is not a 
defense to prosecution. 
- 17 -
ARTICLE 3. KIDNAPING 
40-3-1. False imprisonment. Any person who intentionally 
confines or detains another without the other's consent and without 
proper legal authority commits false imprisonment and is guilty of a 
class misdemeanor. ---
Comment 
This section is a restatement of the present offense defined 
in 40-2-42, CRS 1963. The present offense is defined as the unlawful 
violation of the personal liberty of another, and consists in confine-
ment or detention without sufficient authority. 
40-3-2. Simple kidnaping. Any person who intentionally does 
any of the following acts commits simple kidnaping and is guilty of a 
class ____ felony: 
Comment 
(1) Forcibly seizes and carries any person from one place to 
another without his consent and without lawful justifica-
tion; or 
(2) Takes, entices or decoys away, for an unlawful purpose, 
any child not his own and under the age of 18 years, 
without the consent of its parent or guardian. 
Simple kidnaping is aggravated false imprisonment. It re-
quires a confinement or restraint without consent and without proper 
legal authority plus some aggravating factor, other than an intent 
to extort a ransom. 
In subsection (l)(a), force is used to overcome the victim's 
refusal to consent to the carrying from one place to another. This 
subsection covers a normal case of kidnaping where the victim is 
overpowered and is lifted or forced at gun point into an awaiting car. 
A special situation where force is not required is covered in sub-
section (l)(b). The offender need not have a special motive to kidnap, 
with the exception of extortina ransom. Kidnaping for ransom is con-
sidered the most heinouA offense which violates personal liberty, and 
is dealt with accordingiy in proposed section 40-3-3. It is essential 
under this subsection that the victim is moved from one place to 
another, although this definition is broad enough to cover a situation 
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in which the victim is carried or forced to move from one room to 
another, a distance of only a few feet. It is not essential that the 
victim is an adult or a juvenile and is harmed or unharmed. These 
facts are some of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances which 
obviously should be considered by the court following the defendant•• 
conviction and prior to his sentencing. 
In subsection (l)(b), force is not required, but the victim 
· must be a juvenile. Children under the age of 18 can be taken away 
without the use of force because they are too young to understand what 
is happening: an offer of candy to a child can be just as persuasive 
as a poirit of a gun is to an adult. The actor must have an intent to 
commit an unlawful act, harmfulness which corresponds to the danger of 
force required in subsection (l)(a). Usually,· this will be an intent 
to commit a sex offense. However, the language is sufficiently broad 
enough to include any unlawful act. The child enticed away must not 
be the offender's child. This exclusion covers cases where a parent 
takes his child who is in the legal custody of the other parent --
conduct which, although undesirable, is not kidnaping under this pro-
posed section and is covered by proposed section 40-3-4. 
The victim's age, the actor's method and degree of enticement, 
and the seriousness of the intended unlawful act are aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances, as the case may be, and should be weighed 
by the court upon the defendant's conviction but prior to his sentenc• 
ing. 
40-3-3. Aggravated kidnaping. (1) Any person who does any 
of the following acts with the intent thereby to force the victim, or 
some other pe~son, to give up anything of value in order to secure a 
release of the person under the offender's actual or apparent control 
commits aggravated kidnaping: 
(a) forcibly seizes and carries any person from one place to 
another; or 
(b) Entices or persuades any person to go from one place to 
another; or 
(c) Imprisons or forcibly secretes any person. 
(2) Whoever commits aggravated kidnaping is guilty of a 
class ____ felony if any person kidnaped shall have suffered 
bodily harm; provided, that no person convicted of aggravated kidnap-
ing shall suffer the death penalty if at the time of the offense he 
was under the age of 18 years, if he was convicted on circumstantial 
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evidence alone, or if each person kidnaped was liberated alive prior 
to his conviction. 
(3) Whoever commits aggravated kidnaping is guilty of a 
class_ felony if, prior to his conviction, each person kidnaped 
was liberated unharmed. 
Comment 
This section defines the offense of simple kidnaping and false 
imprisonment with the intent to extort a ransom. It increases the 
penalty for kidnaping when it is done for ransom. If a person does 
any of the acts in subsections (l)(a), (l)(b) or (l)(c) with the in-
tent to demand a ransom in return for the release of his victim, he is 
guilty under this section. Although ransom will usually be money, the 
broader term "anything of value 11 is used to cover things like jewels 
or other valuables. 
To maximize his incentive to return the victim unharmed, a 
number of penalties may be imposed on a convicted kidnaper, depending 
on two aggravating factors: the harm inflicted upon the victim, 
and whether or not the victim was released prior to his ccmviction. 
The maximum penalty is death if the victim is not released and harmed, 
. life imprisonment if the victim is released harmed, and ____ years 
if the victim is released unharmed. 
Two additional facts may also bar the death penalty from 
being imposed: the kidnaper was convicted solely on circumstantial 
evidence or the kidnaper was under the age of 18 at the time of the 
commission of the offense. These two defenses are contained in the 
present law. Except for the change that the actor must be under 18 
at the time of the offense rather than at the time of his conviction. 
(the latter time being irrelevant), these two defenses are essentially 
restatements of the defenses contained in the present law, and are 
identical to the defenses contained in the proposed murder statute; 
40-3-4. Violation of custody. (l)(a) Any person, including 
a natural or foster parent, who, knowing that he has no privilege to. 
do so or heedless in that regard, takes or entices any child under 
the age of eighteen years from the custody of its parent, guardian, 
or other lawful custodian shall be guilty of a class --- felony. 
(b) Any parent or other person who violates an order of any 
district or juvenile court of this state, granting the custody of a 
child under the age of eighteen years to any person, agency, or insti-
tution, with the intent to deprive the lawful custodian of the custody 
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of a child under the age of eighteen years, shall be guilty of a 
class ___ felony. 
(2) It shall be an affirmative defense either that the of-
f ender reasonably believ·ed that his conduct was necessary to preserve 
the child from danger to its welfare, or that the child, being at the 
time not less than fourteen years old, was taken away at its own 
instigation without enticement and without purpose to commit a criminal 
offense with or against the child. Knowledge or disregard of the fact 
that a child is below the age of fourteen years shall be presumed. 
Comment 
This section is new law, designed to meet a situation which 
-not infrequently arises and for which there is at present no proper 
remedy. 
Under present Colorado law, no felony offense is committed if 
a divorced parent, who was not granted the custody of his child or 
children, takes his child from its lawful custodian. If the parent 
having the unlawful custody of his child remains in Colorado, the 
court could convict the parent under a kidnaping provision which pro-
vides a misdemeanor penalty. If he leaves the state, however, the 
court is powerless: a commission of a misdemeanor is not a sufficient 
ground for extradition. Generally, there are only two remedies 
available to a parent granted the custody of a child when the other 
parent unlawfully removes them from Colorado: 1) "re-kidnap" the 
child and return to Colorado, or 2) ask a court of pro~er jursidiction 
in which the children are now residing to hold a custody hearing. 
Violation of lawful custody of children requires special 
legislation, notwithstanding its similarity in some respects to kid-
naping. The interest to be protected is not freedom from physical 
danger or terrorization by abduction, since this is covered elsewhere, 
but rather the maintenance of parental custody against all unlawful 
interruptions, except if the child is 14 years of age or older and is 
a willing, undeceived participant in the attack on this interest of 
its parent. The problem is further distinguishable from kidnaping by 
the fact that the offender here will often be a parent or another 
person favorably disposed toward the child. 
Subsection (l)(a) covers situations in which a person, in-
cluding a parent, intentionally entices or takes a child away from 
the parent or other person to whose custody it has been awarded, i.e., 
he must know that the custody of the child has been awarded to that 
parent or other person. If the enticement is for an immoral or other 
criminal purpose, of course, prosecution will be carried out under 
another appropriat~ section of this code. Subsection (l)(b) covers a 
situation in which a parent or other person intentionally deprives the 
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lawful custodian of the custody of the child. Such a situation would 
occur where a parent, not the lawful custodian, is awarded visitation 
rights and fails to return the child to its lawful custodian. 
Both subsections (l)(a) and (l)(b) provide a felony penalty. 
However, it is not the committee's intent for penitentiary sentences 
to be imposed each time a violation of this section occurs; it is the 
intent that an adequate ground (commission of a felony) be established 
for extradition. 
The age of 18 is selected as the limit of parental interest 
in custody, to be protected by criminal law, since this is the age at 
which a child begins to move into the relative independence of self-
support or higher education. 
Subsection (2) provides two broad defenses to prosecution 
which will tend to bar a conviction in most prosecutions, and which 
reflect the committee's desire of keeping convictions to a minimum. 
No crime is committed if the child, 14 years of age or older, is 
principally responsible for its determination to leave home. It is 
unfair to punish a parent who merely fell in with the child's plan. 
Subsection (2) provides also the defense that the actor enticed or 
fails to return the child in the belief that to do so would endanger 
the child's welfare. Both defenses are questions of fact. 
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PART B. OFFENSE DIRECTED AGAINST PROPERTY 
ARTICLE 4. ARS<l-J 
40-4-1. Aggravated arson. Any person who intentionally sets 
fire to, burns, causes to be burned, or aids the burning of, or by 
the use of any explosive, damages or destroys, causes to be damaged 
or destroyed or aids in the damage or destruction of, any building or 
occupied structure of another and without his consent, commits aggra-
vated arson and is guilty of a class __ _ felony. 
Comment 
This section replaces a major portion of the present offense 
of first degree arson, and has substantially altered the elements of 
·the present offense (see also proposed section 40-4-4). 
The example of recently enacted revised codes of other states 
has been followed in that the concept of arson has been enlarged to 
include exploding as well as burning. The criminologic considerations 
are quite similar: likelihood of extensive property destruction 
accompanied by danger to life. Also, explosions frequently lead to 
fires, just as fires sometimes cause explosions. 
· The proposed section requires the property to be that of 
another (the present crime requires that the property must be that of 
"himself or of another"). Other proposed sections deal with situation, 
in which a person, exploding or burning his own property, causes in-
jury to other property (see sections 40-4-4, reckless burning and ex-
ploding, and 40-4-2, simple arson). 
To burn down a building owned and occupied by the actor may or 
may not be recklessness in relation to other people's safety or valued 
property, depending on the isolation of the premises and. the degree of 
care taken, but the actor's poor choice of means to get rid of his own 
property does not mark him as the same kind of dangerous character as 
one who burns his own buildings to defraud an insuror, or another's 
building to wreck vengeance. 
The definition of the type of structure that is burned or 
exploded has been narrowed. This section, the most serious arson 
offense, covers only arson in which valued property is destroyed or 
imperiled and the life of any person is placed in jeopardy. Burning 
or exploding other property (property other than a building or occu~ 
pied structure) may endanger life to some extent, as .firefighters and 
spectators are drawn to the scene. This danger, however, is not 
considered as serious as that to which the owner or occupants of the 
building are exposed. In principle, the burning of a dilapidated and 
deserted house unsuited for occupancy should be no more than simple 
criminal damage to property (proposed section 40-6-2 or reckless 
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burning and exploding (proposed section 40-4-4). But the probabiliti 
that a building is used by human beings in ways that make it dangerous 
to burn or explode is so high that it seems pointless to require the 
prosecution to charge and prove occupancy in every case. Occupied 
structures-include ~hips, ~leeping cars, mobile homes and offices 
but not ordinary passenger cars, trucks or freight cars (see proposed 
section 40-4-~). 
40-4-2. Simple arson. Any person who intentionally sets fire 
to, burns, causes to be burned, or aids the burning of, or by the use 
of any explosive, damages or destroys, causes to be damaged or de-
stroyed, or aids in the damage or destruction of, any property of 
another and without his consent, other than any building or occupied 
structure, commits simple arson and: 
Comment 
(1) Is guilty of a class felony, if the damage exceeds 
the value of one hundred dollars; 
(2) Is guilty of a class_ misdemeanor, if the damage does 
not exceed one hundred dollars in value; or 
(3) Is guilty of a class_ felony, if the damage does not 
exceed one hundred dollars in value and the person has 
been previously convicted of simple arson, aggravated 
arson, reckless burning or exploding or arson to defraud. 
This section also reflects the concept of arson broadened to 
include exploding. It replaces the present second and third degree 
arson laws. It requires the property to be that of another. The 
ownership provision in the present law requires that the property may 
be that of •himself or of another" (second degree arson) or "of another 
person" (third degree arson). Again, other proposed arson sections 
pertain to those situations in which a person causes injury to other 
property while exploding or burning his own property in a reckless 
fashion. 
This section broadens the type of property to include both 
real and personal property, other than a building or occupied structure. 
Thus, any type of property covered by the wording in the proposed ag-
gravated arson section is precluded from this section. An intentional 
act of arson which is not a violation of the proposed aggravated arson 
section is a violation of this proposed section. 
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The value of the property required under the present third 
degree arson statute distinguishes whether the act of burning is an 
offense of arson or malicious mischief; third degree arson requires 
the damage to exceed $25 in value, while lesser valued damage is an 
act of malicious mischief. This section has increased the value of 
property fro~ $25 to ,100 to reflect contemporarr values. This section 
also covers all types or arson, regardless of va ue, out, as mentioned 
below, the severity of the penalty for violating this section depends 
on the value of the damage. The value of the property is a factor to 
be considered only by the court in sentencing the convicted offender. 
Value does not determine whether or not simple arson has been com-
mitted. 
Two penalties are provided in this section. Simple arson is 
a felony offense if the damage exceeds $100 dollars in value or the 
actor has been convicted previously of simple arson, aggravated arson, 
reckless burning or exploding or arson to defraud, regardless of 
damage value. Simple arson is a misdemeanor offense if the value of 
the damage does not exceed $100. 
40-4-3. Arson to defraud. Any person who, by ~~ans ot fire 
· or explosives, intentionally damages any property with intent to de-
fraud, commits arson to defraud and is guilty of a class_ felony. 
Comment 
This section is substantially a restatement of the present 
statute. Again, the concept of arson has been expanded to include 
exploding as well as burning of property. 
40-4-4. Reckless burning and exploding. Any person who 
intentionally starts a fire or causes an explosion, whether on his 
own property or that of another, and thereby recklessly does any of 
the following acts commits reckless burning and exploding and is guilty 
of a class felony: 
Comment 
---
(1) Places another in danger of death or bodily injury; or 
(2) Places any building or occupied structure of another in 
danger of damage or destruction. 
Reckless burning and exploding contains minor elements of 
first degree arson that have been expanded. Where aggravated arson 
requires intent, reckless burning and exploding requires recklessness. 
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This section deals with three situations presently dealt with 
by first degree arson: 
(1) the burning of one's own property under circumstances 
where there is a high risk that the fire will spread to property of 
another. This situation is usually treated as severely as setting 
fire to another's property. The present first degree arson section 
defines that offense as the "malicious" burning of a dwelling and re-
lated structures whether the property of himself or of another; 
(2) the burning of lesser forms of property in close proximity 
to the specially valued categories, also treated as first degree arson 
(
11 
••• or any kitchen, shop, barn, stable or other outhouse that is 
parcel thereof, or belonging to or adjoining thereto ••• "); and 
(3) other recklessness in relation to sp•cial categories of 
highly regarded property, such as setting fire to a pile of trash near 
a home, where no burning of the home occurs. 
40-4-5. Definition~ As used in this article, the term 
"occupied structure" includes a tent, boat, trailer, sleeping car, or 
any other vehicle adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or 
for carrying on business therein, whether or not a person is act~ally 
present. If a building or structure is divided into separately oc-
cupied units, any unit not occupied by the actor is an occupied 
structure of another. 
Comment 
This designation of the property protected by the proposed arson 
sections is narrower than that contained in the present laws. By 
restricting the aggravated arson offense to buildings and occupied 
structures, the offense is confined to the fire and explosions which 
are the most dangerous. Occupancy is to be distinguished from 
"p~sence" of a person because the presence or ibsence of a person in 
a structure which is normally occupied may be purely a matter of · 
chance so far as the arsonist is concerned. On the other hand, the 
arsonist should be able to judge whether the structure is a dwelling, 
store, factory, warehouse, o~ other place for the conduct of human 
affairs. It is unnecessary to prescribe that "buildings" be occupied, 
since buildings are generally employed by humans in ways that amount 
to occupancy. In the case of structures other than buildings, such 
as a mine shaft, prosecution would have to prove occupancy as part of 
its case. The requirement of occupancy is significant chiefly in re-
lation to vehicles. It serves to exclude from aggravated arson the 
burning of freight cars, motor vehicles other than house trailers or 
mobile offices, ordinary small water craft and the like. 
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The provision as to separate or occupied portions of build-
ings and structures takes care of the situation of apartment houses, 
office buildings, etc., where occupancy is by unit. It is a unit 
rather than a structure which must be safeguarded, even against the 
occupants of other units in the same structure. 
ARTICLE 5. BURGLARY 
40-5-1. Burglary. Any person who without authority enters 
or remains in any building or enclosed portio~ of any vehicle or 
craft, whether movable or immovable, or who being lawfully within any 
building or enclosed portion of any vehicle or craft, whether movable 
I' 
or immovable, enters into any room, apartment, or enclosed portion of 
the same building, vehicle, or craft, with the intent to commit any 
felony or theft therein commits burglary and is guilty of a class 
___ felony. 
Comment 
This section essentially restates the present law, 40-3-5, 
CRS 1963, but it proposes one major change. Under the present law, a 
per·son who breaks and enters must have the intention to commit any 
felony or misdemeanor in order to be convicted of burglary. This 
section proposes to limit the required intent to any felony and mis-
demeanor-theft. 
and: 
40-5-2. Aggravated burglary. Any person who commits burglary 
(1) Is armed with a dangerous weapon and intends to inflict 
bodily injury if discovered; or 
(2) After entering arms himself with ,,a dangerous weapon and 
intends to inflict bodily injury if discovered; or 
(3) Uses, or possesses with intent to use, any explosive 
substance, commits aggravated burglary and is guilty of a 
class --- felony. 
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Comment 
This section is substantially new law in that it defines an 
offense that parallels the classification of robbery offenses. Any 
burglar who is armed with a dangerous weapon, either before or $Ubse-
quent to his unlawful entry, is guilty of an offense under this sec-
tion. Under present law, this aggravating feature of burglary is 
prosecuted under the assault with a deadly weapon section. This sec-
tion also includes a restatement of the present use of dynamite in 
burglary statute 40-3-6, CRS 1963. 
40-5-3. Possession of burglary tools. Any person who pos-
sesses any key, instrument, device, or any explosive substance suitable 
for use in breaking into any building, vehicle, craft, or any deposi-
tory designed for the safekeeping of anything of value, or any part 
thereof, with intent to commit burglary, commits possession of burglary 
tools and is guilty of a class __ felony. 
Comment 
This section replaces 40-3-7, CRS 1963, and proposes no major 
changes. 
40-5-4. Coin-box burglary. Any person who, with intent to 
commit theft, enters or breaks into any coin-operated vending machine 
or other coin-operated contrivance, apparatus, or equipment used for 
the purpose of providing lawful amusement, sales of goods, services,· 
or other valuable things, or telecommunications, when punishment 
therefor is not otherwise provided, upon a first conviction, is guilty 
of a class misdemeanor. Upon a second or subsequent conviction, 
any such person is guilty of a class_ felony. 
Comment 
This section is designed to cover vending machine burglaries. 
Under present law, this conduct may be prosecuted under either the 
present burglary section or the section on damage or destruction of 
property belonging to another. 
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ARTICLE 6. DAMAGE AND TRESPASS TO PROPERTY 
40-6-1. Criminal damage to property involving danger to the 
person. Any person who intentionally damages any property, real or 
personal, by any means other than fire or explosion, and thereby 
recklessly places another person in danger of death or bodily injury 
commits criminal damage to property involving danger to the person, 
and is guilty of a class_ felony. 
Comment 
This proposed section defines an offense of property destruc-
tion that, regardless of the value of the property destroyed, creates 
a dangerous situation for another. This section defines an offense 
that cannot be committed with fire or explosives. Essentially it 
· covers all conduct outside the scope of arson. 
40-6-2. Simple criminal damage to property. (1) Any person 
who intentionally damages any property, real or personal, of another, 
without the consent of 'the owner, by any means other than fire or ex-
plosion, commits simple criminal damage to property .• 
(2) Any person who commits simple criminal damage to property, 
where the damage done does not exceed one hundred dollars, upon a 
first conviction, is guilty of a class misdemeanor. Upon a second 
or subsequent conviction, any such person is guilty of a class 
felony. 
(3) Any person who commits simple criminal damage to property, 
where the damage done exceeds one hundred dollars, is guilty of a 
class_ felony. 
(4) Any person who commits the crime of simple criminal 
damage to property, where the damage is done to any public utility or 
common carrier and the damage done directly interferes with or inter-
rupts any common carrier, pipe line, gas, electrical, telephone, 
telegraph or water service, or makes inoperable any facility or 
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equipment directly used in furnishing any such service, no matter 
what the amount of damage done, is guilty of a class_ felony. 
Comment 
This proposed section restates the major elements of the of-
fense defined in 40-18-1, CRS 1963, i.e •• unlawful damage or destruc-
tion of personal or real property of another. 
40-6-3. Damage to property with intent to defraud. (1) Any 
person who damages or destroys any property, real or personal, by any 
means other than fire or explosion, with intent to defraud commits 
damage to property with intent to defraud. 
(2) Any person who commits damage to property with intent to 
defraud, where the damage or destruction exceeds one hundred dollars, 
is guilty of a class felony. 
(3) Any person who commits damage to property with intent to 
defraud, where the damage or destruction does not exceed one hundred 
dollars, upon first conviction, is guilty of a class_ dismeanor. 
Upon a second or subsequent conviction, any such person is guilty of 
a class felony. 
Comment 
This proposed section is the counterpart of the proposed arson 
to defraud section 40-4-3. 
40-6-4. Criminal trespass. Any person who enters or remains 
upon the lands of another, knowing that the consent to enter or remain 
is denied or withdrawn'by the owner, the person having lawful posses-
sion thereof, or any agent of such owner or possessor, commits criminal 
trespass and is guilty of a class_ misdemeanor; provided, that this 
section shall not apply to any reasonable entry seeking safety, shelter, 
or information. 
Comment 
This section proposes to consolidate offenses involving crimi-
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nal trespass. Present trespass statutes that this section replaces 
include: 
40.-3-8, CRS 1963 -- Trespass on Premises of Another. 
40-18-12, CRS 1963 -- Trespass to Injure Dam or Embankment. 
40-18-13, CRS 1963 -- Trespass Upon Garden or Orchard. 
ARTICLE 7. FORGERY 
40-3-10. Forgezy. (1) Any person who, with intent to de-
fraud, knowingly: 
(a) Makes or alters the signature or any part of any document 
apparently capable of defrauding another in such manner 
that it purports to have been made by another, at another 
time, with different provisions, or by authority of one 
who did not give such authority: or 
(b) Issues or delivers such document knowing it to have been 
thus made or altered, commits forgery and is guilty of a 
class felony. 
(2) An intent to defraud means an intention to cause another 
to assume, create, transfer, alter, or terminate any •right, obligation, 
or power with reference to any person or property. 
(3) A document apparently capable of defrauding another in-
cludes, but is not limited to, a writing by which any right, obliga-
tion, or power with reference to any person or property may be 
created, transferred, altered, or terminated. 
Comment 
The key to this section is that the offender must, with the 
use of a document, knowingly cause another either to assume, create, 
transfer, alter or terminate any right, obligation or power. This 
section replaces the present and general forgery statute, 40-6-1, CRS 
1963, and other statutes defining forgery offenses, including: 
13-6-42, CRS 1963 
13-7-35, CRS 1963 
40-6-12, CRS 1963 
59-21-7, CRS 1963 
Altering or Using Altered Certificates. 
Forging Ability to Respond in Damages. 
Forging or Defacing Official Seals. 
Forgery of Ballot 
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ARTICLE 8. THEFT 
40-8-1. Theft. Any person who knowingly does any of the 
following commits theft: 
{l){a) Obtains or exerts unauthorized control over anything 
of value of another; or 
{b) Obtains by deception control over anything of value of 
another; or 
(c) Obtains by threat control over anything of value of 
another; or 
(d) Obtains control over any stolen thing of value knowing 
the thing of value to have been stolen by another: and 
(2){a) Intends to deprive another permanently of the use or 
benefit of the thing of value; or 
{b) Knowingly uses, conceals, or abandons the thing of 
value in such manner as to deprive another permanently 
of such use or benefit; or 
(c) Uses, conceals, or abandons the thing of value knowing 
such use, concealment, or abandonment probably will 
deprive another permanently of such use or benefit. 
(3) Any person who commits theft where the value of the 
thing involved does not exceed one hundred dollars, and any person 
who commits theft twice or more within a period of six months and from 
the same person, where the aggregate value of the things involved does 
not exceed one hundred dollars, is guilty of a class misdemeanor. 
(4) Any person who commits theft where the value of the thing 
involved exceeds one hundred dollars, and any person who commits theft 
twice or more within a period of six months and from the same person, 
where the aggregate value of the things involved exceeds one hundred 
dollars, is guilty of a class felony. 
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(5) Any person who commits theft from the person of another, 
regardless of the value of the thing involved, is guilty of a class 
felony. 
Comment 
This section combines the major crimes of larceny, embezzle-
ment, confidence game, obtaining goods or services by false pretenses, 
and buying and receiving stolen goods. The distinctions between these 
crimes are technical and have historical significance only. 
In combining these crimes, this section makes three major 
changes. 
(1) It abolishes the distinction between these crimes, such 
as whether or not the actor had possession of the property before he 
misappropriated it, which is the distinction between larceny and 
embezzlement; whether he obtained title to it or just possession of 
. the property, which is the distinction between larceny by bailee and 
obtaining goods and services under false pretenses; and whether the 
false representation was a visible token, symbol or device, which is 
the distinction between obtaining goods or services under false pre-
tenses and confidence game. 
(2) The criminal intent required for each of the present 
crimes varies. For example, the present crime of larceny requires 
the intent to deprive the owner permanently of his property. If the 
actor did not intend to keep the property permanently but intended to 
return it, he is not guilty of larceny. (A special situation, "joy-
riding," is treated separately in the present and proposed law (see 
proposed section 40-8-2). Joyriding requires an intent to depriye 
the owner temporarily of his property.) In embezzlement, the intent 
to return the property is not a defense to prosecution, even though 
that intent existed at the time of the conversion. All that is re-
quired in embezzlement is a fraudulent or criminal conversion. It is 
well established Colorado law that only a person with custody of 
property can commit larceny of it. In addition, the larceny by bailee 
provision covers larceny by persons in possession of the property. 
The result is that, although each has the same intent, one person is 
guilty and another is not guilty, depending on the section under which 
he is prosecuted. 
(3) A number of the present sections were necessitated by the 
fact that the subject matter of larceny, i.e., the property which 
could be stolen, had been limited at common law to personal goods of 
another, so that deeds to land, things which were affixed to l~nd, 
and things which grew on the land were outside the scope of larceny. 
This has caused many specific enactments adding to the things which 
might be stolen. A partial list of special Colorado enactments in-
cludes: 
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40-5-3 Stealing of a Dog 
40-5-4 Stealing of Ore or Minerals from a Mine 
40-5-5 Stealing of Ore from a Reduction Mill 
40-5-6 Stealing Fixtures from a House 
40-5-7 Stealing from Realty 
40-5-8 Stealing Livestock 
40-5-9 Stealing a Motor Vehicle 
40-5-13 Larceny by Bailee 
40-5-14 Stealing Bedding, Furniture, etc., from a Lodging 
40-5-29 Shoplifting 
Embezzlement is not a common law offense. It is common law 
larceny extended by statute. Colorado statutes contain several 
embezzlement statutes, including: 
40-5-15 What Constitutes Embezzlement 
40-5-16 Embezzlement of Public Property 
40-5-17 Embezzlement by Public Officers 
40-5-18 Embezzlement by Carriers and Warehousemen 
40-5-19 Embezzlement of Landlord's Share of Crops 
In all, this proposed section replaces some 50 separate sec-
tions which define and provide penalties for some type of "stealing" 
or "misappropriation. 11 
This proposed section can not be violated unless the actor's 
conduct is described in one paragraph of both subsections (1) and (2). 
Subsection (1) lists four methods which may be used to accomplish th~ 
misappropriation, and subsection (2) describes a state of mind which 
is either evident or presumed. 
Presumption of· the actor's intent is reflected in the manner 
in which he uses the stolen thing of value. Subsection (1) describes 
the required criminal act, and subsection (2) describes the required 
criminal state of mind. 
In subsection (1), property is defined as "anything of value" 
to be sure that its scope is as broad in stealing as it is elsewhere 
in the law, and the specific provisions are no longer needed. 
"Anything of value" is sufficiently broad in its coverage to 
include real and personal property, and tangible and intangible 
property. 
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Subsection (l)(a) covers a situation where, present Colorado 
larceny and embezzlement statutes are now applicable. This section 
deals with the problem of appropriation of property without the con-
sent of the owner or other authorization. The offense may be commit-
ted by a person snatching the property out of the owner's hands, such 
as a purse snatcher, or by a person entrusted with the property as 
agent, bailee or otherwise. It is immaterial what relationship to 
the owner or to the property the actor had. 
Subsection (l)(b) covers conduct which is now covered by 
confidence game and false pretenses statutes. If the deception is 
effective to cause the victim to part with anything of value, it is, 
in general, no defense that a reasonable person would not have been 
misled. The actor must intend to create an impression for the furpose. 
of inducing the owner to part with it. Deception can be accomp ished 
by the actor in reinforcing the victim's false belief, preventing the 
victim from acquiring information which could influence his decision, 
failing to disclose all pertinent information to the victim or by 
using symbols, tokens or any other visible instrument to deceive the 
victim. 
Subsection (l)(c) deals with situations where coercion rather 
than deception is the method employed to make the victim transfer his 
property. This method is covered by the present blackmail or extor-
tion statute. · 
The threat may be either express or implied. It is sufficient, 
for example, that the actor asks for money in exchange for his promise 
not to inflict physical harm, or in exchange for "protection" from 
harms where the actor intends to convey the impression that he will in 
some fashion instigate the harm from which he proposes to "protect" 
the·victim. 
The threatened harm may be lawful or unlawful. The actor may 
be privileged or even duty-bound to inflict the harm which he 
threatens; yet if he employs the threat of harm to coerce a transfer 
of property for his own benefit he clearly is guilty~ For example, 
a policeman who is under a duty to make an arrest threatens an arrest 
unless his victim pays him money. 
Threats need not be made especially to the actor. Threats can 
be threats to anyone. If the threat is in fact the effective means 
of compelling another to give up anything of value, the character of 
the relationship between the victim and the actor whom he chooses to 
protect is immaterial. Whether a threat to injure a third person, 
unrelated to the victim, was intended to intimidate or was effective for 
that purpose can be decided .by the trier of the facts. 
In addition to the threat of bodily harm, this section includes 
a threat to physical confinement, to commit any criminal offense, to 
accuse any person of a criminal offense, to expose any person to 
hatred, contempt or ridicule, and to harm a person's credit or business 
repute. 
Subsection (l)(d) incorporates the present crime of buying and 
receiving stolen goods. This subsection broadens the present crime by 
eliminating the nece:~sity that the property comes into the receiver's 
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hands from an act of burglary, larceny or robbery. Also, the present 
statute excludes from its coverage situations where the property 
transferred is valued at less th~n $50. T~is propos:d subs7ction 
includes anything of value. By incorporating the crime, this 
subsection makes it impossible to convict of two offenses based on the 
same transaction, which can happen under present law, where a person 
is held ~uilty as a principal to the original act of theft because he 
helped plan the offense, and also of a separate offense of receiving 
because he took his share of the proceeds. 
Subsection (2) requires the actor, after a thing of valYe has 
been misappropriated, to act either knowingly or intentionally in 
such a manner so as to deprive the owner of such thing of value. The 
actor must have either the intention to deprive permanently the owner 
of such thing of value or knowingly act in such a manner that he ex-
hibits a knowledge that his conduct will cause, in all likelihood, the 
owner to lose permanently such thing of value. The criminal state of 
mind in subsection (2)(aJ is permanent deprivation, while subsections 
(b) and (c) describe conduct which is engaged in knowingly and which 
presumes the intent of permanent deprivation. 
Subsections (3) and (4) provide penalties for the offense of 
theft. The grading of penalties is essentially the same as now pro-
vided in the larceny statute. The distinction between misdemeanor and 
felony punishment is determined by the value of the items taken and 
the frequency of the offenses. The value.distinction has been r~ised 
from $50 to $100, however, to reflect co?temporary values. 
Subsection (3) makes theft a high misdemeanor if the value of 
the thing misappropriated is $100 or less in value or the actor has 
committed theft two or more times within six months from the same 
victim and the value of all things taken does not exceed $100_-
Subsection (4) makes theft a low grade felony if the value of 
the thing taken exceeds $100 in value or the actor has committed theft 
two or more times within six months and the value of all things mis-
appropriated exceeds $100 dollars in value. 
Subsection (5) covers cases where the thing misappropriated, 
regardless of vaiue, is taken from the person of another. It is a 
restatement of the present law. Essentially, it is an act of "steal-
ing," without circumstances of force or violence as would constitute 
robbery, where the thing stolen is on the person on whom the theft is 
made. Nevertheless, taking something of value from a person involves 
some degree of danger to the victim which is not present during other 
theft offenses, and accordingly is punished more severely than other 
types of theft offenses. Pocket-picking is an example of conduct 
covered here. 
40-8-2. Joyriding. (1) Any person who knowingly takes pos-
session of, or drives, or propels, or takes away, any motor vehicle 
or craft, the property of another, without authority or consent of the 
owner thereof or his duly authorized agent, with the intent to 
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temporarily deprive the owner of the possession, use, or benefit of 
the same, or who knowingly aids, abets, or assists another in so 
doing, commits joyriding. 
(2) Any person who commits joyriding for the first time is 
guilty of a class misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person who commits joyriding a second or S\.lbsequent 
time is guilty of a class_ felony. 
Comment 
This section restates the present joyriding statute -- 13-13-
2, CRS 1963. 
ARTICLE 9. ROBBERY 
40-9-1. Simple robbery. Any person who takes anything of 
value from the person or presence of another, with the intent to de-
prive the owner permanently of his property or interest therein, by 
the use of force or by threatening the use of force commits simple 
robbery and is guilty of a class_ felony. 
Comment 
This proposed section proposes no major changes, and is• 
restatement of 40-5-1(1), CRS 1963. One minor change is recommended, 
that of stating the offender must have the intent to deprive perma-
nently the owner of his property. This is e.ssentially that required 
under the present statute: "Robbery is the felonious and violent 
t k . fl a 1.ng ••• 
40-9-2. Aggravated robbery. Any person who commits simple 
robbery and during the act of robbery: 
(1) Is armed with a dangerous weapon and intends to inflict 
bodily injury if resisted; 
(2) Inflicts bodily injury with a dangerous weapon; or 
(3) Has present an accomplice who •is armed with a dangerous 
weapon and who intends to inflict bodily injury if 
- 37 -
Comment 
resisted, commits aggravated robbery, and is guilty of 
a class_ felony. 
This proposed section replaces the armed or aggravated robbery 
provisions contained in the present law, 40-5-1(2), CRS 1963, and 
proposes no major changes. 
40-9-3. Sentencing. Any person convicted of robbery or 
aggravated robbery who is under the age of twenty-one years at the 
time of the offense, may be sentenced to confinement in the state re-
formatory, or the state penitentiary, in the discretion of the court; 
and, if sentenced to the state penitentiary, such person shall be 
deemed guilty of a class_ felony. 
Comment 
This section restates the special penalty clause of the present 
statute, 40-5-1(3), CRS 1963. However, it proposes that where the 
offender is under -·21 year of age at the time of the offense, rather 
than at the time of his conviction, he may be sentenced to the state 
reformatory. No felony penalty is provided for a reformatory sentence. 
All sentences to the state reformatory under the present law are for 
an indeterminate number of years. 
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PART C. OFFENSES AFFECTING PUBLIC DECENCY 
SUB-PART I. SEXUAL OFFENSES 
ARTICLE 10. RAPE 
40-10-1 • .fi!.2!. (1) Any male who has sexual intercourse with 
a female not his wife· commits rape if: 
(a) He compels her to submit by force or by threat of im-
minent death, serious bodily harm, extreme pain or kid-
naping, to be inflicted on anyones or 
(b) He has substantially impaired her power to appraise or 
control her conduct by administering or employing without 
her knowledge drugs, intoxicants or other means for the 
purpose of preventing resistance; or 
(c) The female is unconscious; or 
(d) The female is less than 12 
,·, 
years old. 
(2) R~pe is a class felony unless in the course thereof 
the· off6nder inflicts serious bodily harm upon anyone, or the victim 
was not a voluntary social companion of the offender upon the occas-
ion of the crime and had not previous! y permitted him sexua_l liberties., 
in which cases the offense is a class --- felony. 
Comment 
Under this section, a ma.n must have sexual intercourse with a 
woman he 'knows is not his wife under circumstances where it is clear 
that she has not consented to intercourse and where her resistance is 
overcome by the use or threat of force. or she is unable to give 
effective consent because she lacks mental capacity or responsibility. 
Restricting liability to males under this section does not preclude 
the conviction of a female who acts as an accomplice, however. Forcible 
sexual conduct, other than intercourse is covered under proposed 
article 11. 
The situations covered by subsection (l)(a) are the classic 
rape cases. This subsection substantially restates subsection (3) and 
a major portion of subsection (4) of the present law. The victim's 
resistance must be overcome either by force or by a threat of death, 
serious bodily harm, extreme pain or kidnaping to be inflicted upon 
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anyone. The phrase "to be inflicted upon anyone" extends the range of 
threats of harm to a member of the victim's family, her friends, or 
anyone. Whether the threat is sufficient to undermine her will to 
resist and whether the threat is in fact a "bargain," however, must 
be determined by the trier of the facts. 
Subsection (l)(b) covers situations now covered by subsec-
tions (6) and (7) and a portion of subsection (4) of the present 
statute. Cases in which the victim is unwittingly drugged or intoxi-
cated should be treated as being equal to forcible rape because, in 
both cases, the victim's will to resist is undermined. 
Subsection (l)(c) covers situations where the female is un-
conscious. Her unconsciousness may or may not be brought about by 
the offender, but she is powerless to consent or resist. 
Subsection (l)(d) covers the statutory rape situation now 
covered by section (1) of the present law, which requires the female 
to be under 18 and the male over 18 years of age. Consent of the 
female is immaterial under the present law. This proposed section 
covers only intercourse with a child under the age of 12. The age of 
the offender and whether or not the child gave consent are immaterial 
facts. Sexual activity involving adolescents and adolescents and 
adults is covered in proposed article 13. 
Subsection (2) provides two penalties for rape. A lesser. 
penalty is to be imposed if the rapist does not harm the victim or 
anyone, or if the victim has previously permitted the rapist sexual 
liberties and was at the time of the offense a voluntary social 
companion of the rapist. The most severe penalty should only be im-
posed in situations which are the most brutal or shocking, and evoke 
a threat to public security, e.g., where the victim suffers physical 
injury or where in effect she is attacked by a stranger. A lesser 
penalty should be imposed in the latter case where the offender com-
mits forcible rape upon a female with whom he has already been inti-
mate. In this situation, there is clearly less outrage to the female 
sense of virtue which is the basis for the offense of rape. 
40-10-2. Gross sexual imposition. Any male who has sexual 
intercourse with a female not his wife commits gross sexual imposition 
and is guilty of a class __ _ felony if: 
(1) He compels her to submit by any threat that would prevent 
resistance by a woman of ordinary resolution; or 
(2) He knows that she suffers from a mental disease or defect 
which renders her incapable of appraising the nature of 
her conduct; or 
(3) He knows that she is unaware that a sexual act is being 
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Comment 
committed upon her or that she· s-ubmi ts because she 
falsely supposes that he is her husband. 
This section deals with sexual intercourse under circumstances 
which are not considered as aggravating as those covered in the pro-
posed rape section. Forcible sexual activity other than intercourse 
is covered under proposed article 11. · 
Subsection (1) covers situations wher~ the male compels her 
to submit to intercourse by threats, other than threats of death, 
serious bodily harm, intense pain or kidnaping to be inflicted on 
anyone. Lesser threats of harm to be inflicted only upon the victim 
warrant a lesser penalty than that provided for in subsection (l)(a) 
of the proposed rape section. 
Subsection (2) of this proposed section deals with sexual 
intercourse under circumstances in which the victim is unable to give 
. effective consent because of her _mental incapacity. It must be proved 
that the woman was so seriously mentally ill or deficient, that her 
mental illness or deficiency rendered her incapable of understanding 
the nature of the act, and that the offender knew of her incapacity 
in order to obtain a conviction under this subsection. Proof that the 
offender knew of her incapacity will usually be made by showing the 
circumstances in which the act was accomplished. If the woman was an 
inmate of an institution for the mentally ill or deficient, that in 
most cases will be sufficient proof that the offender knew of her 
incapacity. 
Intercourse under these conditions does not warrant the 
imposition of the heavy penalty for rape. This type of intercourse 
does not lead to a general sense of insecurity in the community. as 
does forcible rape, and the harm done is nqt as great, if outrage to 
the feelings of the victim is considered the essential harmfulness of 
non consensual sexual intercourse. 
Subsection (3) covers situations where intercourse is ac-
complished by means other than by force, and where consent of the 
victim is present. A female who submits to intercourse but is unaware 
that a sexual act is being committed upon her is covered in this 
subsection. This situation rarely occurs a~d usually results from a 
doctor-patient relationship. Where a doctor has intercourse with the 
victim who has been led to believe that she must submit to intercourse 
as necessary treatment, the female is not forcibly ravished, although 
she has been deceived. Subsection (3) also covers situations where 
the offender impersonates the victim's husband, and where the offender 
stages a mock marriage in reliance on which the victim engages in 
sexual intercourse with him. 
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ARTICLE 11. DEVIATE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE 
40-11-1. Deviate sexual intercourse by force or imposition. 
Any person who engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another 
person, or who causes another to engage in deviate sexual intercourse, 
commits deviate sexual intercourse by force or imposition and is 
guilty of a class __ _ felony if: 
(1) He compels the other person to participate by force or 
by threat of imminent death, serious bodily harm, extreme 
pain or kidnaping, to be inflicted on anyone; or 
(2) He has substantially impaired the other person's power 
to appraise or control his conduct, by administering or 
employing without the knowledge of the other person 
drugs, intoxicants or other means for the purpose of 
preventing resistance; or 
(3) The other person is unconscious; or 
(4) The other person is less than 12 years old. 
40-11-2. Deviate sexual intercourse by other imposition. 
Any person who engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another 
person, or who causes another to engage in deviate sexual intercourse, 
commits deviate sexual intercourse by other imposition and is guilty 
of a class felony if: 
(1) He compels the other person to participate by any threat 
that would prevent resistance by a person of ordinary 
resolution; or 
(2) He knows that the other person suffers from a mental 
disease or defect which renders him incapable of apprais-
ing the nature of his conduct; or 
(3) He knows that the other person submits because he is una-
ware that a sexual act is being committed upon him. 
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Comment 
Sections 40-11-1 and 40-11-2 replace Colorado's present 
crime against nature statute. In general, these proposed sections 
parallel the proposed rape and gross sexual imposition sections. 
Present Colorado law is broader in its scope than is proposed here in 
that it extends its coverage into a married couple's bedroom when 
there is a departure from an accepted standard of sexual conduct. 
By paralleling sections 40-10-1 and 40-10-2, these deviate sexual 
intercourse sections proposed here exclude from their coverage all 
deviate sexual practices not involving force, adult corruption of 
minors, or conduct offensive to the public. - The scope of these sec-
tions is limited to unnatural sexual intercourse accomplished by force 
or its equivalent. Conduct other than unnatural sexual intercourse is 
covered by other proposed sections. The scope of these sections 
covers unnatural sexual intercourse between two persons of the same 
sex, between two persons of the opposite sex, and between a person 
and an animal. Proposed section 40-13-1 covers situations where the 
victim is 12 years of age and older but has not reached majority, and 
the offender is at least four years older than the victim. 
Penalties provided in these two proposed sections are less 
than those provided in proposed sections 40-10-.l and 40-10-2. The 
reduction is justifiable on the ground that, in most cases, the harm 
done to a woman by forcible, normal intercourse is graver than that 
involved in homosexual or deviate heterosexual assault. Also, the 
possibility of pregnancy, the physical danger in case abortion is 
required, and the impairment of her marital eligibility are factors 
that need not be considered here. 
40-11-3. Definition. "Deviate sexual intercourse" means 
sexual intercourse per os or per anum between human beings who are 
not husband and wife, and any form of sexual intercourse with an 
animal. 
Comment 
Deviate sexual intercourse is defined in proposed section 
40-11-3 as mouth-genital and anus-genital intercourse between human 
beings, and any form of intercou:se between a human being and a~ 
animal. Sexual intercourse, defined elsewhere.by statute, requ~res 
penetration however slight. It does not require emission. This 
definition includes only those acts of conduct which simulate normal 
intercourse. Indecent assaults that do not take thi~ special form of 
mock intercourse are covered in other proposed sections. 
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ARTICLE 12. SEXUAL ASSAULT 
40-12-1. Sexual assault. Any person who subjects another 
not his spouse to any sexual contact commits sexual assault and is 
guilty of a class misdemeanor, if: 
Comment 
(1) He knows that the contact is offensive to the other 
person; or 
(2) He knows that the other person suffers from a mental 
disease or defect which renders him or her incapable of 
appraising the nature of his or her conduct; or 
(3) He knows that the other person is unaware that a sexual 
act is being committed; or 
(4) He has substantially impaired the other person's power 
to appraise or control his or her conduct by admini$ter-
ing or employing without the other's knowledge drugs, 
intoxicants or other means for the purpose of preventing 
resistance; or 
(5) The other person is less than 21 years old and the of-
fender is his guardian or is otherwise responsible for 
general supervision of. his welfare; or 
(6) The other person is in custody of law or detained in a 
hospital or other institution and the offender has 
supervisory or disciplinary authority over him. 
This proposed section defines circumstances under which a 
sexual assault has been committed. Under present Colorado law, a 
person who commits a sexual assault upon another who is 16 years of 
age or older is prosecuted under the present assault and battery 
section. 
The circumstances enumerated under this section are intended 
to cover all situations wherein, if a sexual contact is made, an of-
fense has been committed. Each circumstance requires the element of 
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non consent. Under subsection (1), the offender must know that the 
sexual contact is offensive to the victim •. Under subsection (3), the 
offender must know that the sexual contact is known only to himself 
or to others but not to the victim. Under the remaining circumstances, 
a presumption is made that the victim is aware of th~ contact but is 
incapable of resisting; either the victim has not consented or the 
offender, in some manner other than by force, has overcome the victim's 
ability to resist. 
The definition of what constitutes a sexual contact is con-
tained in proposed section 40-12-3. 
A married party may not be convicted of sexually assaulting 
his or her spouse, unless the contact involves another party, either 
human or animal, and the spouse-victim has not given his or her consent. 
Since this section requires non consent of the victim, consensual 
homosexual as well as heterosexual non intercourse, and non deviate 
intercourse relations do not fall within its scope. This exclusion 
parallels other sections defining sexual offenses and reflects the 
committee's decision not to punish consensual sexual relations between 
adults, regardless of the gender of the parties involved and the type 
of sexual activity, unless the activity is open and notorious. 
Acts of sexual aggression, other than sexual intercourse and 
deviate sexual intercourse, involving an adolescent or an adult and a 
child or two adolescents whose ages are at least five years apart, 
regardless of the gender of the parties, are covered under the proposed 
sexual assault on children section. 
40-12-2. Sexual assault on children. Any person who subjects 
another not his spouse to any sexual contact commits sexual assault on 
children and is guilty of a class felony, if: 
Comment 
(1) The other person is less than twelve years old; or 
(2) The other person is less than sixteen years old and the 
offender is at least four years older than the other 
person. 
The conduct which constitutes an offense under this proposed 
section is treated under present law as 1) an assault (an unlawful 
attempt coupled with the present ability to commit a violent injury on 
the person of another (40-2-33, CRS 1963)) on a child under 16 years 
of age and the taking of indecent and improper lib7rties with the child, or 2) the enticement, allurement or persuasion of any child 
under the age of 16 into any room, or office, or to any other place for 
the purpose of taking immodest, immoral, and indecent liberties with 
the child or 3) the taking of immodest, immoral, and indecent liber-
ties with'the person of a child under 16 at any place (40-2-32, CRS 
- 45 -
1963). Thus, under the present law, the victim must be under 16 while 
the offender may be of any age, although it is conceivable that the 
offender could be the same age as or younger than the victim. The 
victim's consent or lack of consent is immaterial. 
This recommended section proposes several substantial changes 
in defining what constitutes an offense in this area of "indecent" 
activity. 
(1) As defined under proposed section 40-12-3, actual contact 
of the victim, either directly or indirectly by the offender, must be 
accomplished. "Enticement, allurement, and persuasion" are not ele-
ments of the offense as proposed in this section, and, if considered 
substantially enough conduct to constitute an overt act which, unless 
frustrated, would culminate in the commission of a sexual contact, 
will be prosecuted under the general criminal attempt sections as an 
attempt to commit sexual assault on children. 
(2) No offense has been committed under the proposed section 
unless the victim is under 16 and the offender is at least four years 
older. (Subsection (2) which covers situations in which the victim is 
11 years or younger and the offender is any age is discussed below.) 
Thus, if the victim is 13 and the offender is 16, or if the victim is 
15 and the offender is 18, no offense has been committed. 
It is the committee's intention not to punish sexual activity, 
other than sexual intercourse and deviate sexual intercourse, which is 
engaged in by consenting adolescents, irrespective of whether the 
activity is homosexual or heterosexual in nature. The committee's 
intent is based on the following: 
(a) The basis of the present offense, retained as the basis 
for the present offense, is i) the attack on the moral standards of 
the community, and, perhaps more importantly, ii) the danger of the 
possibility of distortion of the psychosexual growth of a child. 
Neither of these bases are present in any significant degree by sexual 
activity between consenting adolescents, perhaps prompted more by 
normal curiosity rather than any other reason. 
(b) · It is imperative that the offender not be, in actuality, 
the victim. Some children and adolescents are more promiscuous than 
others. Under the present law, an offender need be any age but the 
victim must be under 16 to constitute an offense. A sexual contact 
made by a 35 or 40-year-old paedophiliac upon a 15-year-old adolescent 
should not be considered by the law as equal to the mutual, consensual 
fondling practiced by a 16-year-old and his 15-year-old date. Con-
ceivably, a situation may arise wherein the victim is 15 and the of-
fender 13, and, in such a situation, it is difficult to decide exactly 
who is the "victim" and who is the "victimizer." Indeed, it is even 
possible that the offender, in actuality, is the real "victim." 
Consequently, it was decided that an offense is committed only where 
there is a significant age differential between the victim and the 
offender, and this differential, coinciding with that ~ecommended in 
the Model Penal Code, was set at four years. The committee does not 
intend to protect the immature from the immature, where no physical 
harm results. 
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(3) If the victim is 11 years of age or younger and, with or 
without consent, is sexually contacted by another, irrespective of the 
other's age, an offense has been committed under subsection (2). It 
is realistic to consider a child not yet.having reached complete 
adolescence as the true victim of an assault. 
40-12-3. Definition. As used in this article, sexual contact 
is any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of the person of 
another for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of 
either party. 
Comment 
The key to the proposed provisions on sexual assault and sexual 
assault on children is this proposed definition of sexual contact. 
This definition requires actual contact; indecent exposure, 
abusive and obscene proposals, and other offensive gestures and lan-
·guage are treated elsewhere in this code. Sexual contact is the 
touching of another's sexual organs or other intimate parts of the 
human body. This definition, however, is sufficiently broad enough t~ 
include the touching of another's sexual parts through clothing as 
well as removing undergarments. Also, it includes the subjecting of 
another to sexual contact with an animal. 
The touching must be for the purpose or intention of arousing 
or gratifying sexual desire of either the victim or the offender. 
Sexual intercourse and deviate sexual intercourse are treated else-
where, if accomplished under circumstances constituting an offense in 
this code, although these acts do fall within the scope of touching 
another for sexual gratification. Any touching of another without the 
intent or purpose of arousing or satisfying sexual desire is not a 
sexual contact and is outside the scope of this definition. 
Present Colorado statutory law does not define the term "inde-
cent liberties." However, case law has declared that "indecent" is 
something that is unfit to be seen and is offensive to modesty and 
delicacy. The common sense of the community is sufficient to apply 
the statute to each particular case, and point unmistakably what 
particular conduct is rendered criminal by it (44 Colo. 525). 
ARTICLE 13. CORRUPTION OF MINORS AND SEDUCTION 
40-13-1. Corruption of minors and seduction. Any person who 
does any of the following commits corruption of minors and seduction: 
(1) Any male who has sexual intercourse with a female not 
his wife, or any person who engages in deviate sexual 
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intercourse or causes another to engage in deviate 
sexual intercourse, if: 
(a) The other person is less than sixteen years old 
and the offender is at least four years older than 
the other person; or 
(b) The other person is less than twenty-one years 
old and the offender is his guardian or otherwise 
responsible for general supervision of his wel-
fare: or 
(c) The other person is in custody of law or detained 
in a hospital or other institution and the offender 
has supervisory or disciplinary authority over 
him; or 
(d) The other person is a female who is induced to 
participate by a promise of marriage which the 
offender does not mean to perform. 
(2) Any female who has sexual intercourse or engages in de-
viate sexual intercourse with a male not her husband, if: 
(a) The male is less than eighteen years old; or 
(b) The male is of good repute, and the female is a 
prostitute. 
An offense under subsection (l)(a) is a class_ felony. 
Otherwise an offense under this section is a class misdemeanor. 
Comment 
This section proposes to define conduct involving sexual inter-
course and deviate sexual intercourse which is accomplished under 
circumstances not considered as aggravating as those contained in the 
proposed sections on rape, gross sexual imposition, deviate sexual 
intercourse by force or imposition, and deviate sexual intercourse by 
other imposition. This section, which defines circumstances under 
which the less serious acts of intercourse are accomplished, is the 
least serious sexual offense involving intercourse, other than 
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prostitution (commercial intercourse) and adultery and fornication 
(where intercourse is open and notorious and, in effect, constitutes 
an offense of public indecency). 
Intercourse under this section must be accomplished with 
mutual consent, and it is the presence of consent which reduces the 
penalty to that of a misdemeanor in the majority of the subsections. 
Intercourse under this section may be either normal or deviate. 
Since consent is an element, there appears no reason to make a dis-
tinction between the two types of intercourse in establishing this 
section's penalty. 
Subsection (l)(a), in effect, replaces Colorado's present 
statutory rape provision, i.e., an act of sexual intercourse with an 
unmarried female who is under, and the male who is over, the age of 
18 years (40-2-25(l)(b), CRS 1963). It also replaces 40-2-25(l)(j), 
i.e., where both the male and the female are under the age of 18, and 
a portion of 40-9-7, CRS 1963, which defines the offense of seduction, 
i.e., any male who, without promise of marriage, seduces and has 
illicit connection with an unmarried female of previous chaste char-
acter under the age of 16 years. Respectively, the maximum terms of 
imprisonment for the commission of the foregoing acts of intercourse, 
irrespective of the presence of the female's consent, are imprisonment 
for life, five years, and ten years. The minimum terms of imprison-
ment are considerably less and depend, in addition to the leniency of 
the court, on the age and reputation of the offender: commitment for 
an indeterminate term to the reformatory, commitment for an indeter-
minate term to the Lookout Mountain School for Boys or the Mount View 
School for Girls, and commitment to the penitentiary for one day. 
Since the basis of the offense of statutory rape or statutory 
seduction is the victimization of the immature, it appears extremely 
harsh to subject a 19-year-old male who has consensual sexual inter-
course, normal or deviate, with his 17-year-old sweetheart to a 
possible imprisonment in the penitentiary for life. Likewise, it 
appears equally harsh to subject a 16-year-old male who has consensual 
sexual intercourse with his 15-year-old "steady" to a possible $1,000 
fine and five-year term of imprisonment (third degree rape), or to a 
possible ten-year term of imprisonment if, prior to the act of inter-
course, she was of chaste repute. The committee believes that not 
only are these possible maximum penalties unrealistic and that, in 
actuality, they are seldom imposed, but the conduct described should 
not be considered criminal. As stated elsewhere, it is not the com-
mittee's belief that criminal law should protect the immature from the 
immature. The best way to avoid this unreasonable protection and, at 
the same time, protect the immature from being exploited by the mature 
is to provide an age differential between the victim and the victimizer. 
Identical to the number of years set under the proposed sexual assault 
on children section, the committee has set the age differential under 
this section at four years. 
Under this proposed subsection, a low grade felony has been 
committed, if the female is 15 years old and the male 19. If the 
female is 16 years of age and the male is of any age, no offense has 
been committed. However, if the consensual intercourse was accomplished 
openly and notoriously (fornication) or falls within the circumstances 
included ·within the scope of other subsections of this section, a 
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misdemeanor offense has been committed. 
Special bars to conviction under the present seduction statute, 
i.e., marriage of the offender and his victim is contracted prior to 
conviction, testimony of the seduced female is unsupported by other 
evidence, and the information is filed later than two years after the 
act of intercourse, are discussed under other sections in sub-part I, 
Sexual Offenses. 
Under subsection (l}(b} the victim must be 20 years of age or 
younger and the offender, regardless of his or her age, must be the 
victim's guardian or otherwise responsible for the general supervision 
of welfare of the victim. A father who has sexual intercourse with 
his daughter who is under 21 years is also subject to prosecution 
under the proposed aggravated incest section and another who has sexual 
intercourse with her son who is under 21 years is also subject to 
prosecution under the proposed incest section. Cohabitation, wherein 
either normal or deviate intercourse is presumed, may also be prose-
cuted under the respective incest sections or this section. Further-
more, any guardian, if he or she is an ancestor, a brother or sister, 
or an uncle, aunt, nephew, or niece of the whole blood, is liable for 
prosecution under this or the proposed incest sections. Other non-
related guardians must be prosecuted under this section. 
Consensual intercourse under this subsection is not considered 
as serious as the circumstance defined under subsection (l)(a) in that 
the victim's age will range from 16 to 20 years. If the victim's age 
ranges from 12 to 15 years and the guardian's is at least four years 
older than the victim, prosecution may be pursued under this subsection 
or subsection (l)(a). 
Subsection (l)(c) is similar to (l)(b) in that the offender has 
authority over the victim. In this subsection, the age of the victim 
is immaterial. 
Subsection (l)(d) defines a specific type of circumstance 
under which an act of intercourse is an offense that is similar to 
that contained in the present code, i.e., the seduction and illicit 
connection, under promise of marriage, with an unmarried female of 
previous chaste character, irrespective of the age of either party 
concerned (40-9-7, CRS 1963). 
Under both the present and proposed sections, prosecution must 
prove that it was the male's promise of marriage which induced the 
female to yield. For this reason, the committee agreed that a:promise 
of marriage intentionally made in bad faith, and not, as the present 
law requires, a promise of marriage whether made,in good or bad faith, 
should be required. The latter type of promise seems to open the door 
to the possibility of blackmail. 
This proposed subsection makes no mention of the previous 
reputation held by the victim. Requiring a victim to be of chaste 
character prior to the act of intercourse that is induced by the 
promise of marriage, which is the excuse for prosecution, seems to 
indicate that an "experienced" woman cannot be deceived by a false 
promise of marriage. Moreover, it seems to indicate that no harm is 
accomplished if the female held an unchaste reputation previous to 
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the act. The committee agreed that sexual intercourse resulting from 
deception should be the basis for the offense, rather than intercourse 
with a female of good repute. It should be the method in which inter-
course was induced rather than the result which occurred; the "how" 
rather than the "what." Also, this proposed section does not require 
the female to be unmarried. She may in fact be married, legally 
separated or divorced. And, if she is married and the intercourse 
induced by the offender's false promise, the offender may be prose-
cuted under this section or under the proposed adultery section. 
Because of the difficulty that may be encountered by a de-
fendant in1proving that his promise was made in good faith, and be-
cause a district attorney may not know for certain whether he is 
prosecuting a legitimate seducer or a "victim" of a disappointed and 
angry ex-fiance, the penalty of this offense has been reduced to the 
misdemeanor level. It is common knowledge than many seductions end 
in marriage, and the majority of seductions, whether ending in marriage 
or otherwise, do not come to the attention of law enforcement author-
ities. 
Marriage of the victim and the seducer, subsequent to the 
. information or indictment but prior to conviction, bars a conviction 
under the present law. Although a marriage during this time seems to 
indicate a promise made in good faith, it also seemingly gives a 
felony incentive to the seducer to marry his victim. Moreover, it 
provides an angry father an opportunity to retaliate against the_ 
seducer for the unfavorable publicity given his family and daughter 
by denying to his daughter his permission to marry, albeit she and her 
seducer wish to marry. For these reasons, marriage as a bar to con-
viction is omitted in this proposed subsection. 
Subsection (2) is a restatement of the present offense de-
fined in 40-2-25(k), CRS 1963. 
ARTICLE 14. PROVISIONS GENERALLY AP~LICABLE 
TO ARTICLES 10 THROUGH 13 
40-14-1. Mistake as to age. Whenever in articles 10 through 
13 the criminality of conduct depends on a child's being below the 
age of twelve, it is no defense that the actor did not know the 
child's age, or reasonably believed the child to be older than twelve. 
When criminality depends on the child's being below a critical age 
other than twelve, it is a defense for the actor to prove that he 
reasonably believed the child to be above the critical age. 
40-14- 2. Spouse Ielationships. Whenever in articles 10 
through 13 the definition of an offense excludes conduct with a spouse, 
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the exclusion shall be deemed to extend to persons living as man and 
wife, regardless of the legal status of their relationship. The 
exclusion shall be inoperative as respects spouses living apart under 
a decree of judicial separation. Where the definition of an offense 
excludes conduct with a spouse or conduct by a woman, this shall not 
preclude conviction of a spouse or woman as accomplice in a sexual 
act which he or she causes another person, not within the exclusion, 
to perform. 
40-14-3. Sexually promiscuous complainants. It is a defense 
to prosecution under article 13 and sections 40-12-1(5), 40-12-1(6), 
and 40-12-2(2) for the alleged offender to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the alleged victim had, ~rior to the time of the 
offense charged, engaged promiscuously in sexual relations with 
others. 
40-14-4. Prompt c:omplaint. No prosecution may be instituted 
or maintained under this article unless the alleged offense was 
brought to the notice of public authority within three months of its 
occurrence or, where the alleged victim was less than sixteen years 
old or otherwise incompetent to make complaint, within three months 
after a parent, guardian or other competent person specially interested 
in the victim learns of the offense. 
40-14-5. Testimony of ~omplainants. No person shall be con-
victed of any felony under articles 10 through l3 upon the uncorroborated 
testimony of the alleged victim. Corroboration may be circumstantial. 
In any prosecution before a jury for an offense under articles 10 through 
13, the jury shall be instructed to evaluate the testimony of a victim 
or complaining witness with special care in view of the emotional in-
volvement of the witness and the difficulty of determining the truth 
with respect to alleged sexual activities carried out in private. 
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Comment 
Generally, all sections contained in articles 10, 11, 12, and 
13 of this proposed code are based on those sections recommended in 
the Model Penal Code, Proposed Official Draft.l Article 14 is also 
based on the Model Penal Code's provisions. 
Mistake as to age. Concerning this defense, the Model Penal 
Code's reporters commented that: 
It is generally provided or held under present 
law that even a reasonable mistake as to the age of 
the girl does not exculpate or mitigate the offense. 
Ploscowe has severely criticized this ·1egislative 
and judicial attitude in cases where the girl is over 
10 years old, on two gro~nds: (1) over the age of 10, 
the sexual act begins to lose its abnormality and 
physical danger to the victim; (2) bona-fide mistakes 
in age can be made more easily by men who are not 
essentially dangerous where the girl is physically 
more developed. He recommends that a reasonable be-
lief that the girl was above the age of consent be 
permitted as a defense to· the charge of "statutory 
rape." 
Lfhis sectio,n? ••• follows existing law in deny-
ing the defense of mistake as to age, when the 
victim is in fact under 10, for the reason that any 
error that is at all likely to be made would still 
have the young girl victim far below the age for sex-
ual pursuit by normal males • 
.b\lso, under this sectio,n? ••• the actor 
escapes even third degree liability if he reasonably 
believed the girl to be over 16. Pursuit of females 
who appear to be over 16 betokens no abnormality but 
only a defiance of religious and social conventions 
which appear to be fairly widely disregarded.2 
The committee adopted this provision recommended in the Model 
Penal Code but, where the criminality of conduct depended on the child 
being below the age of 10, the committee agreed that this minimum age 
should be raised to 12. 
Spouse Relationships. In explaining the justification for 
this section, the Model Penal Code's reporters stated that: 
Coercion of a wife to submit to conjugal embrace 
is not rape under existing law. The husband may, 
however, be convicted as an accomplice in the rape of 
l. Model Penal Code, American Law Institute, Philadelphia, Proposed 
Official Draft, May, 1962. 
2. Model Penal Code, American Law Institute, Philadelphia, Tentative 
Draft No. 4, April 1955, p. 253. 
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his wife, where he compels or 'helps compel her to 
submit to another man. In England a husband probably 
may be convicted as a principal on a count of common 
assault upon his wife for having intercourse with her 
against her will. A 1949 English decision held that 
a judicial separation order containing a non-cohabi-
tation provision revoked the marital consent of the 
wife, making a husband liable for rape. The mere 
filing of a divorce petition, which is in the process 
of being heard, will not open the door to a rape con-
viction in England. A related problem arises where 
the parties are living together as husband and wife 
although not legally married. These problems are re-
solved,in the text by defining "wife" as including a 
woman living with the accused as his wife, regardless 
of the legal validity of their marital status, but 
not including a woman living apart under a decree of 
judicial separation. Under the proposed statute a 
rape prosecution is not possible where the spouses 
have been living apart without benefit of a judicial 
order. We take this position because of the substan-
tial possibility of consent in the resumption of 
sexual relations in this situation, coupled with the 
special danger of fabricated accusations. 
Under the general provisions of this Code there 
could be no liability for rape unless the accused 
knew that the victim was not his wife or was reckless 
in this regard. Some such requirement seems important 
particularly in cases where rape liability can be 
imposed for consensual relations, e.g., with girls 
below the age of 16. A man who married a young girl, 
without knowing that she was already married to 
another, might find himself charged with statutory 
rape for sleeping with his supposed wife. The ques-
tion is not often explicitly dealt with in present. 
law; but the new Wisconsin Code, for example, speci-
fies that the man must know that the woman is not his 
wife. 
Lfhis sectio,n7 ••• takes care of situations where 
the accessorial liability of a husband for rape of 
his wife is not otherwise clear, i.e., where the 
actual perpetrator is an unwilling participant. Under 
the reasoning that threat of violence or other com-
pulsion which negatives female acquiescence in inter-
course ought to be punishable, it would make little 
difference whether the actual penetration was accom-
plished by the actor or by another functioning as 
the actor's tool. Where the actor is the husband and 
his own penetration would not be punishable, the de-
gradation of the marriage relationship brought about 
by forcing his wife to have intercourse with another 
man is sufficient to remove his immunity and to sug-
gest that outrage to the female sense of virtuP which 
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is a basis for the offense of rape.3 
The committee agreed with this reasoning and, accordingly, adopted 
this section. 
Sexually Promiscuous Complainants. This proposed section 
broadens the defense now available under the present Colorado seduc-
tion statute, 40-9-7. CRS 1963, and applys it to all sections of 
articles 10 through 13. Under t~e present Colorado seduction statute, 
no conviction can be had unless the victim was of "previous chaste 
character." Chastity is also material under other "corruption" statutes, 
including 40-9-8 and 40-9-9, CRS 1963. Again, the committee agreed with 
the reasoning of the Model Penal Code's reporters: 
At common law, prior unchastity of the female 
was not a defense to either forceful or "statutory" 
rape; a minority of American jurisdictions make the 
female's virtue an issue in prosecutions for consens-
ual intercourse with female children. Virtue, in 
this connection, is likely to be defined as absence 
of previous sexual intercourse. In Pennsylvania, the 
defendant is guilty only of fornication if the girl 
under 16 was "not of good repute." 
Inquiries of this character may be justified 
in cases involving older adolescent girls where the 
essence of the offense is the defendant's corruption 
of innocent but capable females. If, however, we 
proceed on the hypothesis that girls under 16 lack 
capacity for judgment in this area, it is something 
of a farce to inquire into their virtue. Previous 
sexual experience in this situation might well be-
token previous victimization, which should not be a 
defense to a subsequent victimizer. However, one can 
envision cases of precocious 14 year old girls and 
even prostitutes of this age who might themselves be 
the victimizers •••• It is believed that in the rare 
instance of prostitution or promiscuity in girls 
under 10, the aberration evidenced by the male in 
his desire for gratification with the child, is a 
sufficient menace to the community to warrant the 
penalty irrespective of the abnormal sex habits of 
the girl.4 
Present seduction legislation commonly requires 
that the woman be of "previously chaste character" 
or "innocent and virtuous"; e.g., Minnesota, North 
Carolina. These terms are generally construed to 
mean the real moral qualities of a woman; she must 
be of good conduct and pure thought. This does not 
necessarily mean, however, that she must be a virgin 
3. Ibid., pp. 244-246. 
4. "fbid., p. 254. 
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in the physical sense, for a woman once fallen and 
now reformed may be "chaste" within the meaning of 
the statutes. A minority of the sample jurisdictions 
adopt the test of the woman's "reputation" for 
morality rather than her physical virginity or actual 
chaste character; e.g., Indiana, New Jersey 
The rationale of these requirements would ap-
pear to be either that an "experienced" woman cannot 
be easily imposed upon, i.e., that her story is 
unworthy of belief, or that no important "harm" is 
done to such a victim. The correlation between 
credibility and chastity is uncertain; it may even 
be that emotional factors attending an initial ex-
perience involve a special tendency to distortion. 
In any event, cross-examination and the requirement 
of corroboration would appear sufficient safeguards 
on this account. "Harm" of the sort which is our 
present concern, can be done to those who have had 
previous sexual experience; the girl once seduced 
may be the readier victim of him who now proposes 
marriage. Also, deterrent and reformative consider-
ations would seem to call for the application of 
penal measures to the male who practices these de-
ceptions, regardless of his victim's character or 
reputation. In lieu of the virtue requirement there 
is proposed a defense against complaints by prosti-
tutes and the like. 
Although two-thirds of the sample states re-
quire that the woman be single, we recommend that 
this curcumstance not be made determinative. Indeed, 
if the actor was aware of her marital state, this 
might well be regarded as a matter of aggravation. 
In some cases, it is true, the fact that the woman 
was married may indicate that she could not have re-
lied on a promise of marriage which must be contingent 
on her divorce (as it might be contingent on his, 
were he married). But considering the frequency and 
ease of divorce in this country, there seems to be no 
justification for an absolute immunity for seduction 
of married women on promise of marriage.5 
Prompt Complaint. The present Colorado seduction statute 
comes close to the scope of that which is proposed under this section. 
Section 40-9-7, CRS 1963, provides that "No conviction shall be had 
under this section ••• unless the indictment shall be found, or the 
information laid, within two years after the commission of the of-
fense." The committee, by adopting the Model Penal Code's recommended 
section, implicitly agreed with its purpose: 
At common law, "a strong, but not a conclusive 
presumption against a woman" was raised by her 
Ibid., pp. 259-260. -
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failing to complain of rape within a reasonable time 
after the fact. In the absence of statutory provi-
sion, failure to make prompt complaint is not a bar 
to prosecution for rape. However, evidence of prompt 
complaint is admissible to repel a suggestion that the 
complaint was insincere. Some jurisdictions have 
provided special statutes of limitation for rape 
cases, so that complaint would have to be made with-
in that limited time. The specific requirement under 
••• fthis sectio!!.7 ••• that the offense be brought to 
the attention of the public authorities within six 
months is an innovation in Anglo-American law. A 
prosecutor would, however, hesitate to institute pro-
secution on a stale complaint. The possibility that 
pregnancy might change a willing participant in the 
sex act into a vindictive complainant, as well as the 
sound reasoning that one who has, in fact, been sub-
jected to an act of violence will not delay in bring-
ing the offense to the attention of the authorities, 
are sufficient grounds for setting some time limit 
upon the right to complain. Likewise, the dangers of 
blackmail or psychopathy of the complainant make 
objective standards imperative. A specific possi~ 
bility of extension of time is made in the case of 
young children and incompetents for the obvious reason 
that if such individuals, under our rationale, do not 
possess the judgment and capacity necessary to become 
"willing" participants in an act of sexual inter-
course, their deficiency may also blind them to the 
need for complaint. Fear of parental anger or con-
fusion as to the significance of the act might well 
encourage silence in this situation. Hence the ••• 
ff.hreiJ ••• month period for complaint does not begin 
to run, for such individuals, until after a competent 
person specially interested in the victim learns of 
the offense.6 
Testimony of Comelainants. Again, the only related statutory 
provision to that which is proposed here is found in the present 
Colorado seduction statute, 40-9-7. CRS 1963, i.e •• "No conviction 
shall be had under this section on the testimony of the female 
seduced, unsupported by other evidence ••• " The reporters of the 
Model Penal Code justified this recommended section on the following 
grounds: 
Seduction statutes usually, and rape statutes 
occasionally, require ••• that the prosecutrix' story 
be corroborated, conviction being barred if her 
testimony is "unsupported by other evidence." Wig-
more disapproves of corroboration requirements on 
the ground that they are unnecessary because (1) 
jurors are naturally suspicious of such complaints, 
6. Ibid., pp. 264-265. 
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and (2) the purpose of the rule is already attained 
by the court's power to set aside a verdict for in-
sufficient evidence. This, he says, is being done 
in jurisdictions having no statutory rule upon the 
same evidence which would not be sufficient in 
jurisdictions having the statutory rule of corrobo-
ration. The most important issue raised by the dif-
ferences among present laws is whether corroboration 
in seduction cases shall be required only of the 
promise of marriage (e.g., Missouri, Pennsylvania), 
or of all the material elements of the offense (e.g., 
Indiana). For example, New York's statute says the 
testimony of the woman must be supported by other 
evidence, but decisions have held this to require 
corroboration of the promise of marriage and the 
intercourse only; there is no need for corroboration 
that the girl is single or that she is chaste. Some-
times under the statutes which require corroboration 
without further specification, the language of the 
opinions suggests that what is desired is not so 
much independent evidence of particular elements of 
the offense, but rather a basis for believing that 
the "testimony given by the woman ••• is worthy of 
credit and belief." A common formulation with regard 
to corroboration of the promise of marriage is that 
the circumstances must be such as usually accompany 
the relationship of engaged couples. 
The text requires corroboration, but does not 
attempt to particularize as to its nature. A general 
caution to the authorities against convicting on the 
bare testimony of the prosecutrix may be desirable 
in view of the probable special psychological 
volvement, conscious or unconscious, of judges and 
jurors in sex offenses charged against others. The 
only rational alternative would be to require cor-
roboration as to every element of the crime, since 
there is no reason to believe that complainant is 
more likely to lie or deceive herself on one point 
rather than another. A requirement as broad as that 
would impose an impracticable burden on the prose-
cutor, especially considering that the offense under 
subsection ••• B0-13-l(l)(dl7 ••• requires proof that 
the defendant did not intend to perform his promise, 
and is otherwise narrowly circumscribed and lightly 
punished.7 
7. Ibid., pp. 263-264. 
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SUB-PART II. FAMILIAL OFFENSES 
ARTICLE 15. ABORTIOO 
40-15-1. Abortion. (1) Any person who uses any instrument, 
medicine, drug, or other substance whatever, with the intent to pro-
cure a miscarriage of any woman, commits abortion and is guilty of a 
class_ felony. It shall not be necessary in order to commit 
abortion that such woman be pregnant or, if pregnant, that a miscar-
riage be in fact accomplished. 
(2) If any woman by reason of such abortion shall die, the 
person administering or causing to be administered such medicine, 
drug, or other substance whatever, or using or causing to be used any 
instrument as aforesaid, shall be guilty of murder and punished accord-
ingly. 
(3) It shall be an affirmative defense to abortion that the 
abortion was performed by a physician licensed to practice medicine 
and· surgery in all its branches and in a licensed hospital or other 
licensed medical facility because it was necessary for the preserva-
tion of the woman's life or the prevention of serious and permanent 
bodily injury to her. 
Comment 
This section is a restatement of the present abortion offense 
defined in 40-2-23, CRS 1963, with the exception of one proposed 
change, that of including within the coverage of this proposed section 
"pretended" abortions. 
The present practice of district attorneys is to prosecute an 
alleged abortionist under the present abortion and false pretenses 
or confidence game sections which. in effect. forces the alleged 
abortionist to plead guilty under one of the two sections. However, 
there does remain the possibility that in less populous judicial 
districts, where the offense of abortion is seldom prosecuted, a dis-
trict attorney may prosecute only under the abortion statute and be 
surprised after the trial has begun when the defendant claims he knew, 
in fact, that the female was not pregnant. To avoid this remote pos-
sibility, "pretended" abortions are brought within the scope of the 
section. 
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40-15-2. Distributing abortifacients. Any person who sells 
or distributes any drug, medicine, instrument, or other substance 
whatever which he knows to be an abortifacient and which is in fact 
an abortifacient to or for any person other than licensed physicians 
commits distributing abortifacients and is guilty of a class __ mis-
demeanor. 
40-15-3. Advertising abortion. Any person who advertises, 
prints, publishes, distributes, or circulates any communication through 
print, radio, or television media advocating, advising, or suggesting 
any act which would be a violation of this article commits advertising 
abortion and is guilty of a class misdemeanor. 
Comment 
These two proposed sections restate the present and identical 
offenses now defined under 66-3-65 to 67, 'CRS 1963. 
ARTICLE 16. BIGAMY 
40-16-1. Bigamy. Any person having a husband or wife who 
subsequently marries another or cohabits in this state after such 
marriage commits bigamy and is guilty of a class_ felony, unless 
at the time of the subsequent marriage: 
-
(1) The accused reasonably believed the prior spouse to be 
dead; or 
(2) The prior spouse had been continually absent for a period 
of five years during which time the accused did not know 
the prior spouse to be alive; or 
(3) The accused reasonably believed that he was legally 
eligible to remarry. 
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Comment 
This section propose.s no major changes in the definition of 
the offense of bigamy now contained in 40-9-1, CRS 1963. The defenses 
available to a charge of bigamy also are restatements of the present 
law, with one minor proposed change contained in subsection (3). 
This defense, which replaces the defense that the former marriage 
ended in divorce or otherwise was declared void, is intended to reach 
circumstances wherein the alleged bigamist reasonably believed that 
he was legally eligible to remarry. Such wording is intended to 
avoid confusing situations arising under foreign divorces, compounded 
by the question of their validity, which have caused many different 
court opinions. 
40-16-2. Marrying a bigamist. Any previously unmarried 
person who knowingly marries another under circumstances known to 
him which would render the other person guilty of bigamy under the 
laws of this state, or who cohabits in this state after such marriage, 
commits marrying a bigamist and is guilty of a class_ felony (mis-
demeanor). 
Comment 
This section replaces the present offense of marrying a spouse 
of another, 40-9-2, CRS 1963, and proposes no major changes. 
40-16-3. Cohabitation after discovery of bigamous marriage. 
Either party to a bigamous marriage who continues to cohabit with the 
other party to a bigamous marriage after he or she has discovered 
that said marriage is bigamous commits cohabitation after discovery of 
bigamous marriage and is guilty of a class misdemeanor. 
Comment 
This section proposes new law. The committee agreed that in 
any proposed bigamy sections, there should be a provision making the 
spouse of a bigamist also guilty of an offense when he or she dis-
covers that the marriage, entered into in good faith, is bigamous ·. 
Often. a wife who discovers after her marriage that her husband has 
another wife will literally blackmail him, asking for unfair property 
settlements, etc., in turn for her silence. Both parties in such a 
situation should be guilty of an offense. 
i' 
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ARTICLE 17. INCEST 
40-17-1. Incest. Any person who knowingly marries or co-
habits with or has sexual intercourse with an ancestor or descendant, 
a brother or sister of the whole or half blood, or an uncle, aunt, 
nephew, or niece of the whole blood, commits incest and is guilty of 
a class_ felony. 
40-17-2. Aggravated incest. Any father who cohabits or has 
sexual intercourse with his daughter commits aggravated incest and is 
guilty of a class_ felony. 
40-17-3. Definition. As used in sections 40-9-8 and 40-9-9, 
the word "cohabit" means to live together under the representation or 
appearance of being married. The relationships referred to herein 
include blood relationships without regard to legitimacy, and the 
relationship of parent and child by adoption. 
Comment 
These sections propose no major changes and replace the 
present definitions contained in 40-9-4 to 6, CRS 1963. 
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SUB-PART Ill. COMMUNITY OFFENSES 
ARTICLE 18. OBSCENITY 
40-18-1. Obscenity offenses. Any person who, with knowledge 
of the nature or content thereof, does any of the following commits 
obscenity: 
(1) Sells, delivers, or provides, or offers or agrees to 
sell, deliver, or provide any obscene writing, picture, 
record, or other representation or embodiment of the 
obscene; or 
(2) Presents or directs an obscene play, dance, or other 
performance or participates directly in that portion 
thereof which makes it obscene; or 
(3) Publishes, exhibits, or otherwise makes available any-
thing obscene; or 
(4) Performs an obscene act or otherwise presents an 
obscene exhibition of his body for gain; or 
(5) Creates, buys, procures, or possesses obscene matter 
or material with intent to disseminate it in violation 
of this article, or of the penal laws or regulations of 
any other jurisdiction; or 
(6) Advertises or otherwise promotes the sale of material 
represented or held out by him to be obscene. 
Any person who commits obscenity for the first offense is 
guilty of a class_ misdemeanor, and for a second or subsequent 
offense is guilty of a class_ felony. 
40-18-2. Obscenity defined. A thing is obscene if, consid-
er,~ as a whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient interest, that 
is,a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, and if 
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it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description 
or representation of such matters. A thing is obscene even though 
the obscenity is latent, as in the case of undeveloped photographs. 
40-18-3. Interpretation of evidence. Obscenity shall be 
judged with reference to ordinary adults, except that it shall be 
judged with reference to children or other specially susceptible 
audience if it appears from the character of the material or the cir-
cumstances of its dissemination to be specially designed for or 
directed to such an audience. In any prosecution for an offense under 
this article evidence shall be admissible to show: 
(1) The character of the audience for which the material 
was designed or to which it was directed; 
(2) What the predominant appeal of the material would be 
for ordinary adults or a special audience, and what 
effect, if any, it would probably have on the behavior 
of such people; 
(3) The artistic, literary, scientific, educational, or 
other merits of the material, or absence thereof; 
(4) The degree, if any, of public acceptance of the material 
in this state; 
(5) Appeal to prurient interest, or obscene thereof, in 
advertising or other promotion of the material; 
(6) Purpose of the author, creator, publisher, or dissemin-
ator. 
40-18-4. Prima facie evidence. The creation, purchase, 
procurement, or possession of a mold, engraved plate, or other embodi-
ment of obscenity specially adapted for reproducing multiple copies, 
or the possession of more than three copies of obscene material shall 
be prima facie evidence of an intent to disseminate. 
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40-18-5. Exceptions. It shall be an affirmative defense to 
obscenity that the dissemination: 
Comment 
(1) Was not for gain and was made to personal associates 
other than children under eighteen years of age: 
(2) Was to institutions or individuals having scientific 
or other special justification for possession of such 
material. 
The key to any offense involving obscenity, e.g., possession 
and dissemination, is the definition of obscenity. In a 1957 deci-
sion (Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476), the United States Supreme 
Court defined obscene material as material which deals with sex in a 
manner appealing to prurient interest, that is, material having a 
tendency to excite lustful thoughts. This definition is included 
under this proposed article. The proposed sections presented here are 
based on the similar provisions of the new criminal code of Illinois 
that was enacted in 1961. Coverage of obscenity offenses provided 
here is essentially that which is provided under present Colorado law. 
ARTICLE 19. PROSTITUTION 
40-19-1. Prostitution. Any person who performs, offers, or 
agrees to perform any of the following with any person not his spouse 
for money commits prostitution and is guilty of a class misde-
meanor: 
(1) Any act of sexual intercourse; or 
(2) Any act of deviate sexual intercourse. 
Comment 
. This proposed section defines an act of prostitution which the 
present law, by relying on a common law definition, does not. An act 
of prostitution. as defined here, is committed by a person when he or 
she performs, offers to perform or agrees to perform an act of inter-
course, whether normal or deviate, with another who is not his or her 
spouse and in consideration for which is the payment of money. 
Under this section, a male as well as a female can be convicted. 
Although one may expect the majority of the offenders under this sec-
tion or under the present section to be females, prostitution is not 
exclusively a crime of women. 
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An act of prostitution, however, cannot be committed if the 
two parties are married to each other, or, if the two parties are not 
married to each other, where there is the payment of anything of value, 
other than money, in consideration for which there is an act of inter-
course. Since this article is directed toward commercialized prosti-
tution, it is intended to exclude a female who rewards her date with 
intercourse in consideration for a night on the town, and other similar 
non-marital rewards, whether the agreements are explicit or implicit. 
Similarly, an act of intercourse in consideration of the payment of 
money involving a married couple is excluded from the coverage of this 
section. 
40-19-2. Soliciting for a prostitute. Any person who per-
forms any of the following commits soliciting for a prostitute and is 
guilty of a class misdemeanor: 
Comment 
(1) Solicits another for the purpose of prostitution; or 
(2) Arranges or offers to arrange a meeting of persons for 
the purpose of prostitution; or 
(3) Directs another to a place knowing such direction is for 
the purpose of prostitution. 
This section broadens the coverage of the two present.provi-
sions which it replaces. This section replaces 40-9~14, CRS 1963, 
i.e., any prostitute, courtesan or lewd woman who, by word, gesture 
or action, shall endeavor to ply her vocation upon the streets, or 
from the door or window of any house, or in any public place in any 
city or town in this state, or who for such purpose shall make a bold 
and meretricious display of herself, and 40-9-11, CRS 1963, i.e., any 
ma!._ .,ver the age of 18 years who acts or engages himself as a pimp, 
or solicits for any prostitute. 
The basis of this offense is the promotion of prostitution. 
An offense under this section is a misdemeanor and can be committed 
by a customer, prostitute or a third party, e.g.,a bellboy, an ele-
vator operator, or a bartender. An offense can be committed irre-
spective of whether the offender is male or female, whether the 
solicitation is open or discreet, and whether the solicitation was 
made within a town or city or within an unincorporated area. 
40-19-3, Pandering. (1) Any person who does any of the 
following for money commits pa·ndering: 
(a) Compels a female to become a prostitute; or 
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(b) Arranges or offers to arrange a situation in which a 
female may practice prostitution. 
(2) Any person convicted of pandering under paragraph (a) of 
subsection (1) of this section is guilty of a class_ felony. Any 
person convicted of pandering under paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of 
this section is guilty of a class_ misdemeanor. 
Comment 
This proposed section replaces the present offense defined 
under 40-9-10, CRS 1963, i.e., the encouraging, persuading, influenc-
ing, inducing, or procuring a female of chaste character to have 
illicit sexual intercourse with any male by any person over the age of 
18 years. A person convicted under this present section may be 
punished by a one to five-year term of imprisonment in the peniten-
tiary. 
Under proposed subsection (l)(a), an offense of which consti-
tutes the only felony penalty provided in this article, a person can be 
convicted of panderi~g.only if he or she compelled the female to become 
a prostitute. If the female is offered a situation in which she can 
practice prostitution or if such an arrangement is actually made, 
whether she accepts or refuses, a misdemeanor offense under subsection 
(l)(b) has been committed. However, the mere encouragement, induce-
ment or persuasion of a female to become a prostitute without actual 
compulsion or, in the absence of compulsion, the offer to or actual 
arrangement of a situation in which she can practice prostitution, is 
not an offense under this section. 
If the panderer's conduct conforms to that described by either 
subsection (l)(a) or (l)(b) but he has not acted for the. purpose of 
financial gain, no offense has been committed under this section. 
40-19-4. Keeping a place of prostitution. Any person who 
has or exercises control over the use of any place which offers 
seclusion or shelter for the practice of prostitution and who performs 
any one or more of the following commits keeping a place of prostitu-
tion and is guilty of a class misdemeanor: 
(1) Knowingly grants or permits the use of such place for 
the purpose of prostitution; or 
(2) Grants or permits the use of such place under circum-
stances from which he could reasonably know that the 
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Comment 
place is used or is to be used for purposes of prostitu-
tion; or 
(3) Permits the continued use of a place after becoming aware 
of facts or circumstances from which he should reasonably 
know that the place is being used for purposes of prosti-
tution. 
This proposed sect·ion replaces several provisions now contained 
in the law: 1) the keeper or proprietor of any house of ill fame or 
bad repute or any assignation house into which an unmarried female is 
enticed shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor as principal (40-9-9, 
CRS 1~63); 2) any male person over the age of 18 years who engages or 
assists in operating or managing any room, house, or building for the 
furpose of carrying on prostitution shall be deemed guilty of a felony 40-9-11, CRS 1963); and 3) any person who maintains or keeps a lewd 
house or place for the practice of fornication, or keeps a common, 
ill-governed and disorderly house, to the encouragement of idleness, 
gaming, drinking, fornication or other misbehavior is guilty of a mis-
demeanor (40-9-15, CRS 1963). · 
This section proposes to combine these present offenses under 
one section and to penalize any person, irrespective of the person's 
age or sex, who has or exercises control over any place which he knows 
or should reasonably know offers seclusion or shelter for the practice 
of prostitution. . 
40-19-5. Patronizing a prostitute. Any person who performs - ·--•-
any of the following with a person not his spouse commits patronizing 
a prostitute and is guilty of a class misdemeanor: 
(l) Engages in an act of sexual intercourse with a prosti-
tute; or 
(2) Engages in an act of deviate sexual conduct with a 
prostitute; or 
(3) Enters or remains in a place of prostitution with in-
tent to engage in an act of sexual intercourse or 
deviate sexual conduct. 
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Comment 
This section proposes a new offense, that of promoting prosti-
tution through the patronization of prostitutes. Under the present 
law, a man who engages a prostitute commits no offense unless the 
engagement is an open flout of the community standards of morality. 
Since prostitution could hardly flourish without customers, it is 
recommended here that the patronization of prostitutes be treated no 
different than other conduct deemed criminal under this article, which 
involves the promotion of prostitution, e.g.,pandering, soliciting for 
a prostitute, and keeping a place of prostitution. 
This section penalizes customers and intended customers of 
prostitutes, whether the intercourse is normal or deviate. Delivery 
men, telephone repair men, and others who enter a place of prostitution 
for legitimate business purposes are excluded from the coverage of 
this section. 
40-19-6. Pimping. Any person who receives money or other 
property from a prostitute, not for a lawful consideration, knowing it 
· was earned in whole or in part from the practice of prostitution, 
commits pimping and is guilty of a class_ misdemeanor. 
Comment 
This proposed section replaces one of the present offenses 
defined under 40-9-11, CRS 1963, i.e., any person 18 years of age or 
older who knowingly lives on or is supported or maintained in whole or 
in part by the money or other valuable consideration realized, pro-
cured or earned by any female through her own prostitution or the 
prostitution of other females is guilty of a felony. 
This section, reflecting the changes proposed in other sections 
of this article, including the ability of a male to commit prostitution, 
proposes to penalize pimping in more realistic terms. The wording of 
the present law can be construed in such a manner as to subject to a 
felony penalty.a grocer or other storekeeper who knowingly sells to a 
prostitute. and to the prostitute's 19 or 20-year-old son and daughter 
wno knowingly receives financial support from his prostitute-parent 
to meet tuition and other college expenses. The Model Penal Code's 
reporters criticized felony punishment for this offense for another 
reason: 
It is obvious that such £pimping offense? laws were 
evolved to help prosecutors convict men believed to be 
engaged in promoting prostitution. often of their wives. If 
there were sufficient evidence, the man might be convicted 
of soliciting for the woman. But where evidence of soliciting 
or other actual complicity in prostitution is lacking, con-
viction can be had on proof merely that she supports him "in 
whole or in part." 
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Such legislation is insupportable in principle and goes 
well beyond any pragmatic justification which might be urged 
for it. In no other instance is criminal liability based on 
the bare fact that one is supported by another person who 
gains his livelihood illegally. True, a high statistical 
probability favors the inference t~at a man without other 
means of support must be collaborating in the prostitution of 
the woman who supports him. But this hardly warrants more 
than the presumption[cif promoting prostitutio!!.7 provided by 
subsection {4).8 . 
40-19-7. Testimony of witness to prostitution. In any in-
vestigation or prosecution of any violation of the provisions of this 
article, or any attempt thereof, no person shall be excused from giv-
ing testimony or producing documentary or other evidence material to 
such investigation or prosecution on the ground that the testimony or 
evidence required of him is or may be incriminating; provided, that 
any person who so testifies or produces evidence concerning such of-
fenses shall be immune to prosecution or conviction for any such 
violation about which he may testify or produce evidence. 
Comment 
This section is a restatement of the existing witness immunity 
section, 40-9-12, CRS 1963, and proposes no major changes. 
8. Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft No. 9, The American Law Institute, 
Philadelphia, 1959, p. 180. 
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ARTICLE 20. PUBLIC INDECENCY 
40-20-1. Adultery. Any person who cohabits or has sexual 
intercourse with another not his spouse commits adultery and is 
guilty of a class --- misdemeanor, if the behavior is open and 
notorious, and: 
Comment 
(1) The person is married and the other person involved in 
such intercourse is not his spouse; or 
(2) The person is not married and knows that the other 
person involved in such intercourse is married. 
The present Colorado adultery crime leans on the common 
law definition of adultery for a description of the unlawful conduct. 
At common law, adultery consisted of an act of sexual intercourse by 
a man, whether single or married, with a married woman not his wife, 
performed in such an open and notorious manner as to be a public 
nuisance. 
This section proposes to define adultery also by statute law. 
It is the same conduct which constitutes fornication and performed by 
a person who is married and knows the other person, whether married 
or single, is not his spouse, or by a single person who knows that 
the other person is married. If the person believes that the other 
person is single, wh~n in fact the other person is married, the con-
duct constitutes fornication. 
40-20-2. Fornication. Any person who cohabits or has sexual 
intercourse with another not his spouse commits fornication and is 
guilty of a class __ _ misdemeanor, if the behavior is open and 
notorious. 
Comment 
Present Colorado law does not define the crime of fornication. 
It relies on the common law definition, i.e., an act of private sexual 
intercourse by a man, either married or single, with a consenting, 
unmarried woman, as modified by the phrase "Any man or woman ••• " 
This section proposes to define fornication by statute law. 
It is cohabitation or a single act of sexual intercourse by an unmar-
ried person, either male or female, with an unmarried person of the 
opposite sex, in a non-private manner. Where one party is married, the 
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conduct if criminal, constitutes adultery. Cohabitation, of course, 
implies'one or more acts of s!xual activity and does not requi~e.a 
special definition. Prosecution do7s not have.to prove~ ~pec1fic act of sexual intercourse occurred if the parties were living together 
under circumstances that makes it obvious that a continuing sexual 
relationship existed between them. Furthermore, prosecution does not 
have to prove an act of sexual intercourse occurred -- any type of 
sexual activity, normal or deviate, is covered. 
Following the present statute's exclusion of bedroom conduct, 
the act of sexual intercourse or cohabitation must occur under cir-
cumstances which reveal the conduct to the public. Only when sexual 
activity between consenting adults is so "open and notorious" that it 
offends the public's morals is it criminal. 
40-20-3. Loitering to solicit deviate sexual relations. 
Any person who loiters in or near any public place for the purpose of 
soliciting or being solicited to engage in deviate sexual relations 
commits loitering to solicit deviate sexual relations and is guilty 
of a class misdemeanor. ---
Comment 
Section 40-20-3 covers deviate behavior which requires treat-
ment somewhat similar to "open and notorious" heterosexual relation-
ships. However, the problem is different in that a strong inference 
of sexual relations follows from "cohabitation" of a man and woman, 
and if it is known that they are not married the cohabitation consti-
tutes an open flouting of widely held standards of morality. This is 
not the case when two people of the same sex live together, however 
strong the suspicion may be of a sexual relation between th~m. Ac- • 
cordingly, section 40-20-3, similar to subsection (2) of the present 
Colorado law, 40-2-31, CRS 1963, reaches the problem by prohibiting 
solicitation of strangers in public places. 
By reducing the penalty for solicitation of sodomy and by 
requiring the solicitation to be accomplished only in public places, 
the danger of abuse of the law by blackmailers is reduced. · 
40-20-4. Public indecency. Any person of the age of 17 years 
and upwards who performs any of the following in a place where the 
conduct may reasonably be expected to be viewed by others commits 
public indecency and is guilty of a class_ misdemeanor: 
(1) An act of sexual intercourse; or 
(2) An act of deviate sexual intercourse; or 
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Comment 
(3) A lewd exposure of the body done with intent to arouse 
or to satisfy the sexual desire of the person; or 
(4) A lewd fondling or caress of the body of another person 
of the same sex. 
This section defines the undefined crime of open lewdness now 
contained in 40-9-15, CRS 1963, i.e., "If any person shall be guilty 
of open lewdness, or other notorious act of public indecency, tending 
to debauch the public morals, ••• ffie shal.J7 be fined not exceeding one 
hundred dollars, or imprisoned in the county jail not exceeding six 
months." At common law, which the present statute relies upon for a 
definition, "open lewdness" means open and public indecency, and in 
order to amount to an indictable offense it must always amount to a 
common nuisance, committed in a public place, and seen by two or more 
persons lawfully at that place. 
This section requires that one of four acts of conduct must 
be committed in a public place by a person 17 years of age or older. 
A public place is defined as any place where the prohibited conduct 
may reasonably be expected to be seen by others. This definition 
includes public parks during the daylight and early evening hours as 
well as any office waiting rooms during normal business hours. It is 
a question for the trier of the facts to decide if the place is a 
public place, depending on the circumstances under which the conduct 
was performed. The age of 17 years was selected under this particular 
section as the division of responsibility of offenders. A child, 17 
years of age or younger, may or may not be expected by society to exer-
cise discretion in choosing his arena for promiscuity, depending on 
his age, but a person over the age of 17, generally considered an 
adult in this code, is expected to exercise some judgment. 
Four acts are considered indecent under this section, if done 
publicly by adults. 
Subsections (1) and (2) define two acts of public indecency. 
The prohibited conduct may be conduct which, if done in a proper 
place, is lawful but which is prohibited when done in the presence of 
others, i.e., an act of sexual intercourse between a man and his wife, 
or the conduct may be unlawful and prosecuted under this section or 
under the section which defines the prohibited conduct, i.e., an act 
of sexual intercourse between an unmarried man and woman. 
Subsection (3) requires lewd exposure coupled with an intent 
to arouse or to satisfy the carnal appetite of a viewer. Most often 
prosecution under this subsection will involve the genital exposure 
of an exhibitionist. This subsection does not apply to members of 
nudist camps, persons appearing nude in public showers, nor persons 
attired in brief beach wear, since there is no lewd exposure coupled 
with the specific intent of sexual arousal-or gratification., 
Subsection (4) is similar to the other three subsections in 
that a gross flouting of community standards in respect to sexuality 
is exhibited. - 73 -
PART D. OFFENSE AFFECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY 
ARTICLE 21. LIBEL 
40-21-1. Libel. (1) ,Libel is the malicious defamation ex-
pressed either by printing, or by signs, or pictures or the like, 
tending: 
(a) To blacken the memory of one who is dead: or 
(b) To impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue or reputation, 
or publish the natural defects of one who is alive, and 
thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridi-
cule. 
(2) Any person who commits libel is guilty of a class 
misdemeanor. 
40-21-2. Justification. In all prosecutions for libel,. the 
truth thereof may be given in evidence in justification, except libels 
tending to blacken the memory of the dead or expose the natural de-
fects of the living. 
Comment 
These two proposed sections constitute a restatement of the 
present offense of libel defined under 40-8-12, CRS 1963. 
ARTICLE 22. CLAIRVOYANCY 
40-22-1. Practicing clairvoyancy. Any person who practices 
or advertises a practice of clairvoyancy, palmistry, mesmerism, fortune 
telling, astrology, seership, or like crafty science, readings, sit• 
tings or exhibitions of a like character, for which a fee or charge is 




This section combines and restates the definitions and penalty 
contained in 40-24-1, 40-24-2, and 40-24-3, CRS 1963. 
ARTICLE 23. BRIBERY IN SPORT CONTESTS 
40-23-1. Bribery of sports.participants and officials. Any 
person who does any of the following acts commits bribery of sports 
participants and officials and is guilty of a·class _ felony: 
(1) Gives, offers or promises to any participant in any con-
test of skill, speed, strength or endurance any gift or 
gratuity whatever with intent thereby to influence such 
participant to refrain from exerting his full degree of 
skill, speed, strength, or endurance, in such contest; or 
(2) Requests or accepts a gift or gratuity or promises to 
make a gift or promise to do an act beneficial to him-
self, under an agreement or with an understanding that 
he shall refrain from exerting his full degree of skill, 
speed, strength or endurance in such contest; or 
(3) Gives, offers, or promises to any person who is or will 
be an umpire, referee, judge or other official at any 
such contest with the intention or understanding that 
such person will corruptly or dishonestly umpire, referee, 
judge or officiate at any such contest so as to affect or 
influence the result thereof; or 
(4) Requests or accepts a gift or gratuity or promises to 
make a gift or promise to do an act beneficial to himself, 
when he is or expects to be an umpire, referee, judge or 
other official at any such contest, under an agreement 
or understanding that he shall corruptly or dishonestly 
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umpire, referee, judge or officiate at any such contest. 
(2) As used in this section, "participant" includes any 
person who is selected or who expects to be selected to take part in 
any such contest. 
Comment 
This section is a restatement of the offenses presently de-
fined in 40-12-2, 40-12-3, 40-12-4, CRS 1963. 
ARTICLE 24. CRUELTY TO ANIMALS 
40-24-1. Cruelty to animals. (l) Any person who does any 
of the following acts commits cruelty to animals and is guilty of a 
class misdemeanor: 
(a) Intentionally tortures any animal, or without justifica-
tion kills any domestic animal of another without the 
owner's consent; or 
(b) Abandons or fails, without reasonable excuse, to provide 
necessary food, care or shelter for any animal in his 
custody; or 
(c) Intentionally poisons any domestic animal of another 
without the owner's consent or places poison in any place 
with intent that it be taken by a domestic animal of 
another; or 
(d) Intentionally transports or confines any animal in a 
cruel manner; or 
(e) Intentionally participates in the earnings of any place 
for baiting or fighting animals or intentionally main-
tains or allows any place to be used for such purpose. 
(2) As used in this section, "torture" does not include bona 
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fide experiments carried on for scientific research or normal and 
accepted veterinary practices. 
Comment 
This section, by combining the essential criminal conduct 
defined in many statutes, is a restatement of present law. Present 
Colorado statutes to be replaced by this proposed section include: 
40-20-1, CRS 1963 -- Overdriving and Starving Animals. 
40-20-2, CRS 1963 -- Improper Care of Impounded Animals. 
40-20-4, CRS 1963 -- Keeping Fowls or.Animals to Fight. 
40-20-16, CRS 1963 Sheepherder Abandoning Sheep Without 
Notice. 
40-20-18, CRS 1963 -- Unlawful to Dock a Horse's Tail. 
40-20-22, CRS 1963 -- Killing Animals in a Contest. 
40-24-2. Influencing dog and horse races. (1) Any person 
who influences, conspires with or has any understanding or connivance 
with any owner, jockey, groom or other person associated with or 
interested in any stable, kennel, horse or dog, or any race in which 
any horse or dog participates or is expected to participate, to pre-
arrange or predetermine the results of any such race, or any person 
who-stimulates or depresses a dog or horse for the purpose of affect-
ing the results of a race commits influencing dog and horse races and 
is guilty of a class_ felony. 
{2) Nothing in this section shall prohibit the normal treat-
ment of such animals by veterinarians when the purpose of such treat-
ment is not primarily designed to stimulate or depress such animals 
in order to affect the results of a race. 
Comment 
This section is a restatement of the present law, 40-20-27, 
CRS 1963. 
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>MTIO..E 25. DISORDERLY CONDUCT 
40-25-1. Disturbance of the peace by telephone. (1) Any 
person who does any of the following commits disturbance of the peace 
by telephone and is guilty of a class misdemeanor: 
(a) Disturbs or tends to disturb the peace, quiet, or right 
of privacy of any person or family to whom the call is 
directed by repeated and continued anonymous or identi-
fied telephone messages intended to harass or disturb; 
or 
(b) By a single call or repeated calls uses obscene, profane, 
indecent, or-offensive language or suggests any lewd or 
lascivious act over or through a telephone; or 
(c) Attempts to extort money or other thing of value from 
any person or family by means or use of the telephone; 
or 
(d) Threatens any physical violence or harm to any person or 
family; or 
(e) Repeatedly or continuously causes the telephone of any 
person or family to ring with intent to disturb or harass 
such person or family. 
(2) The normal use of a telephone for the purpose of request-
ing payment of debts or obligations or for other legitimate business 
purposes does not constitute a violation of this section. 
Comment 
This section restates the present offenses defined in 40-4-23, 
CRS 1963. 
40-25-2. Disturbance of the peace. Any person who shall 
maliciously or willfully disturb the peace or quiet of any neighborhood 
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or family, by loud or unusual noises, or by tumultuous or offensive 
carriage, threatening, traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight, 
or fighting, commits disturbance of the peace and is guilty of a 
class misdemeanor. 
Comment 
This proposed section is a restatement of the present offense 
defined in 40-8-1, CRS 1963, as amended by Chapter 39, 1964 Session 
Laws. 
40-25-3. Unlawful assembling. Any person who assembles with 
another for the purpose of disturbing the peace, or committing any 
unlawful act, and does not disperse on being desired or commanded so 
to do by a judge, sheriff, coroner or other public officer, commits 
unlawful assembling and is guilty of a class_ misdemeanor. 
Comment 
This proposed section is a restatement of the present offense 
defined in 40-8-3, CRS 1963, as amended by Chapter 39, 1964 Session 
Laws. 
40-25-4. Riot. Any person who meets with another to do an 
unlawful act with force or violence against the person or property of 
another, with or without~ common cause of quarrel, or even does a 
lawful act in a violent or tumultuous manner commits riot and is 
guilty of a class misdemeanor. 
Comment 
This proposed section is a restatement of the present offense 
defined in 40-8-6, CRS 1963. 
40-25-5. Disturbing worship. Any person who by menace, pro-
fane swearing, vulgar language, or any disorderly or immoral conduct, 
interrupts and disturbs any congregation or collection of citizens 
assembled together for the purpose of worshiping Almighty God commits 




This proposed offense is a restatement of the present offense 
defined in 40-8-15, CRS 1963. 
40-25-6. Vagrancy. (1) Any person who loiters or prowls in 
a place at a time, or in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals 
under circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of persons or 
property in the vicinity commits vagrancy and is guilty of a class_ 
misdemeanor. 
(2) Among the circumstances which may be considered in deter-
mining whether such alarm is warranted is the fact that the person 
takes flight upon appearance of a peace officer, refuses to identify 
himself, or manifestly endeavors to conceal himself or any object. 
Unless flight by the person or other circumstance makes it impracti-
cable, a peace officer shall prior to any arrest for an offense under 
this section afford the person an opportunity to dispel any alarm 
which would otherwise be warranted, by requesting him to i~entify him-
' 
self and explain his presence and conduct. No person shall be con-
victed of an offense under this section if the peace officer did not 
comply with the preceding sentence, or if it appears at trial that the 
explanation given by the person was true and, if believed by the peace 
officer at the time, would have dispelled the alarm. 
Comment 
This section proposes a substantial deviation from the present 
vagrancy statute, 40-8-19, CRS 1963, as amended by Chapter 39, 1964 
Session Laws, and is based on the Model Penal Code's recommended 
statute. The complete analysis of this Model Penal Code section, as 
stated by the Code's reporters, is as follows: 
The proposals here made to penalize what might 
be called "suspicious loitering," are all that would 
be left in the law of that ancient protean offense 
designated "vagrancy," if indeed even this much 
should be retained in a code of substantive penal 
law. The reasons for doubt on that score are that 
a statute which makes it a penal offense for a person 
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to fail to identify himself and give an exculpatory 
account of his presence is in effect an extension of 
the law of arrest, and trenches on the privilege 
against self-incrimination. It authorizes arrest of 
persons who have not given reasonable ground for be-
lieving that they are engaged in or have committed 
offenses. Alternatively, it can be regarded as a 
legislative determination that in ''suspicd.ous" cir-
cumstances, failure to respond to police inquiries 
supplies reasonable ground. In either view, exten-
sion of the law of arrest might be regarded as a 
matter for a code of procedure rather than an end to 
be achieved indirectly by creating a ~ubstantive 
offense of failure to respond to the police. 
The constitutionality of such legislation may 
depend on the fact that the history of Anglo-American 
law provides an ancient pedigree for offenses of this 
character, under the heading of "vagrancy". In 
feudal times the vagrancy statutes served to protect 
the rights of the lord in his fugitive serfs. They 
also were an instrument for controlling wandering 
bands of robbers, as the feudal system began to break 
up, leaving a surplus of rootless workmen. Paradoxi-
cally, the vagrancy laws also lent themselves to 
control of scarce labor. When the Black Death de-
populated England of one-third to one-half of its 
inhabitants, and the Statute of Labourers was passed 
to compel able-bodied men to serve anyone who re-
quired their services at the customary rate of wages, 
it was made an offense for a workman or servant to 
depart from service before the time agreed upon. It 
was also an offense to give alms to a "valiant" beg-
gar. Wandering or vagrancy was punishable summarily. 
About this time a distinction came to be made between 
sturdy and impotent beggars. The former were treated 
as vagrants, the latter being non-criminal so long as 
they remained in their own locality. Thus the vagrancy 
laws assumed still another role: criminal sanctions 
against abuse of the poor laws. These laws placed the 
burden of the impotent beggar on his home parish. 
Impotent beggars were required to remain in the cities 
or towns where they were living, later being given an 
option of going to their places of birth. Such beg-
gars came to be licensed. Sturdy beggars were 
punished and given a pass to return to their place of 
habitation or birth. Provisions were made for the 
employment of sturdy beggars in their own locality 
in workhouse-like institutions. 
Thus, the early vagrancy laws were criminal 
sanctions of the Statute of Labourers, designed to 
control the labor market. Later they became the 
criminal sanction of the poor laws. As time went on, 
they came to be looked upon also as devices to con-
trol a mass of potential criminals. 
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Today some form of vagrancy is a statutory of-
fense in every state except West Virginia, where it 
is a common law offense. It will be observed that 
many of these activities are punishable under speci-
fic provisions of this Code and the existing codes 
of the several states. Others cannot, consistently 
with constitutional standards, be proscribed in the 
terms commonly found in the vagrancy statutes. 
The most noteworthy aspect of the legislation 
is its effect to create a ttstatustt of criminality 
based on past behavior. Illustrative is People v. 
Craig, 152 Cal. 42, 91 Pac. 997 (1907). Defendant 
was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon. His 
defense was that he was resisting an illegal arrest. 
The testimony of the arresting officers was quite 
frank. They received a report that the defendant 
and another had assaulted a man. They had not seen 
the offense and concluded they could not arrest them 
for battery without a warrant. One officer testi-
fied: "I was notified that this man and Mack had 
beat up a man ••• and I says: 'Well, the only thing 
we can do -- we didn't see it -- we will go and vag 
them.'" There was evidence that he knew defendant 
as a vagrant, but had been instructed to leave him 
alone if he behaved himself. The court affirmed the 
conviction stating: 
Whether this is an entirely commendable 
attitude toward appellant's class of misde-
meanants we need not stop to consider, but we 
think the admitted fact that appellant would not 
have been arrested if he had confined himself 
to vagrancy did not render his arrest for that 
offense illegal. Vagrancy differs from most 
other offenses in the fact that it is chronic 
rather than acute; that it continues after it is 
complete, and thereby subjects the offender to 
arrest at any time before he reforms. (152 Cal. 
at 47) 
If the disorderly conduct statutes are troublesome 
because they require so little in the way of misbe-
havior, the vagrancy statutes offer the astounding 
spectacle of criminality with no misbehavior at all! 
Loitering statutes, whether or not they in-
clude provisions for police interrogation and com-
pulsion on the loiterer to explain his presence, 
appear to be designed to enable the police to arrest 
persons suspected of having committed or being about 
to commit offenses. Thus, in State v. Grenz, de-
fendant was convicted of vagrancy (wandering the 
streets at late or unusual hours without visible.or 
lawful business) upon evidence that he was moving 
towards a chicken coop carrying a gunny sack. The 
Court said: 
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It is true that there was insufficient 
evidence adduced to support a charge of at-
tempted larceny or attempted burglary for the 
reason that there was no overt act tending to 
accomplish the commission of either of these 
offenses •••• But such was not the charge in 
this case. The laws relating to criminal at-
tempts do not properly apply to the vagrancy 
statutes •••• The gist of the offense in the 
instant case is that the circumstances under 
which the appellant was apprehended were con-
sistent with the hypothesis that he was about 
to commit a crime, and were inconsistent with 
any reasonable hypothesis that he· had any law-
ful or visible business at the time and place 
of his apprehension. This is the very evil 
which the statute was designed to remedy, and 
it is difficult to conceive of a clearer case 
calling for its application. (26 Wash. 2d at 
770-771) 
Four justices dissented, including two who expressed 
the view that the legislature is without power to 
make this type of activity an offense. Apart from 
the issue of constitutionality, the courts are in-
clined to construe the loitering statutes to exclude 
lassitude or indolence, i.e., non-suspicious loiter-
ing. 
Typical suspicious loitering situations would be 
the following: a known professional pickpocket is 
seen loitering in a crowded railroad station; a 
rough-looking character, not recognized by the police-
man as a local resident, is seen lurking in a doorway 
looking up and down the street as if to see whether 
anyone is watching; a nervous housewife summons police 
to her neighborhood because an unknown man has been 
standing for some time in a dark alley. These situa-
tions would not be covered by the law of attempt, 
even under the expanded definition of that offense in 
Article 5 of this Code, since no act has yet been done 
which is a "substantial step" toward commission of an 
offense or "strongly corroborative of the actor's 
criminal purpose." The "offender" does not even pos-
sess burglary tools or other "instrument of crime," 
upon which to base a conviction under Section 5.06. 
What response does the community wish to make to 
these situations? At least five courses are open: 
(1) Loitering or wandering "without lawful 
business" or "at unusual hours," may be made an 
offense, as in many vagrancy laws, e.g., Cal. 
Pen. Code§ 647, thus laying the basis for arrest 







The suspicious situation may be treated 
the basis for police inquiries to 
actor must respond, as in draft Section 
(3) The suspicious situation may be treated 
as a proper occasion for brief detention to facil-
itate police interrogation, not involving charge 
of crime. 
(4) The situation might be one in which the 
police could be authorized to order the suspect 
to "move on," i.e., to depart from the place 
where his presence causes alarm. 
(5) Or, finally, the police might expect 
merely to make inquiry of suspicious persons, 
most of whom would of course answer questions 
voluntarily. Where the answer does not dissi-
pate suspicion, the officer would make such ob-
servations as would facilitate identification of 
the suspect in case an offense is committed in 
the neighborhood. 
All these alternatives have difficulties. The 
first authorizes conviction of persons without proof 
of anti-social behavior or inclination. The second 
does not exclude that possibility, since failure to 
identify or to give credible account of one's behavior 
leads to criminal liability, without necessity on the 
part of the prosecution to prove any criminal purpose. 
Another trouble with alternative 2 is that a plausible 
lie about one's purposes or identity will exclude 
liability under this section, while an implausible 
truth does not. The third alternative involves a quite 
controversial and possibly unconstitutional change in 
the law of arrest, rather than a definition of a sub-
stantive offense within the scope of the Model Penal 
Code. The fourth alternative, the police order to 
"move on," hardly solves the problem of the individual 
who is bent on crime, and confers a disturbingly un-
bounded discretion upon the police. The last alterna-
tive, although most consistent with our ideas of the 
proper role of the police and with general principles 
of penal law against convicting person without proof 
of anti-social behavior, involves total abandonment of 
the traditional vagrancy concept, a departure which 
will encounter serious resistance. 
In draft Section 250.12 our aim had been to pro-
vide the least objectionable form of alternative 2 for 
those jurisdictions not prepared to break entirely 
from the vagrancy concept. In contrast to some pro-
posals of the same general character, Section 250.12 
requires that the loitering be such as to justify sus-
picion of criminal activity. Moreover, the offense is 
only a violation, i.e., not subject to imprisonment. 
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Municipalities may properly regulate the use of 
sidewalks to safeguard against annoying and impor-
tunate mendicants and merchants; but such legislation 
does not belong in the penal code. Other codes, deal-
ing with traffic, or heal th and welfare·, or regulating 
callings, would be the place for specific and detailed 
provisions necessary to make proper distinctions be-
tween the aggressive beggar· and the immobile, silent 
beggar; between begging as a business and soliciting 
for the Red Cross, Disabled Veterans, or the Salvation 
Army; between begging and the "selling" of pencils or 
trinkets which the purchaser is not expected to take; 
between the person suffering a momentary embarrassment 
from having lost his wallet and the bum dunning 
passersby for coins with which to buy liquor, under 
the fraudulent pretense of needing carfare.9 
40-25-7. Reckless hunting. (1) Any p~rson, while in the 
act of pursuing, taking or killing game or birds, who does a~y of the 
following commits reckless hunting and is guilty of a class mis-
demeanor: 
(a) Carries a firearm while under the influence of intoxi-
cants or drugs; or 
(b) Acts in a careless or reckless manner or wanton disre-
gard of huma~ life or property. 
(2) The hunting license of any person convicted under this 
section shall be revoked upon conviction and the offender shall not 
be eligible to purchase or use a Colorado hunting license for a 
period of three years next following conviction. 
Comment 
This proposed offense is a restatement of the present of-
fenses defined in 40-11-5, 40-11-6, and 40-11-7, CRS 1963. 
40-25-8. Disturbing the remains of a dead person. Any person 
who knowingly disturbs or removes the remains, or any part thereof, of 
9. Model Penal Code, American Law Institute, Philadelphia, Tentative 
Draft No. 13, April 1961, pp. 60-65. 
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any person permanently interred in any church, churchyard or cemetery, 
other than pursuant to an order of court, commits disturbing the re-
mains of a dead person and is guilty of a class misdemeanor. 
Comment 
This proposed section is a restatement of the pr~sent offense 
defined in 40-12-5, CRS 1963. 
40-25-9. Defacing Tombs. Any person who intentionally does 
any of the following commits defacing tombs and is guilty of a class 
misdemeanor: 
Comment 
(1) Defaces, breaks, destroys or removes any tomb, monument 
or gravestone erected to any deceased person or any 
memento or any memorial or any ornamental plant, tree or 
shrub appertaining to the place of burial of any human 
being; or 
(2) Marks, defaces, injures, destroys or removes any fence, 
post, rail or wall of any cemetery or graveyard or 
erected within any cemetery or graveyard. 
This proposed section constitutes a new offense. 
40-25-10. Conducting or participating in endurance contests. 
(1) Any person who conducts or participates in· any physical or mental 
endurance contest for a period longer than 24 hours or conducts or 
participates in any such endurance contest within any period of 168 
hours commits conducting or participating in endurance contests and 
is guilty of a class misdemeanor. 
(2) This section does not apply to any athletic contest of 
schools, colleges or universities. 
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Comment 
This proposed section is a restatement of the present offense 
defined in 40-12-9 through 40-12-17, CRS 1963. 
40-25-11. Sunday barbering. Any person who carries on the 
business of barbering on Sunday in any city of the first or s&cond 
class, whether incorporated by general law or special charter, commits 
Sunday barbering and is guilty of a class misdemeanor. 
Comment 
This proposed section is a restatement of the present offenses 
defined in 40-12-20 and 40-12-21, CRS 1963. 
40-25-12. Polluting streams. Any person who does any of the 
following commits polluting streams and is guilty of a class mis-
demeanor: 
Comment 
(1) Throws or discharges into any stream or running water, 
or into any ditch or flume, any obnoxious substance, such 
as refuse matter from a slaughter house or privy, or 
slops from eating houses, or any other fleshy or vege-
table matter which is subject to decay in water; or 
(2) Empties or causes to be emptied, or allows the emptying 
or flowing of oil, petroleum or other oleaginous sub-
stance into any of the waters of this state, or deposits 
or causes the same to be deposited at such distance that 
the same may be carried into such waters by natural 
causes. 
This proposed section is a restatement of the present offenses 
defined in 40-12-22 and 40-12-23, CRS 1963. 
40-25-13. Causing danger to blind persons. Any person, other 
than a wholly or partially blind person. who knowingly does any of 
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the following commits causing danger to blind persons and is guilty 
of a class misdemeanor: 
Comment 
(a) Carries or uses on any street, highway or other public 
place, a cane or walking stick which is white in color, 
or white tipped with red; or 
(b) Fails to take precaution against accidents or injury to 
a person carrying or using on any street, highway, or 
other public place a cane or walking stick which is white 
in color, or white tipped with red. 
This proposed section is a restatement of the present offenses 
defined in 40-12-24, 40-12-25, and 40-12-26, CRS 1963. 
40-25-14. Selling tobacco to children. Any person who, with-
out the written permission of the child's parent or guardian, gives 
or sells any item containing tobacco to a child under the age of six-
teen years commits selling tobacco to children and is guilty of a 
class misdemeanor. 
Comment 
This proposed section constitutes a restatement of the present 
offense defined in 40-13-2 and 40-13-5, CRS 1963. 
ARTICLE 26. GAMBLING 
40-26-1. Defi~itions relating to gambling. As used in this 
article, the following words have the meaning given below: 
(1) "Bet" means a bargain in which the parties agree that, 
dependent upon chance even though accompanied by some 
skill, one stands to win or lose anything of value 
specified in the agreement. But a bet does not include: 
(a) Bona fide business transactions which are valid under 
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the law of contracts, including, without limitation: 
C~ntracts for the purchase or sale, at a future date, of 
securities or other commodities; and agreements to com-
pensate for loss caused by the happening of the chance, 
including without limitation, contracts for indemnity or 
guaranty and life or health and accident insurance; 
(b) Offers of purses, prizes, or premiums to the actual con-
testants in any bona fide contest for the determination 
of skill, speed, strength, or endurance or to the bona 
fide owners of animals or vehicles entered in such con-
tests; or 
(c) Betting or games of chance otherwise permiited by law. 
(2) "Gambling device" means a contrivance which for a con-
sideration affords the player an opportunity to obtain 
anything of value, the award of which is determined by 
chance, even though accompanied by some skill and whether 
or not the prize is automatically paid by the device. A 
gambling device does not include: 
(a) A coin-in-the-slot operated mechanical device played for 
amusement which rewards the player with the right to 
replay such mechanical device, which device is so con-
structed or devised as to make such result of the 
operation thereof depend in part upon the skill of the 
player and which returns to the player thereof no coins, 
tokens, or merchandise; 
(b) Vending machines by which full and adequate return is 
made for the money invested and in which there is no 
element of chance or hazard. 
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(3) "Gambling place" means any structure or place, any 
vehicle (whether self-propelled or not), or any room 
within any of them, one of whose principal uses is any 
of the following: Making and settling bets; receiving, 
holding, recording, or forwarding bets or offers to 
bet; or playing gambling devices. 
40-26-2. Gambling. Gambling consists of: 
(1) Making a bet; or 
(2) Ent·ering or remaining in a gambling place with intent to 
make a bet or to play a gambling device; 
Whoever commits gambling is guilty of a class misdemeanor. 
40-26-3. Commercial gambling. Commercial gambling consists 
of either: 
felony. 
(1) Participating in the earnings of or operating a gambling 
' 
place; 
(2) Receiving, recording, or forwarding bets or offers to 
bet; 
(3) Possessing or controlling facilities with the intent to 
receive, record, or forward bets or offers to bet; 
(4) For gain, becoming a custodian of anything of value, 
either bet or offered to be bet; 
(~) Setting up for use, for the purpose of gambling, or 
collecting the proceeds of, any gambling device. 
Whoever commits commercial gambling is guilty of a class 
40-26-4.- Permitting premises to be used for gambling. Per-
mitting premises to be used for gambling consists of: 
(1) Knowingly permitting any property owned or occupied by 
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any person or under his control to be used as a gambling 
place; or 
(2) Knowingly permitting a gambling device to be set up for 
use by another for the purpose of gambling in a place 
under his control. 
Whoever commits permitting premises to be used for gambling 
is guilty of a class_ misdemeanor. 
40-26-5. Dealing in gambling devices. (1) Dealing in 
gambling devices consists of manufacturing, transferring commercially, 
or possessing, with intent to transfer commercially, any of the fol-
lowing: 
Comment 
(a) Anything which he knows evidences, purports to evidence, 
or is designed to evidence participating in gambling; or 
(b) Any device which he knows is designed exclusively for 
gambling purposes or anything which he knows is designed 
exclusively as a subassembly or essential part of such 
device. This includes without limitation, gambling 
devices, numbers jars, punchboards, and roulette wheels. 
(2) Proof of possession of any device designed exclusively 
for gambling purposes which is not in a gambling .place 
and is not set up for use is prima facie ~vidence of 
possession with intent to transfer. 
(3) Whoever commits dealing in gambling devices i·s guilty 
of a class misdemeanor. 
This article restates the essential gambling provisions con-
tained in 40-10-7 through 40-10-11, CRS 1963, 40-10-12, CRS 1963, as 
amended by Chapter 39, 1964 Session Laws, and the 17 sections that 
comprise Artitle 16 of Chapter 40, CRS 1963. 
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ARTICLE 27. WEAPONS 
40-27-1. Unlawful use of weapons. Any person who knowingly 
does any of the following acts commits unlawful use of weapons: 
(1) Sells, manufactures, purchases, possesses or carries any 
bludgeon,· black-jack, sling-shot, sand-club, sand-bag, 
shotgun with a barrel less than 18 inches in length, 
metal knuckles or any knife, commonly referred to as a 
switchblade knife, which has a blade that opens auto-
matically by hand pressure applied to a button, spring or 
other device in the handle of the knife; or 
(2) Carries or possesses with intent to use the same unlaw-
fully against another, a dagger, dirk, billy, dangerous 
knife, razor, stiletto or any other dangerous or de~dly 
weapon or instrument of like character; or 
(3) Carries on or about his person or in any vehicle, a 
tear gas gun projector or bomb or any object containing 
noxious liquid gas or substance; or 
(4) Carries concealed in any vehicle or concealed on or about 
his person except when on his land or in his own abode 
or fixed place of business any pistol, revolver or 
other firearm; or 
(5) Sets a spring gun; or 
(6) Possesses any device or attachment of any kind designed, 
used or intended for use in silencing the report of any 
firearm; or 
(7) Sells, manufactures, purchases, possesses or carries any 
weapon from which more than 8 shots or bullets may be 
discharged by a single function of the firing device. 
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Any person who commits unlawful use of weapons is guilty of a 
class misdemeanor if the offense is a violation of subsections 
(1) through (6) of this section. Any person who commits unlawful use 
of weapons is guilty of a class __ felony if the offense is a viola-
tion of subsection (7) of this section. 
Any person who has been convicted of any felony under the laws 
of this or any other state and, within ten years of release from 
penitentiary or within ten years of conviction if a penitentiary 
sentence has not been imposed, violates any subsection of this section 
is guilty of a class_ felony. 
40-27-2. Exemptions. (1) Subsections (3) and (4) of section 
· 40-27-1 shall not apply to or affect any of the following: 
(a) Peace officers or any person summoned by any such of-
ficers to assist in making arrests or preserving the 
peace while he is actually engaged in assisting such 
officer. 
(b) Warden, superintendents and keepers of prisons, peni-
tentiaries, jails, and other institutions for the 
detention of persons accused or convicted of an offense. 
(c) Members of the armed services or reserve forces of the 
United States or the national guard or the reserve 
officers training corps, while in the performance of 
their official ·duty. 
(d) Watchmen while actually engaged in the performance of 
the duties of their employment. 
(e) Manufacture, transportation, or sale of weapons to 
persons authorized under paragraphs (a) through (d) of 
this subsection to possess such. 
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(2) Subsection (4) of section 40-27-1 shall not apply to or 
affect any of the following: 
(a) Members of any club or organization organized for the 
purpose of practicing shooting at targets upon estab-
lished target ranges, whether public or private, while 
such members are using their firearms on such target 
ranges. 
{b) Licensed hunters or fishermen while engaged in hunting 
or fi-shing. 
:(c)) Transportation of weapons broken down in a non-function-
:in9 '.State or not immediately accessible. 
(d) Any person in possession of a valid license issued to 
him pursuant to sections 40-27-7 through 40-27-11. 
(3) Subsection (7) of section 40-27-1 shall not apply to or 
affect a~y,oJ the following: 
(a) ~eace officers. 
(b.) Wardens, superintendents and keepers of prisons, peni-
·tentiaries, jails and other institutions for the deten-
tion of persons accused or convicted of an offense. 
(c) Members of the armed services or reserve forces of the 
United States or the national guard while in the per-
formance of their official duty. 
( d) Manuf actu·re, transportation or sale of machine guns to 
persons authorized under paiagraphs (a) through (c) of 
this subsection to possess such, provided said machine 
guns are broken down in a .non-func,t;i.oning state or not 
immediately accessible. 
(4) An information or indictment .based ,~pon a violation of 
sections 40-27-1 through 40-27-6 need not ,negativ.e any exemptions 
- 94 -
tained in this article. The defendant shall have the burden of prov-
ing such exemptions. 
40-27-3. Unlawful sale of firearms. A person commits the 
offense of unlawful sale of firearms and is guilty of a class 
misdemeanor when he knowingly: 
(1) Sells or gives any firearm of a size which may be con-
cealed upon the person to any person under eighteen 
years of age; or 
(2) Sells or gives any firearm to any narcotic addict; or 
(3) Sells or gives any firearm to any person who has been 
convicted of a felony under the laws of this .or any 
other jurisdiction within ten years from release from 
the penitentiary or within ten years of conviction if 
penitentiary sentence has not been imposed. 
40-27-4. Register of sales by dealer. (1) Any seller of fire-
arms of a size which may be concealed upon the person, other than a manu-
facturer selling to a bona fide wholesaler or retailer or a whole-
saler selling to a bona fide retailer, shall keep a register of all 
firearms sold or given away. 
(2) Such register shall contain the date of the sale or 
gift, the name, address, age, and occupation of the person to whom 
the weapon is sold or given, the price of the weapon, the kind, des-
cription, and number of the weapon, and the purpose for which it is 
purchased and obtained. 
(3) Such seller on demand of a peace officer shall produce 
for inspection the register and allow such peace officer to inspect 
such register and all stock on hand. 
(4) Any person convicted of violating any subsection of this 
section is guilty of a class misdemeanor. 
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40-27-5. Defacing identification marks of firearms. (1) 
Any person who shall change, alter, remove, or obliterate the name of 
the maker, model, manufacturer's number, or other mark of identifica-
tion of any firearm is guilty of a class misdemeanor. 
(2) Possession of any firearm upon which any such mark shall 
_ have been changed, altered, removed, or obliterated shall be prima 
facie evidence that the possessor has changed, altered, removed, or 
obliterated the same. 
40-27-6. Confiscation and disposition of weapons. Any 
stolen weapon so confiscated, when no longer needed for evidentiary 
purposes, shall pe returned to the person entitled to possession if 
known. All other confiscated weapons when no longer needed for evi-
dentiary purposes shall, in the discretion of the trial court, be 
destroyed, preserved as county property, delivered to the armed forces 
of the United States or the national guard or .sold and the proceeds of 
such sale shall be paid to the county treasurer. 
40-27-7. License to carry concealed firearm. Upon proof that 
the applicant is of good moral cha·racter, a citizen of the United 
States, has no prior history of mental illness, or narcotic drug 
addiction, has not been convicted of a felony in this or any other 
state or of an offense which if committed in this state would consti-
tute a felony, during the preceding ten years, is 21 years of age or 
older, and that a good reason or reasons exist for the issuance 
thereof, the sheriff of any county may issue to such applicant a 
license to carry a concealed firearm in that county, restricted to 
any such reasons which are satisfactory to the sheriff. 
40-27-8. Application for license. Each applicant shall pay 
to the sheriff an application fee of three dollars upon the submis-
sion of his application for license. Such application for license 
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shall be filed in writing and include the applicant's: (1) name, (2) 
occupation, (3) home address, (4) business address, (5) age, (6) sex, 
(7) height, (8) weight, (9) color of eyes, (10) color of hair, (11) 
color photograph, two inches by two inches, taken within one year 
prior to such application, (12) signature, and (13) reasons for the 
necessity or desirability to carry a concealed firearm. 
40-27-9. Comparison of fingerprints of applicant. Upon 
application, the sheriff shall cause to have duplicate fingerprints 
made of the applicant and shall forward one copy to the national 
bureau of identification in Washington, D. C., for comparison of 
fingerprints with those on file in the bureau. No license, except a 
· temporary emergency license, shall be issued unless and until a report 
is received by the sheriff that such comparison shows no conviction of 
a felony during the preceding ten years. In the event the applicant 
previously has been fingerprinted in accordance with this section, and 
his fingerprints are on file with the national bureau of identifica-
tion, reference to such prints may be submitted in lieu thereof. 
40-27-10. License contents -- in possession. (1) Each 
license shall be issued for a definite period of not more than one 
year, and no renewal of such license shall be granted except upon the 
filing of a new application. Each license shall include the appli-
cant's (1) name, (2) occupation, (3) home address, (4) business 
address, (5) age, (6) sex, (7) height, (8) weight, (9) color of eyes. 
(10) color of hair. (11) color photograph, two inches by two inches. 
taken within one year prior to the application, (12) signature. (13) 
right thumb imprint or if that be not possible. the left thumb im-
print or some other finger. Each license shall contain a description 
of the weapon or weapons authorized to be carried. including the name 
of the manufacturer, the serial number, and the caliber. 
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(2) Each licensee shall carry his license upon his person at 
all tlmes when he may be carrying a concealed firearm upon his person 
or in any vehicle operated or occupied by such licensee, and shall 
display such license upon the request of any law enforcement officer. 
40-27-11. Temporary emergency license. The sheriff of any 
county may grant a temporary emergency license to carry a concealed 
firearm in that county in cases of emergency pending the results of a 
fingerprint comparison. Such temporary emergency license shall expire 
automatically 30 days after the date of issuance thereof. 
Comment 
This article restates the essential firearm provisions con-
tained i~ 40-11-1. CRS 1963, as amended by Chapter 39, 1964 Session 
Laws; 40-11-2, and 40-11-8 through 40-11-10, CRS 1963; 53-3-1 through 
53-3-3, CRS 1963, 53-3-4, CRS 1963, as amended by Chapter 39, 1964 
Session Laws; and the four sections comprising Article 4 of Chapter 
53, CRS 1963. 
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PART E. OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
i 
ARTICLE 28. DISLOYALTY 
40-28-1. Flag Desecration. (1) Any person who intentionally 
does any of the following commits flag desecration and is guilty of a 
class misdemeanor: 
(a) Places on or attaches to a flag any word, mark, design, 
or advertisement not properly a part of the flag; or 
(b) Exposes to public view a flag upon which has been placed 
or attached a word, mark, design, or advertisement not 
properly a part of the flag; or 
(c) Manufactures or exposes to public view an article of 
merchandise or a wrapper or receptacle for merchandise 
upon which a flag is depicted; or 
(d) Publicly mutilates, defiles, or casts contempt upon a 
flag. 
(2) As used in this section, flag means anything which is or 
purports to be: 
(a) The Stars and Stripes; or 
(b) The Colorado state flag; or 
(c) Any other authorized flag, standard, color, or ensign of 
the United States or of the state of Colorado; or 
(d) Any copy, picture or representation of any authorized 
flag, standard, color or ensign of the United States or 
of the state of Colorado. 
(3) The possession of any flag upon which is placed or at-
tached a word, mark, design, or advertisement not properly a part of 
the flag and the possession of any article of merchandise oz a wrapper 
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or receptacle for merchandise upon which a flag is depicted is prima 
facie evidence of an intent to expose the same to public view. 
Comment 
This proposed section constitutes a restatement of the present 
offense defined in 40-23-3, CRS 1963. 
40-28-2. Display of foreign flag. (1) Any person who in-
tentionally displays any flag, except the flags of the United States, 
upon any state, county or municipal building commits display of 
foreign flag and is guilty of a class misdemeanor. 
(2) Whenever any foreigner becomes a guest of the United 
States, the state of Colorado or of any city in this state, or upon 
the occasion of the visit of any foreign minister, envoy or ambassa-
dor in his official representative capacity, the flag of the cou~try 
of which he is a citizen may be displayed upon public buildings. 
(3) As used in this section, foreign flag includes flags of 
other nations and flags of anarchistic societies. 
Comment 
This proposed section restates the present offense defined 
in 40-23-1, CRS 1963. 
40-28-3. Improper use of national anthem. Any person who 
plays, sings or renders in any public place or assemblage, except an 
entire or separate composition or number "The Star Spangled Banner," 
commits improper use of national anthems and is guilty of a class 
misdemeanor. 
Comment 
This proposed section is a restatement of the present offense 
defined in 40-23-16 and 40-23-17, CRS 1963. 
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40-28-4. Insurrection. Any person who engages in, or co-
operates or participates with any armed force of men, with the intent 
by force of arms to obstruct, retard or resist the execution of any 
law of this state or, with an armed force of men, invades any portion 
of this state, commits insurrection and is guilty of a class -
felony. 
Comment 
This proposed section is a restatement of the present offense 
defined in 40•7-18, CRS 1963. 
ARTICLE 29. BRIBERY 
40-29-1. Definitions. In article 29, unless a different 
meaning plainly is required: 
(1) "Benefit" means gain or advantage, or anything regarded 
by the beneficiary as gain or advantage, including benefit to any 
other person or entity in whose welfare he is interested, but not an 
advantage promised generally to a group or class of voters as a conse-
quence of public measures which a candidate engages to support or 
oppose; 
(2) "Government" includes any branch, subdivision or agency 
of the government of the State or any locality within it: 
(3) "Harm" means loss, disadvantage or injury, or anything 
so regarded by the person affected, including loss, disadvantage or 
injury to any other person or entity in whose welfare he is inter-
ested; 
(4) "Official proceeding'' means a proceeding heard or which 
may be heard before any legislative, judicial, administrative or 
other governmental agency or official authorized to take evidence 
under oath, including any referee, hearing examiner, commissioner, 
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notary or other person taking testimony or deposition in connection 
with any such proceeding: 
(~) "Party official" means a person who holds an elective or 
appointive post in a political party in the United States by virtue of 
which he directs or conducts, or participates in directing or conduct-
ing party affairs at any level of responsibility; 
(6) ''Pecuniary benefit" is benefit in the form of money, 
property, commercial interests or anything else the primary signi-
ficance of which is economic gain; 
(7) "Public servant" means any officer or employee of govern-
ment, including legislators and judges, and any person participating 
as juror, advisor, consultant or otherwise, in performing a govern-
mental function: but the term does not include witnesses: 
(8) 11Administrative proceeding" means any proceeding the out-
come of which is required to be based on a record or documentation 
prescribed by law, or in which law or regulation is particularized in 
application to individuals. 
40-29-2. Bribery in official and political matters. (1) 
Any person who offers, confers or agrees to confer upon another, or 
solicits, accepts or agrees to accept from another any of the follow-
ing commits bribery in official and political matters and is guilty of 
a class felony: 
(a) Any pecuniary benefit as consideration for the recipient's 
decision, opinion, recommendation, vote or other exercise 
of discretion as a public servant, part~ official or 
voter; or 
(b) Any benefit as consideration for the recipient's decision, 
vote, recommendation or other exercise of official 
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discretion in a judicial or administrative proceeding; or 
(c) Any benefit as consideration for a violation of a known 
duty as public servant or party official. 
(2) It is no defense to prosecution under this section that 
a person whom the offender sought to influence was not qualified to 
act in the desired way whether because he had not yet assumed office, 
or lacked jurisdiction, or for any other reas~n. 
40-29-3. Threats and other improper influence in official 
and political matters. (1) Any person who does any of the following 
commits threats and other improper influence in official and politi-
cal matters: 
(a) Threatens unlawful harm to any person with purpose to 
influence his decision, opinion, recommendatior,, vote or 
other exercise of discretion as a public servant, party 
official or voter: or 
(b) Threatens harm to any public servant with purpose to in-
fluence his decision, opinion, recommendation, vote or 
other exercise of discretion in a judicial or adminis-
trative proceeding; or 
(c) Threatens harm to any public servant or party official 
with purpose to infiuence him to violate his duty: or 
(d) Privately addresses to any public servant who has or 
will have an official discretion in a judicial or adminis-
trative proceeding any representation, entreaty, argument 
or other communication designed to influence the outcome 
on the basis of considerations other than those author-
ized by law. 
(2) It is no defense to prosecution under this section that 
a person whom the offender sought to influence was not qualified to 
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act in the desired way whether because he had not yet assumed office, 
or lacked jurisdiction, or for any other reason. 
(3) Any person who commits threats and other improper in-
fluence in official and political matters is guilty of a class 
misdemeanor unless the offender threatened to commit a crime or made 
a threat with purpose to influence a judicial or administrative pro-
ceeding, in which cases the offense is a class felony. 
40-29-4. Official misconduct. Any public officer or employee 
who, in his official capacity, does any of the following commits of-
ficial misconduct and is guilty of a class 
and forfeits his office or employment: 
felony (misdemeanor) 
(1) Intentionally or recklessly fails to perform any manda-
tory duty as required by law; or 
(2) Solicits or knowingly accepts for the performance or any 
act a fee or reward which he knows is not authorized by 
law. 
40-29-5. Compensation for past official behavior. Any person 
who does any of the following commits compensation for past official 
behavior and is guilty of a class misdemeanor: 
(1) Solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any pecuniary 
benefit as compensation for having, as public servant, 
given a decision, opinion, recommendation or vote favor-
able to another, or for having otherwise exercised a 
discretion in his favor, or for having violated his 
duty; or 
(2) Offers, confers or agrees to confer compensation accept-
ance of which is prohibited by subsection (1) of this 
section. 
- 104 -
40-29-6. Retaliation for past official action. Any person 
who harms another by any unlawful act in retaliation for anything 
lawfully done by the latter in the capacity of public servant commits 
retaliation for past official action and is guilty of a class 
misdemeanor. 
40-29-7. Gifts to public servants by persons subject to their 
Jurisdiction. (1) No public servant in any department or agency ex-
ercising regulatory functions, or conducting inspections or investiga-
tions, or carrying on civil or criminal litigation on behalf of the 
government, or having custody of prisoners, shall solicit, accept or 
agree to accept any pecuniary benefit from a person known to be sub-
. ject to such regulation, inspection, investigation or custody, or 
against whom such litigation is known to be pending or contemplated. 
(2) No public servant having any discretionary function to 
perform in connection with contracts, purchases, payments, claims or 
other pecuniary transactions of the government shall solicit, accept 
or agree to accept any pecuniary benefit from any person known to be 
interested in or likely to become interested in any such contract, 
purchase, payment, claim or transaction. 
(3) No public servant having judicial or administrative 
authority and no public servant employed by or in a court or other 
tribunal having such authority, or participating in the enforcement of 
its decisions, shall solicit, accept or agree to accept any pecuniary 
benefit from a person known to be interested in or likely to become 
interested in any matter before such public servant or a tribunal with 
which he is associated. 
(4) No legislator or public servant employed by the legisla-
ture or by any committee or agency thereof shall solicit, accept or 
agree to accept any pecuniary benefit from any person known to be 
interested in a bill, transactioh or proceeding, pending or contemplated, 
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before the legislature or any committee or agency thereof. 
(5) This section shall not apply to: 
(a) Fees prescribed by law to be received by a public 
servant, or any other benefit for which the recipient 
gives legitimate consideration or to which he is other-. 
wise legally entitled; or 
(b) Gifts or other benefits conferred on account of kinship 
or other personal, professional or business relationship 
independent of the official status of the receiver; or 
(c) Trivial benefits incidental to personal, professional or 
business contacts and involving no substantial risk of 
undermining official impartiality. 
(6) No person shall knowingly confer, or offer or agree to 
confer, any benefit prohibited by the foregoing subsections. 
(7) An offense under this section is a class misdemeanor. 
40-29-8. Compensating public servant for assisting private 
interests in relation to matters before him. Any person who does any 
of the following commits comQensating public servant for assisting 
private interests in relation to matters before him and is guilty of 
a class misdemeanor: 
(1) Any public servant who solicits, accepts or agrees to 
accept compensation for advice or other assistance in 
preparing· or promoting a bill, contract, claim, or other 
transaction or proposal as to which he knows that he has 
or is likely to have an official discretion to exercise; 
or 
(2) Any person who pays or offers or agrees to pay compensa-
tion to a public servant with knowledge that acceptance by the public 
servant is unlawful. 
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Connent 
Proposed article 29 is based, on the provisions of the Model 
Penal and the newly enacted Illinois codes. With the exception of 
proposed sections 40-29-2 and 40-29-4, this article proposes new law. 
A list of the present bribery statutes this article replaces would 
include: 
40-7-5, CRS 1963* 
40-7-6, CRS 1963* 
40-7-8, CRS 1963 
40-7-38, CRS 1963 
40-7-43, CRS 1963* 
40-7-45, CRS 1963* --
Bribery of Judges or Legislator 
Bribery of Public Officer 
Bribery of Water Conmissioner 
Embracery 
Judge or Officer Receiving Reward 
Officer Taking Reward for Omission of 
Duty 
* As amended by Chapter 39, 1964 session Laws 
ARTICLE 30. ABUSE OF OFFICE 
40-30-1. Definitions. In this article, unless a different 
meaning plainly is required, the definitions given in section 40-29-1 
apply. 
40-30-2. Speculating or wagering on official action or in-
formation. Any public servant -who, in contemplation of official action 
by himself or by a governmental unit with which he is associated, or 
in reliance on information to which he has access in his official 
capacity and which has not been made public, does any of the following 
commits speculating or wagering on official action or information and 
is guilty of a class misdemeanor: 
(1) Acquires pecuniary interest in any property, transaction 
or enterprise which may be affected by such information 
or official action; or 
(2) Speculates or wagers on the basis of such information or 
official action; or 
(3) Aids another to do any of the foregoing. 
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40-30-3. Official oppression. Any person who, while acting 
or purporting to act in an official capacity or taking advantage of 
such actual or purported capacity, does any of the following with 
knowledge that his conduct is illegal commits official oppression 
and is guilty of a class_ mi~demeanor: 
Comment 
(1) Subjects another to arrest, detention, search, seizure, 
mistreatment, dispossession, assessment, lien or other 
infringement of personal or property rights; or 
(2) Denies or impedes another in the exercise or enjoyment of 
any right, power or immunity; or 
(3) Has legal authority and jurisdiction of any person 
legally restrained of his liberty and denies the person 
restrained the opportunity to consult in private with any 
practicing attorney at law, if: 
(a) There is no danger of imminent escape; and 
(b) The person in custody desires to consult with the 
practicing attorney at law. 
Proposed section 40-30-2 restates several offenses presently 
defined in chapter 40, CRS 1963, including: 
40-19-1, CRS 1963 State and County Officers Not to Deal 
in Warrants 
40-19-2, CRS 1963 County and Municipal Officers Not to 
Deal in Warrants 
40-19-5, CRS 1963 No Officer to Derive Benefit From 
Contract 
40-19-6, CRS 1963 Making Unlawful Contract 
40-19-10, CRS 1963 Interest in Contract Prohibited 
40-19-11, CRS 1963 Penalty for Violation of Section 
40-9-10 
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Proposed section 40-30-.-~, restates several offenses presently 
defined in chapter 40, CRS 1963, including: 
39-1-1, CRS 1963,, as amended by chapter 39. 1964 Session 
Laws -- Rights of Prisoner to Consult Counsel 
40-7-10. CRS 1963 -- Inhumanity of Jailer 
40-7-11,. CRS 1963, -as amended by chapter 39, 1964 Session 
Laws -- Coercion of Prisoners 
40-7-12, ems. 1963 -- Rules of Evidence Not Affected 
40-7-17, CRS 1963, as amended by chapter 39, 1964 Session 
Laws -- Resisting Officer 
ARTICLE 31. ESCAPE AND RELATED OFFENSES 
40-31-1. Refusing to aid an officer. Any person who upon 
, command refuses or knowingly ·fails reasonably to aid a person known 
by him to be a peace off leer to do any of the following, commits re-
fusing to aid an officer and is guilty of a class misdemeanor: 
Comment 
(1) Apprehending a person whom the officer is authorized to 
apprehend; or 
(2) Preventing the commission by another of any offense. 
This proposed section is a restatement of the present offenses 
defined under 40-7-48, CRS 1963, as amended by chapter 39. 1964 
Session Laws. Under the present law, a person may not commit this of-
fense unless he is a male above 18 years of age. The proposed section 
provides no similar limitation. 
40-31-2. Resisting an officer. Any person who intentionally 
obstructs, resists or opposes the authorized service of any lawful 
process or order of any court by any public officer or other person 
commits resisting an officer and is guilty of a class misdemeanor. 
Comment 
This section is a restatement of the present offense defined 
under 40-7-17, CRS 1963, as amended by Chapter 39, 1964 Session Laws. 
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40-31-3. Compounding. (1) Any person who accepts or agrees to 
accept any pecuniary benefit in consideration of refraining from 
reporting to law enforcement authorities the commission or suspected 
commission of any offense or information relating to an offense com-
mits compounding and is guilty of a class misdemeanor. 
(2) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this 
section that the pecuniary benefit did not exceed an amount which the 
offender believed to be due as restitution or indemnification for 
harm caused by the offense. 
Comment 
This proposed section is a restatement of the present offense 
defined in 40-7-34, CRS 1963. 
40-31-4. Aiding escape. Any person commits aiding escape 
when he intentionally: 
Comment 
(1) Rescues any person who has been convicted of a class 
felony, and is guilty of a class_ felony; or 
(2) Rescues any person who has been convicted of a class 
felony, whether the person is in the custody of an officer 
or in the penitentiary, and is guilty of a class_ 
felony; or 
(3) Rescues any person who is charged but not convicted of a 
class_ felony, and is guilty of a class_ felony; or 
(4) Rescues any person who is charged but not convicted of a 
class 
demeanor. 
misdemeanor, and is guilty of a class mis-
This proposed section constitutes a restatement of the present 
offenses defined in 40-7-20 and 40-7-21, CRS 1963. 
40-31-5. Officer aiding escape. Any warden of the penitentiary 
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or any of his employees or any law enforcement officer who intention-
ally aids or permits any prisoner to escape commits officer aiding 
escape and is guilty of a class_ felony. 
Comment 
This proposed section constitutes a restatement of the present 
offense defined in .40-7-22, CRS 1963. 
40-31-6. Officer permitting convict to be at large. Any 
warden of the penitentiary or any of his employees or any law enforce-
ment officer who negligently permits any convict committed or in custody, 
under sentence of solitary imprisonment, to be at large·without the 
cell or apartment assigned to such convict, or to be there visited, 
conversed witn, comforted or relieved, contrary to the rules and 
regulations of the penitentiary, or negligently permits such convict 
or any other convict committed to the penitentiary under sentence of 
confinement to hard labor, to be at large without the precincts of the 
penitentiary, or contrary to the rules and regulations thereof, to be 
out of close confinement, commits officer permitting convict to be at 
large and is guilty of a class_ misdemeanor. 
Comment 
This proposed section constitutes a restatement of the present 
offense defined in 40-7-23, CRS 1963. 
40-31-7. Inducing prisoners to absent selves. Any person who 
invites, entices, inveigles, solicits or induces any prisoner confined 
in the penitentiary or restrained on or in any ranch, farm or camp 
owned, operated or maintained by the state of Colorado or by authority 
thereof or at any place whatsoever, to absent himself from his work, 
or who delays or hinders such prisoner in his work, commits inducing 
prisoners to absent selves and is guilty of a class misdemeanor. 
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Comment 
This proposed section constitutes a restatement.of the present 
offense defined in 40-7-24, CRS 1963. · 
40-31-8. Conveying tools to prisoner. Any person who conveys 
to any convict in custody, or committed to the penitentiary, into the 
penitentiary or other place where such convict may be confined, any 
tool, weapon or other aid, with intent to enable such convict to 
escape such custody or confinement, whether such escape be effected 
or not, commits conveying tools to prisoner and is guilty of a class 
misdemeanor. 
Comment 
This proposed section constitutes a restatement of the present 
offense defined in 40-7-25, CRS 1963. 
40-31-9. Furnishing weapons to convicts. Any person who 
furnishes, or aids or assists in furnishing to any convict who is 
confined in the penitentiary or state reformatory, or restrained on or 
in any ranch, farm, or camp owned, operated, or maintained by the state 
of Colorado, or by authority thereof, or at any place whatsoever, or 
who furnishes to any person confined in any jail, or in the custody 
of any sheriff, deputy sheriff, coroner, peace officer, or other per-
son having lawful custody of such person, or conveys by any means 
into a jail or other place of confinement, any firearms, or other 
deadly weapons, or dynamite or other explosives, for the purpose of 
aiding, assisting, or encouraging such convict or person to escape 
from such confinement, custody, or such restraint, or to bring about 
an ou~break or riot, commits furnishing weapons to convicts and is 
guilty of a class_ felony. 
Comment 
This proposed section constitutes a restatement of the present 
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offense defined in 40-7-26, CRS 1963. 
40-31-10. Assisting escape. (1) Any person who knowingly 
aids, or assists any convict who is confined in the penitentiary or 
state reformatory, or restrained on or in any ranch, farm or camp 
owned, operated or maintained by the state of Colorado, or by authority 
thereof, or at any other place whatsoever, to escape commits assisting 
escape and is guilty of a class_ felony. 
(2) The knowingly leaving or causing to be left any clothing, 
food, money, or other thing whatsoever which may be used by such 
convict in attempting to escape where auch article or thing may be 
obtained by such convict shall be held to be, within the meaning of 
.this section, the assisting of such convict to escape. 
Comment 
This proposed section constitutes a restatement of the present 
offense defined in 40-7-27, CRS 1963. 
40-31-11. Furnishing drugs or liquor to convicts. (1) Any 
person who knowingly furnishes, or assists in furnishing to any 
prisoner confined in the penitentiary or state reformatory or re-
strained on or in any ranch, farm, or camp owned, operated, or main-
tained by the state of Colorado, or by authority thereof, or at any 
place whatsoever, any morphine, cocaine, codeine, or other such habit-
forming drug or any intoxicating liquor, commits furnishing drugs or 
liquor to convicts and is guilty of a class felony. 
(2) Knowingly leaving or causing to be left any such article 
where it may be obtained by ·any such convict shall be held to be, 
within the meaning of this section, the furnishing such articles to 
such convict. 
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Comment 
This proposed section constitutes a restatement of the present 
offense defined in 40-7-28, CRS 1963. 
40-31-12. Rescue on civil process. Any person who rescues 
another in legal custody on civil process commits rescue on civil 
process and is guilty of a class misdemeanor. 
Comment 
This proposed section constitutes a restatement of the present 
offenses defined in 40-7-29, CRS 1963. 
40-31-13. Aiding in escape attempt. Any person who aids or 
assists a prisoner lawfully committed or detained in any jail for an 
offense against this state, or who shall be lawfully confined by 
virtue of any civil process, to make his escape from the jail, though 
no escape be actually made, or any person who conveys or causes to be 
delivered to any such prisoner any disguise, instrument or arms proper 
to facilitate the escape of such prisoner, commits aiding in escape 
attempt and is guilty of a class misdemeanor. 
Comment 
This proposed section c9nstitutes a restatement of the present 
offense defined in 40-7-30, CRS\1963. 
40-31-14. Aiding escape from officer. Any person who aids or 
assists any prisoner to escape, or rescues any prisoner from the law-
ful custody of any law enforcement officer, commits aiding escape from 
officer and is guilty of a class misdemeanor. 
Comment 
This proposed section constitutes a restatement of the present 
offense defined under 40-7-31, CRS 1963, as amended by Chapter 39, 1964 
Session Laws. 
40-31-15. Officer allowing escape. Any law enforcement of-
ficer having lawful custody of any prisoner permits a prisoner to 
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escape or go at large commits officer allowing escape and: 
Comment 
(l} Is guilty of a class_ misdemeanor, if the prisoner ha1 
not been convicted of any offense; or 
(2) Is guilty of a class 
charged with a class 
or 
(3) Is guilty of a class 
felony, if the prisoner is 
felony but has not been ·convicted; 
misdemeanor, if the prisoner 
escapes because of the law enforcement officer's 
negligence. 
This proposed section constitutes a restatement of the present 
offense defined under 40-7-32, CRS 1963, as amended by Chapter 39, 
1964 Session Laws. 
40-31-16. Assault during escape. Any person who c?mmits an 
assault with intent to commit bodily injury upon the person of another 
with a deadly weapon or instrument, or by any means of force likely 
to produce great bodily injury, commits assault during escape and is 
guilty of: 
Comment 
(1) A class 
a class 
(2) A class 
felony, if the person has been convicted of 
felony; or 
felony, if the person has been convicted of a 
class_ felony. 
This proposed section constitutes a restatement of the present 
offense defined under 40-7-49 and 40-7-50, CRS 1963. 
40-31-17. Holding hostages during escape. Any person com-
mitted to the state penitentiary or the state reformatory at Buena 
Vista who, while escaping or attempting to escape, holds as hostage 
any person within the state penitentiary or the state reformatory at 
Buena Vista, or, who by force or threat of force, holds any person or 
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persons against his will in defiance of official orders within the 
state penitentiary, or state reformatory at Buena Vista, or who, while 
being held in jail after sentence but awaiting transportation to the 
state penitentiary or the state reformatory at Buena Vista, or who, 
while being transported to or from the state penitentiary or the state 
reformatory at Buena Vista, escapes, commits holding hostages during 
escape and is guilty of a class_ felony. 
Comment 
This proposed section constitutes a restatement of the present 
offense defined under 40-7-51, CRS 1963. 
40-31-18. Escapes. Any person after being found guilty of a 
felony by a court or jury or after pleading guilty to a felony who, 
while being held in jail or while in the custody of any person lawfully 
having charge of him, escapes therefrom, commits escape and is guilty 
of a class_ felony. 
Comment 
This proposed section constitutes a restatement of the present 
offense defined in 40-7-53, CRS 1963. 
ARTICLE 32. PERJURY AND OTHER FALSIFICATION IN 
OFFICIAL MATTERS 
40-32-1. Definition. In this article, unless a different 
meaning plainly is required: 
(1) The definitions given in 40-29-1 apply; and 
( 2) "Statement II means any representation, but includes a 
representation of opinion, belief or other state of mind 
only if the representation clearly relates to state of 
mind apart from or in addition to any facts which are the 
subject of the representation. 
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40-32-2. Perjury. (1) Any person who, in any official pro• 
ceeding, makes a false statement under oath or equivalent affirmation, 
or swears or affirms the truth of a statement previously made, when 
the statement is material and he does not believe it to be true com-
mits perjury and is guilty of a class_ felony. 
(2) Falsification is material, regardless of the admissi-
bility of the statement under rules of evidence, if it could have 
affected the course or outcome of the proceeding. It is no defense 
that the declarant mistakenly believed the falsification to be im-
material. Whether a falsification is material in a given factual 
situation is a question of law. 
(3) It is not a defense to prosecution under this Section that 
the oath or affirmation was administered or taken in an irregular 
manner or that the declarant was not competent to make the statement. 
A document purporting to be made upon oath or affirmation at any time 
when the actor presents it as being so verified shall be deemed to 
have been duly sworn or affirmed. 
(4) No person shall be guilty of an offense under this Sec-
tion if he retracted the falsification in the course of the proceeding 
in which it was made before it became manifest that the falsification 
was or would be exposed and before the falsification substantially 
affected the proceeding. 
(5) Where the defendant made inconsistent statements under 
oath or equivalent affirmation, both having been made within the period 
of the statute of limitations, the prosecution may proceed by setting 
forth the inconsistent statements in a single count alleging in the 
alternative that one or the other was false and not believed by the 
defendant. In such case it shall not be necessary for the prosecution 
to prove which statement was false but only that one or the other was 
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false and not believed by the defendant to be true. 
(6) No person shall be convicted of an offense under this 
Section where proof of falsity rests solely upon contradiction by 
testimony of a single person other than the defendant. 
40-32-3. false swearing in official matters. (1) Any person 
who makes a false &tatement under oath or equivalent affirmation, or 
swears or affirms the truth of such a statement previously made, when 
he does not believe the statement to be true, commits false swearing 
in official matters and is guilty of a class_ misdemeanor, if: 
(a) The falsification occurs in an official proceeding; or 
(b) The falsification is intended to mislead a public servant 
in performing his official function. 
(2) Subsections (3) to (6) of section 40-32-2 apply to this 
section. 
40-32-4. False swearing. (1) Any person who makes a false 
statement under oath or equivalent affirmation, or swears or affirms 
the truth of such a statement previously made, when he does not be-
lieve the statement to be true, commits false swearing and is guilty 
of a class_ misdemeanor, if the statement is one which is required 
by law to be sworn or affirmed before a notary or other person author-
ized to administer oaths. 
(2) Subsections (3) to (6) of section 40-32-2 apply to this 
section. 
40-32-5. Unsworn falsification to authorities. (1) Any 
person who does any of the following with purpose to mislead a public 
servant commits unsworn falsification to authorities and is guilty of 
a class misdemeanor: 
(a) Makes any written false statement which he does not be-
lieve to be true; or 
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(b) Purposely creates a false impression in a written appli-
cation for any pecuniary or other benefit, by omitting 
information necessary to prevent statements therein from 
being misleading; or 
(c) Submits or invites reliance on any writing which he knows 
to be forged, altered or otherwise lacking in authenti-
city; or 
(d) Submits or invites reliance on any sample, specimen, map, 
boundary-mark, or other object which he knows to be 
false. 
(2) Any person who makes a written false statement which he 
. does riot believe to be true, on or pursuant to a form bearing notice, 
authorized by law, to the effect that false statements made therein 
are punishable is guilty of a class misdemeanor. 
(3) Subsections (3) to (6) of section 40-32-2 apply to this 
section. 
40-32-6. False alarms to agencies of public safety. Any 
person who knowingly causes a false alarm of fire or other emergency 
to be transmitted to or within any organization, official or volunteer, 
· for dealing with emergencies involving danger to life or property, 
commits false alarms to agencies of public safety and is guilty of a 
class misdemeanor. 
40-32-7. False reports to law enforcement authorities. (1) 
Any person who does any of the following commits false reports to law 
enforcement authorities: 
(a) Knowingly gives false information to any law enforcement 
officer with purpose to implicate another; or 
(b) Reports to law enforcement authorities an offense or 
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other incident within their concern knowing that it did 
not occur; or 
(c) Pretends to furnish such authorities-with information 
relating to an offense or incident when he knows he has 
no information relating to such offense or incident. 
(2) A person who commits false reports to law enforcement 
authorities by violating subsection (l)(a) of this section is guilty 
of a class 
is a class 
misdemeanor. Otherwise, an offense under this section 
misdemeanor. 
40-32-8. Tampering with witnesses and informants. (1) Any 
person who, believing that an official proceeding or investigation is 
pending or about to be instituted, attempts to induce or otherwise 
cause a witness or informant to do any of the following commits tamper-
ing with witnesses and informants: 
(a) Testify or inform falsely; or 
(b) Withhold any testimony, information, document or thing; 
or 
(c) Elude legal process summoning him to testify or supply 
evidence; or 
(d) Absent himself from any proceeding or investigation to 
which he has been legally summoned. 
(2) A person who commits tampering with witnesses and in-
formants is guilty of a class felony if he employs force, decep-
tion, threat or offer of pecuniary benefit. Otherwise, an offense 
under this section is a class misdemeanor. 
40-32-9. Retaliation against witness or informant. Any person 
who harms another by any unlawful act in retaliation for anything done 
in the capacity of witness or informant commits retaliation against 
witness or informant and is guilty of a class misdemeanor. 
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40-32-10. Witness or informant taking bribe. Any person who 
solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit in consideration of 
his doing any of the things specified in subsections (l)(a) to (l)(d) 
of section 40-32-8 commits witness or informant taking bribe and is 
guilty of a class_ felony. 
40-32-11. Tampering with or fabricating physical evidence. 
Any person, believing that an official proceeding or investigation is 
pending or about to be instituted, does any of the following commits 
tampering with or fabricating physical evidence and is guilty of a 
class misdemeanor: 
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals or removes any record, docu-
ment or thing with purpose to impair its verity or 
availability in such proceeding or investigation; or 
(2) Makes, presents or uses any record, document ,or thing 
knowing it to be false and with purpose to mislead a 
public servant who is or may be engaged in such proceed-
ing or investigation. 
40-32-12. Tampering with public records or information. (1) 
Any person who does any of the following commits tampering with public 
records or information: 
{a) Knowingly makes a false entry in, or false alteration of, 
any record, document or thing belonging to, or received 
or kept by, the government for information or record, or 
required by law to be kept by others for information of 
the government; or 
(b) Makes, presents or uses any record, document or thing 
knowing it to be false, and with purpose that it be taken 
as a genuine part of information or records referred to 
in paragraph (a); or 
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(c) Purposely and unlawfully destroys, conceals, removes or 
otherwise impairs the verity or availability of any such 
record, document or thing. 
(2) An offense under this section is a class misdemeanor 
unless the offender's purpose is to defraud or injure anyone, in which 
case the offense is a class __ felony. 
40-32-13. False personation of judicial or governmental of-
ficials. Any person who falsely represents himself to be an attorney 
authorized to practice law or a public officer or a public employee, 
commits false personation of judicial or governmental officials and 1, 
guilty of a class misdemeanor. 
40-32-14. Performance of unauthorized acts. Any person who 
performs any of the following knowing that his performance is not 
authorized by law commits performance of unauthorized acts and is 
guilty of a class_ felony (misdemeanor): 
(1) Conducts a marriage ceremony; or 
(2) Acknowledges the execution of any document which by law 
may be recorded; or 
(3) Becomes a surety for any party in any civil or criminal 
proceeding, before any court or public officer authorized 
to accept such surety; or 
(4) Does any other act in the course of any act or proceeding 
whereby if it were done by the person falsely personated, 
such person might in any event become liable to an action 
or special proceeding, civil or criminal, or to pay a sum 
of money, or to incur a charge, forfeiture or penalty. 
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Comment 
Proposed article 32 is based on the provision of the Model 
Penal Code and the newly revised criminal code of Illinois. A partial 
list of present perjury statutes this article replaces would include: 
Perjury - Subornation 
False Verified Statements 
40-7-1, CRS 1963 
40-7-2, CRS 1963 
40-7-3, CRS 1963 
40-7-4, CRS 1963 
40-7-7, CRS 1963 
40-7-9, CRS 1963 
40-7-13, CRS 1963 
40-7-14, CRS 1963 
40-7-15, CRS 1963 
40-7-16, CRS 1963 
40-7-37, CRS 1963 
40-17-1, CRS 1963 
40-17-3, CRS 1963 --
Procuring Conviction of Murder by Perjury 
Indictment - Allegations 
Inducing Witness to Secrete Himself 
Officer Purloining Records 
-- Detaining Office Records 
False Instrument~ - Procuring 
Simulating Judicial Process 
Penalty for Simulating Judicial Process 
Exercising Office Unlawfully 
False Impersonation Defined 
False Impersonation - Penalty 
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/ 
PART F. INCHOATE OFFENSES 
ARTICLE 33. CRIMINAL ATTEMPT 
40-33-1. Criminal attempt. (1) (a) A person is guilty of 
attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the state of mind otherwise 
required for the commission of the crime, he: 
(b) Purposely engages in conduct which would constitute the 
crime if the attendant circumstances were as he believes 
them to be; or 
(c) When causing a particular result is an element of the 
crime, does or omits to do anything with the purpose of 
causing or with the belief that it will cause such result, 
without further conduct on his part; or 
(d) Purposely does or omits to do anything which, under. the 
circumstances as he believes them to be, is a substantial 
step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his 
commission of the crime. 
(2) (a) Such person's conduct shall not be held to constitute 
a substantial step under subsection (1) (d) of this sec~ 
tion unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's 
criminal purpose. Without negativing the sufficiency of 
other conduct, the following, if strongly corroborative 
of the actor's criminal purpose, shall not be held insuf-
ficient as a matter of law: 
{b) Lying in wait for, searching for, or following the con-
templated victim of the crime; 
(c) Enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated victim of 
the crime to go to the place contemplated for its commis-
sion; 
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{d) Reconnoitering the place contemplated for the commission 
of the crime; 
(e) Unlawful entry of a vehicle, into a structure, into any 
enclosure, or onto any real property in which or on 
which it is contemplated that the crime will be committed; 
(f) Possession of items or materials to be employed in the 
commission of the crime, which are specially designed for 
such unlawful use or which can serve no lawful purpose of 
the actor under the circumstances; 
(g) Possession, collection, or fabrication of items or mat-
erials to be employed in the commission of the crime, at 
or near the place contemplated for its commission, where 
such possession, collection, or fabrication serves no 
lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances; or 
(h) Soliciting an accomplice or an innocent agent to engage 
in conduct constituting an element of the crime. 
40-33-2. Conduct in aid of another. Any person who engages 
in conduct intended to aid another to commit any crime which would 
establish his complicity under section ____ or ____ , if the 
crime were committed by such other person, is guilty of an attempt to 
commit a crime, although the crime is not committed or attempted by 
such other person. 
40-33-3. Defenses available -- not available. (1) When the 
actor's previous conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt to 
commit a crime, as defined in this article, it is a defense that he 
abandoned his effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevented its 
commission, under circumstances manifesting the renunciation of his 
criminal purpose. The establishment of such defense shall not affect 
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the liability for the attempt of an accomplice who did not join in 
such abandonment or prevention 
(2) (a) It shall not be a defense to a conviction of the 
crime of attempt to commit a crime that: 
(b) Because of a misapprehension of the circumstances it 
would have been factually or legally impossible for the 
accused to commit the offense attempted; or 
(c) Under the circumstances, the accused could not have 
actually accomplished his purpose; or 
(d) The crime attempted or intended was actually perpetrated 
by the accused. 
40-33-4. Multiple convictions. No person shall be convicted 
of both the perpetration of a crime and the attempt to commit that 
crime where the acts constituting such attempt were part of the same 
conduct constituting the completed crime. 
40-33-5. Penalties. A person convicted of an attempt to 
commit a crime may be fined or imprisoned or both in the same manner 
as for the offense attempted, but such fine or imprisonment shall not 
exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term 
of imprisonment, or both, prescribed for the offense attempted; pro-
vided that: 
(1) If the offense attempted is a class I or class II felony, 
the offense is a class_ felony; 
(2) If the offense is an attempt to commit any felony in-
volving bodily injury of or an assault on any person, 
other than a class I or class II felony, the offense is 
a class_ felony; 
(3) If the offense is an attempt to commit any felony other 
than those referred to in subsections (1) and (2) of this 
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section, the offense is a class_ felony: and 
(4) If the offense is an attempt to commit any class of 
misdemeanors, the offense is a class misdemeanor. 
Comment 
This proposed article is a restatement of the present provi-
sions of article 25, CRS 1963. 
ARTICLE 34. CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY 
40-34-1. Definition of conspiracy. A person is guilty of 
conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if with 
the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission he: 
(1) Agrees with such other person or persons that they or 
one or more of them will engage in conduct which consti-
tutes such crime or an attempt to commit such crime; or 
(2) Agrees to aid such other person or persons in the plan-
ning or commission of such crime or of an attempt to 
commit such crime. 
40-34-2. Scope of conspiratorial relationship. If a person 
guilty of conspiracy, as defined by section (1) of this article, knows 
that a person with whom he conspires to commit a crime has conspired 
with another person or persons to commit the same crime, he is guilty 
of conspiring with such other person or persons, whether or not he 
knows their identity, to commit such crime. 
40-34-3. Conspiracy with multiple criminal objectives. If a 
person conspires to commit a number of crimes, he is guilty of only 
one conspiracy so long as such multiple crimes are the object of the 
same agreement or continuous conspiratorial relationship. 
40-34-4. Joinder and venue in conspiracy prosecutions. (1) 
Subject to the provisions of subsection (2) of this section, two or 
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They are charged with conspiring with one another; or 
The conspiracies alleged, whether they have the same or 
different parties, are so related that they constitute 
different aspects of a scheme of organized criminal con-
duct. 
(2) In any joint prosecution under subsection (1) of this 
(a) No defendant shall be charged with a conspiracy in any 
judicial district other than one in which he entered into 
such conspiracy or in which an overt act pursuant to such 
conspiracy was done by him or by a person with whom he 
conspired; and 
(b) Neither the liability of any defendant nor the admis-
sibility against him of evidence of acts or declarations 
of another shall be enlarged by such joinder; and 
(c) The court shall order a severance or take a special ver-
dict as to any defendant who so requests, if it deems 
it necessary or appropriate to promote the fair deter-
mination of his guilt or innocence, and shall take any 
other proper measures to protect the fairness of the 
trial. 
40-34-5. Overt act. No person may be convicted of conspiracy 
to commit a crime, other than a class or class_ felony, unless an 
overt ·act in pursuance of such conspiracy is alleged and proved to 
have been done by him or by a perspn with whom he conspired. 
40-34-6. Renunciation of criminal purpose. It is an affirma-
tive defense that the offender, after conspiring to commit a crime, 
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thwarted the success of the conspiracy, under circumstances manifest-
ing a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose. 
40-34-7. Duration of conspiracy. For purposes of this 
article: 
, (1) Conspiracy is a continuing course of conduct which ter-
minates when the crime or crimes which are its object 
are committed or the agreement that they be committed is 
abandoned by the defendant and by those with whom he 
conspired; and_ 
(2) Such abandonment is presumed if neither the defendant 
nor anyone with whom he conspired does any ov.ert act in 
pursuance of the conspiracy during the applicable period 
of limitation; and 
(3} If an individual abandons the agreement, the conspiracy 
is terminated as to him only if and when he advises those 
with whom he conspired of his abandonment or he informs 
the law enforcement authorities of the existence of the 
conspiracy and of his participation therein. 
40-34-8. Incapacity, irresponsibility or immunity of party 
to conspiracy. (l} Except as provided in subsection (2} of this 
section. it is immaterial to the liability of a person who conspires 
with another to commit a crime that: 
(a} He or the person with whom he conspires does not occupy 
a particular position or have a particular characteristic 
which is an element of such crime. if he believes that 
one of them does; or 
(b} The person with whom he conspires is irresponsible or has 
an immunity to prosecution or conviction for the commis-
sion of the crime. 
- 129 -
(2) It is a defense to a charge of conspiracy to commit a 
crime that if the criminal object were achieved, the offender would 
not be guilty of a crime under the law defining the offense or as an 
accomplice. 
40-34-9. Penalties for criminal conspiracy; mitigation in 
cases of lesser danger; multiple convictions barred. (1) Except as 
otherwise provided in this section, conspiracy is a crime of the same 
class as the most serious offense which is an object of the conspiracy. 
A conspiracy to commit a class I felony is a class II felony. 
(2) If the particular conduct charged to constitute a crimi-
nal conspiracy is so inherently unlikely to result or culminate in 
the commission of a crime that neither such conduct nor the offender 
presents a public danger warranting the grading of such offense under 
this section, the court may enter judgment and impose sentence for a 
crime of a lesser class or, in extreme cases, may dismiss the prose-
cution. 
( 3) A person may not be convicted of both the con·spiracy to 
commit a crime and: 
Comment 
(a) The commission of the crime which is the object of the 
conspiracy; or 
(b) The attempt to commit the crime which is the object of 
the conspiracy. 
This proposed article, based on the recommended provisions 
contained in the Model Penal Code, constitutes a restatement of the 
present general conspiracy, 40-7-35, CRS 1963. 
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PART G. MISCELLANEOUS OFFENSES 
46-3-3. When marriage is void. (l}(a} A marriage is void 
only if o~e or more of the following conditions existed at the time 
of the marriage: 
Comment 
(b) Either party was under the age of sixteen, unless a 
license to marry was issued by order of. a court of 
record: 
(c} The marriage was not contracted in this state and was 
incestuous as defined by the law of the place where such 
marriage was contracted: 
(d}(i) The marriage was contracted in this state and was be-
tween parents and children, including grandparents and 
grandchildren of every degree, between brothers and 
sisters of the half blood as well as the whole blood, 
between uncles and nieces, aunts and nephews, and between 
first cousins. 
(ii) Subsection (d)(i) of this section shall extend to legi-
timate as well as illegitimate children and relations. 
(iii) As used in subsection (d)(i} of this section, marriages 
between first cousins include those marriages where one 
party has at least one parent who is a sibling of at 
least one parent of the other party; 
(e) The marriage was bigamous or polygamous; or 
(f) The marriage was void by the law of the place where such 
marriage was contracted. 
This proposed section is a restatement of present sections 
40-9-4 and 46-3-3, CRS 1963. The former section defines incestuous 
marriages and the latter voids incestuous marriages. These two 
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sections are combined and broadened under this proposed section to 
include first cousin marriages. The committee agree that the science 
of human genetics supports the popular belief that first cous~n mar-
riages increases the incidence of mentally retarded or otherwise 
defective children in the first generation if the blood line carries 
an unfavorable recessive gene, although not substantially. Under 
this proposed section, a first cousin marriage is void but neither 
party is subject to punishment under this or the proposed criminal in-
cest sections. 
48-5-1. Definitions. ( 11) "Narcotic drugs" means any of the 
following: 
(a) Alpha eucaine 
(b) Beta eucaine 
(c) "Cannabis" includes all parts of the plant Cannabis 
Sativa L. (commonly known as marihuana), whether growing 
or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any 
part of such plant; and every compound, manufacture, 
salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, 
its seeds, or resin; but shall not include the mature 
stalks of such plant, fiber produced from such stalks, 
oil or cake made from the seeds of such plant, any other 
compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or 
preparation of such mature stalks (except the resin ex-
tracted therefrom), fiber, oil or cake, or the sterilized 
seed of such plant which is incapable of germination. 
(d) "Opium" includes morphine, codeine, and heroin, and any 
compound,-manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or 
preparation of opium, but does not include apomorphine 
or any of its salts. 
· (e) "Coca leaves" includes cocaine, and any compound, manu-
facture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of 
coca leaves, except derivatives of coca leaves which do 
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not contain cocaine, ecgonine, or substance from which 
cocaine or ecgonine may be synthesized or made. 
(f) "Isonipecaine" means the substance identified chemically 
as l-methyl-4-phenyl-piperidene-4-carboxylic acid ethyl 
ester, or any salt thereof by whatever trade name identi-
fied. 
(g) "Methadon" means the substance identified chemically as 
4-4-Diphenyl-6-Dimethylamino-Heptanone-3, or any salt 
thereof by whatever trade name identified. 
(h) "lsoamidone" means the substance identified chemically 
as 4, 4-Diphenyl-5-Methyl-6-Dimethylamino-hexanone-3, or 
any salt thereof by whatever trade name identified. 
(i) All parts of the plant of the genus Lophophora whether 
growing or otherwise; the buttons thereof, the alkaloids 
extracted from any such plant; and every compound salt, 
derivative, mixture or preparation of such plant. 
(j) "Dromoran" means any substance identified chemically as 
dl-3-hydroxy-N-methylmorphinan, 1-3-hydroxy-N-methyl-
morphinan (except d-3-hydroxy-N-methylmorphinan), dl-
3-methoxy-N-methylmorphinan, or 1-3-methoxy-N-methyl-
morphinan (except d-3-methoxy-N-methylmorphinan), or any 
salt thereof by whatever trade name designated. 
(k) "Nisentil" means any substance identified chemically as 
2-1, 3-dimethyl-4-phenyl-4-propionoxy-piperidene or any 
salt thereof by whatever trade name designated. 
(1) "Ketobemidone'' means any substance identified chemically 
as 4-(3-hydroxyphenyl)-l-methyl-4-piperidyl ethyl ketone 
or any salt thereof by whatever trade name designated. 
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Comment 
Proposed subsection 48-5-1 (11) replaces and restates in 
modern language the present narcotic drug definitions set out in 48-5-1 
(11), 48-5-1(12), 48-5-1(13) and 48-5-1(14)(a) through (c) and (e), 
CRS 1963. In so doing, the proposed subsection eliminates the phrase 
"any drug found by the state board of health, after reasonable notice 
and opportunity for hearing, to have an addiction-forming or addiction-
sustaining liability similar to morphine or cocaine, from the date of 
publication of,such finding by said board of health," which has been 
declared to be an undue delegation of authority in the Boulder District 
Court. 
48-5-20. Violations -- penalties. (5) Any person within the 
state of Colorado who shall use narcotic drugs, or shall be under the 
influence of narcotic drugs, as defined in this article, except when 
such drugs are or have been administered by or under the direction of 
a person licensed and duly authorized by law to prescribe and admin-
ister narcotic drugs for bona fide medical needs, is a disorderly 
person and, shall, upon conviction, be confined in the county ja~l not 
less than six months, nor more than one year. 
Comment 
This proposed subsection is a restatement of the present sub-
section, minus the phrase 11 shall be addicted to the use of narcotic 
drugs. 11 A California statute, similar to Colorado's, was declared un-
constitutional by the United States Supreme Court in 1962.10 
The court, in its majority opinion, ruled that the statute in-
flicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and 
fourteenth amendments. It stated that: 
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in 
history would attempt to make it a criminal offense 
for a person to be mentally ill, or a leper or to 
be afflicted with a venereal disease. A State might 
determine that the general health and welfare re-
quire that the victims of these and other human af-
flictions be dealt with by compulsory treatment, 
involving quarantine, confinement, or sequestration. 
But, in the light of contemporary human knowledge, a 
law which made a criminal offense of such a disease 
would doubtless be universally thought to be an 
10. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660. 
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infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in viola-
tion of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments ••• We 
cannot but consider the statute before us as of the 
same category. In this court counsel for the State 
recognized that narcotic addiction is an illness. 
Indeed, it is apparently an illness which may be 
contracted innocently or involuntarily. We hold 
that a state law which imprisons a person thus af-
flicted as a criminal, even though he has never 
touched any narcotic drug within the State or been 
guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a 
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. To be sure, imprisonment for 
ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment 
which is either cruel or unusual. But the question 
cannot be considered in the abstract. Even one day 
in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment 
for the "crime" of having a common cold.11 
11 • .ill!;!., pp. 666-667. 
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article: 
48-8-1. Definitions. (l)(a) For the purpose of this 
(b) The term "hypnotic drug" means any drug which contains 
any quantity of: Barbituric acid or any of the salts of 
barbituric acid; or any derivative of barbituric acid; 
provided, that such terms shall not include drugs con-
taining, in addition to any such hypnotic drug, a suf-
ficient quantity or proportion of another drug or drugs 
to prevent the ingestion of a sufficient amount of the 
hypnotic drug to cause a hypnotic.or somnifacient 
effect; and shall not include any drug permitted under 
federal law to be sold over the counter without pre-
scription. 
(c) The term "stimulant drug" means any drug which contains 
any quantity of amphetamine, benzphetamine, diethyloro-
pion, mephentermine, methamphetamine, methylphenidate, 
phenmetrazine, pipradrol, or any salt, mixture or optical 
isomer thereof; provided, that such term shall not in-
clude any drug containing, in addition to any such 
stimulant drug, a sufficient quantity or proportion of 
another drug or drugs to prevent the ingestion of a 
sufficient amount of stimulant drug to cause a stimulat-
ing effect on the central nervous system; and shall not 
include any drug permitted under federal law to be sold 
over the counter without prescription. 
(d) The term "delivery'' means sale. dispensing, giving away, 
or supplying in any other manner. 
(e) The term "patient" means, as the case may be, either 
the individual for whom a hypnotic drug or a stimulant 
- 136 -
drug is prescribed or to whom a hypnotic drug or stimu-
lant drug is administered; or the owner or the agent of 
the owner of the animal for which a hypnotic drug or 
stimulant drug is prescribed or to which a hypnotic 
drug or stimulant drug is administered. 
(f) The term "person" includes individual, corporation, 
partnership, and association. 
(g) The term "practitioner" means a person licensed by law 
to prescribe and administer hypnotic drugs or stimulant 
drugs. 
(h) The term "pharmacist" means a person duly registered 
with the state board of pharmacy as a compounder, dis-
penser, and supplier of drugs upon prescription. 
(i) The term "prescription" means a written or oral order by 
a practitioner to a pharmacist for a hypnotic drug or 
stimulant drug for a particular patient, which specifies 
the date of its issue, thf name and address of such 
practitioner, the name and address of the patient and, 
if such hypnotic drug or stimulant drug is prescribed 
for an animal, the species of such animal, the name and 
quantity of the hypnotic drug or stimulant drug pre-
scribed, the directions for use of such drug, and in the 
case of a written order the signature of such practitioner. 
An oral order by a practitioner for a hynotic drug or 
stimulant drug must be promptly reduced to writing by the 
pharmacist. 
(j) The term "manufacturer" means persons other than pharma-
cists who manufacture hypnotic drugs or stimulant drugs, 
and includes persons who prepare such drugs in dosage 
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forms by mixing, compounding, encapsulating, entableting, 
or other process. 
(k) The term "wholesaler" means persons engaged in the busi-
ness of distributing hypnotic drugs or stimulant drugs 
to persons included in any of the classes named in 
section 48-8-3. 
(1) The term "warehouseman" means persons who store hypnotic 
drugs or stimulant drugs for others and who have no 
control over the disposition of such hypnotic drugs or 
stimulant drugs except for the purpose of such storage. 
48-8-2. Prohibited acts. (1) The following acts, the 
failure to act as hereinafter set forth, or the causing of any such 
act or failure are hereby declared unlawful, except as provided in 
section 48-8-3. 
(2)(a) The delivery of any hypnotic drug or stimulant drug 
unless: 
(b) Such hypnotic drug or stimulant drug is delivered by a 
pharmacist, upon a prescription, and there is affixed to 
the immediate container in which such drug is delivered 
a label bearing the name and address of the owner of the 
establishment from which such drug was delivered; the 
date on which the prescription for such drug was filled; 
the number of such prescription as filled in the pre-
scription files of the pharmacist who filled such 
prescription; the name of the practitioner who pre-
scribed such drug: the name and address of the patient, 
and if such drug was prescribed for an animal, a statement 
of the species of the animal; and the directions for use 
of the drug as contained in the prescription: or 
- 138 -
(c) Such hypnotic drug or stimulant drug is delivered by a 
practitioner in the course of his practice and the 
immediate container in which such drug is delivered bears 
a label on which appears the directions for use of such 
drug, the name and address of such practioner, the name 
and address of the patient, and if such drug is pre-
scribed for an animal, a statement of the species of the 
animal. 
(3) The refilling of any prescription for a hypnotic drug 
or stimulant drug except as designated on the prescription, or by the 
consent of the practitioner. 
(4) The delivery of a hypnotic drug or stimulant drug upon 
prescription unless the pharmacist who filled such prescription files 
and retains it as required in section 48-8-4. 
(5) The possession of a hypnotic drug or stimulant drug by 
any person, unless such person obtained such drug on the prescription 
of a practitioner or in accordance with section 48-8-2 (2)(c). 
(6) The refusal to make available and to accord full oppor-
tunity to check any record or file as required by section 48-8-5. 
(7) The failure to keep records as requir~d by subsection 
(1) or (2) of section 48-8-4. 
(8) The using by any person to his own advantage, or the 
revealing, other than to an officer or employee of the state depart-
ment of public health, or to a court when relevant in judicial pro-
ceeding under this article, of any information required under the 
authority of section 48-5-5, concerning any method or process which 
as a trade secret is entitled to protection. 
48-8-3. Exemptions. (l)(a) The provisions of subsections 
(2) and (5) of section 48-8-2 shall not be applicable to the delivery 
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of hypnotic drugs or stimulant drugs to persons included in any of 
the classes hereinafter named, or to the agents or employees of such 
persons, for use in the usual course of their business or practice or 
in the performance of their official duties, as the case may be; or 
to the possession of hypnotic drugs or stimulant drugs by such persons 
or their agents or employees for such use: 
(b) Pharmacists; 
(c) Practitioners; 
(d) Persons who proc~re hypnotic drugs or stimulant drugs 
for handling by or under the supervision of pharmacists 
or practitioners employed by them; or for the purpose of 
lawful research, teaching, or testing, and not for re-
sale; 
(e) Hospitals and othe~ institutions which procure hypnotic 
drugs or stimulant drugs for lawful administration by 
practitioners; 
(f) Officers or employees of appropriate enforcement agencies 
of federal, state or local governments, pursuant to their 
official duties; 
(g) Manufacturers and wholesalers; or 
(h) Carriers and warehousemen. 
48-8-4. Records. (l)(a) Persons (other than carriers) to 
whom the exemptions of· section 48-8-3 are applicable shall: 
(b) Make a complete record of all stocks of hypnotic drugs 
and stimulant drugs on hand on the effective date of 
this article, and 
(c) Maintain detailed, but not necessarily separate, records 
and inventories relating to hypnotic drugs and stimulant 
drugs manufactured, purchased, sold, distributed and 
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handled; and retain all such records and inventories 
required by this section for not less than two calendar 
years after the date of the transaction shown by such 
record and inventory. 
(2) Pharmacists shall in addition to complying with the 
provisions of subsection (l)(c) of this section, retain each pre-
scription for a hypnotic drug or stimulant drug received by them, for 
not less than two calendar years immediately following the date of the 
filling or the date of the last refilling of such prescription, which-
ever is the later date. 
48-8-5. Inspection of records. Persons required to keep 
files or records, relating to hypnotic drugs or stimulant drugs by 
section 48-8-4 shall, upon the written request of an officer or 
employee duly designated by the state department of public health, 
make such file~ or records available to such officer or employee, at 
all reasonable hours, for inspection and copying; and accord to such 
officer or employee full opportunity to check the correctness of 
such files or records, including opportunity to make inventory of all 
stocks of hypnotic drugs or stimulant drugs on hand; and it shall be 
unlawful for any such person to fail to make such files or records 
available or to accord such opportunity to check their correctness. 
48-8-6. Regulations. The state department of public health 
is hereby authorized to promulgate necessary regulations for the 
administration and enforcement of this article. 
48-8-7. Penalties. Any person who violates any of the pro-
visions of this article shall upon conviction thereof, be punished by 
imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year, or by a 
fine of not more than five hundred dollars, or by both such imprison-
ment and fine. 
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Comment 
This proposed article is aimed at the increasing and illicit 
use of stimulants and depressants. This proposed article is similar 
to the narcotic drug article in that the drugs within the scope of its 
provisions may be sold upon prescription only, and in properly labeled 
containers. Furthermore, a record of each sale must be kept by the 
seller for a minimum of two years. 
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CROSS REFERENCE TABLE 
This table is designed to show the disposition of the present 
sections contained in chapter 40, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, as 
amended by the session laws of 1964. 
Columns (1) and (2) show the present section number and, by 
stating its title, indicates the subject matter of each present 
section of chapter 40. Column (3) shows the proposed article and 
section number in which the subject matter of the present section may 
be found. If no proposed article and section number appears in 
column (3), the subject matter has either been transferred to the 
proposed code's general provisions or to another body of law, or has 
been omitted because it no longer is useful or it duplicates a pro-
vision contained in another body of law, e.g., present chapter 40 
sections which set out the jurisdiction of courts for a specific of-
fense duplicate the jurisdiction provisions of the statutes which 
establish the county and district courts. A present section number 
followed by a single asterisk(*) indicates the section was amended 
by the 1964 session laws, a double asterisk(**) indicates the section 

































What constitutes a crime 
Intention, how manifested 
Who deemed of sound mind 
Infant not guilty 
Lunatics, not to be con-
victed 
Idiot not guilty 
Counseling infant, luna-
. tic, to commit crime, 
penalty 
Husband responsible for 
wife's crimes 
Drunkenness no excuse, 
persons causing, how 
punished 
Accident, offenses against 
officers 
Crime committed under 
fear 
Accessories, standing by, 
not present, during the 
fact 
Accessory after the fact, 
penalty 
OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON 
Murder, defined, how 
committed 
Malice, how manifested 
Implied malice, degrees of 
murder, plea of second 








Death in year and day 
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(3) 
Proposed Penal Law 
Section 
Transferred to General 
Provisions 
Transferred to General 
Provisions 
Transferred to General 
Provisions 
Transferred to General 
Provisions 
Transferred to General 
Provisions 
Transferred to General 
Provisions 
Transferred to General 
Provisions 
Transferred to General 
Provisions 
Transferred to General 
Provisions 
Transferred to General 
Provisions 
Transferred to General 
Provisions 
Transferred to General 
Provisions 















































Driving under influence, 
death 
Driving under influence, 
injury 
Injury in one county, death 
in another, venue 
Justifiable homicide, 
necessary defense 
Bare fear, reasonable 




ing a felon 
Justifiable homicide 
Excusable homicide 
Killing justifiable or 
excusable, acquittal 
Killing proved, burden 
on accused 
Concealing death of 
bastard, penalty 









Punishment for rape 
Application of sections 
Emission 
Crime against nature 
Assault on child under 
sixteen 
What is an assault 
Assault to commit felony, 
deadly weapon 
Assault and battery, 
punishment 
Jurisdiction of county 
court 
Hazing unlawful 
Punishment for hazing 









Transferred to General 
Provisions 
Transferred to General 
Provisions 
Transferred to General 
Provisions 
Transferred to General 
Provisions 
Transferred to General 
Provisions 
Transferred to General 
Provisions 
Transferred to General 
Provisions 






10-1, 10-2, 13-1 
Omitted 
Omitted 
10-1, 10-2, 13-1 
Omitted 
Omitted 















Proposed Penal Law 
Section 































Jurisdiction of county 
court 
Duties of faculty of state 
institutions 
False imprisonment, penalty 
Name of prosecutor endorsed, 
·malice, costs 
Kidnaping defined 
Penalty for kidnaping 
Officer making arrest, age 
of person kidnaped 
Jurisdiction of courts 
Assault and threat• against 





3-2, 3- 3, 3-4 




OFFENSES AGAINST HABITATIONS AND BUILDINGS 
Arson, first degree 
Arson, second degree 
Arson, third degree 
Burning to defraud insurer 
Burglary, what constitutes, 
penalty 
Use of dynamite in burglary, 
penalty 
Burglar tools, possession, 
penalty 
Trespass on premises of 
another 
OFFENSES AGAINST UTILITIES 
Tapping water pipes, mis-
demeanor 
Conduc~ing water around 
meter 
Interference with water 
meter 
Taking water without perinis-
sion 
Prima facie evidence of guilt 
Violation, penalty 
Tapping gas conduits 
Conducting gas around meter, 
misdemeanor 
Injury or destruction of 
meter · 
Prima facie evidence 
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4-1, 4-2, 4-4 
4-1, 4-2, 4.-4 
4-1, 4-2, 4-4 
4-3 






















































Proposed Penal Law 
Section 
OFFENSES AGAINST UTILITIES, contd. 
Violation, penalty 
Electricity, unlawful tapping 
Avoiding meter 
Tampering with meter 
Prima facie evidence 
Violation, penalty 
Interference with telegraph 
and telephone, penalty 
Definitions 
Refusal to yield "party 
line" 
False statement concerning 
an emergency 
telephone directories to 
contain not'ice . 
Removal, injury or destruc-
tion of telephone and 
telegraph facilities, 
penalty 
Disturbance of peace by 
telephone 
ROBBERY, LARCENY AND EMBEZZLEMENT 
Robbery, penalty 
Larceny, penalty 
Dog stealing, larceny 
Ore stealing, larceny 
Stealing ore from reduction 
works, penalty 
Stealing fixtures from house, 
larceny 
Stealing from realty, 
larceny 
Larceny of livestock, penalty 
Larceny of motor vehicles 
Entering motor vehicle with 
intent to commit larceny 
Buying and receiving stolen 
goods 
Property stolen restored, 
action to recover 
Larceny by bailee 
Lodger taking goods, penalty 
Embezzlement, what constitutes 
Embezzlement of public 
property 
Embezzlement, officer failing 




































































Proposed Penal Law 
Section 
ROBBERY, LARCENY AND EMBEZZLEMENT, contd. 
Embezzlement by carriers, warehousemen 
Embezzling landlord's share of 
crops . 
Larceny under fifty dollars 
misdemeanor 
Petit larceny, punishment 





County commissioners to 
furnish work 
Shoplifting, elements of the 
offense 
Penalties for shoplifting, 
subsequent offenses 
Concealment of goods as prima 
facie evidence of crime of 
shoplifting 
Questioning of person suspected 
of shoplifting without civil 
liability 
Sections cumulative and supple-
mental 
FORGERY AND COUNTERFEITING 
Forgery, penalty 
Counterfeiting coin, passing, 
penalty 
Possessing with intent to 
pass 
Possession of counterfeit notes, 
bonds or blanks, penalty 
Counte_rfeit gold or silver, 
penalty 
Mingling base metal, penalty 




bills, checks or notes, 
Possessing tools for counter-
feiting, penalty 
Trial, need not prove incorpora-
tion 
Testimony of experts 



































































Proposed Penal Law 
Section 
OFFENSES AGAINST ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
Perjury, subornation, penalty 
False verified statement, 
perjury 
Procuring conviction of murder 
by perjury, penalty 
Indictment, allegations 
Bribery of judge or legislator, 
penalty 
Bribery of public officer, 
penalty 
Inducing witness to secrete him-
self 
Bribery of water commissioner 
Officer purloining records, 
penalty 
Inhumanity of jailer, penalty 
Coercion of prisoners, felony 
Rules of evidence not affected 
Detaining office records, 
penalty 
False instruments, procuring, 
penalty 
Simulating judicial process 
Penalty for simulating judicial 
process 
Resisting officer, penalty 
Insurrection, penalty 
Obstructing messenger of state 
Rescue after conviction, 
penalty 
Rescue before conviction, 
penalty 
Officer, aiding escape, penalty 
Officer suffering convict to be 
at large, penalty 
Inducing prisoners to absent 
selves 
Conveying tools to prisoner, 
penalty 
Furnishing weapons to convicts 
and other persons, penalty 
Aiding escape, penalty 
Furnishing drugs or liquor to 
convicts, penalty 
Rescue on civil process, 
penalty 









































































Proposed Penal Law 
Section 
OFFENSES AGAINST ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, contd. 
Aiding escape from officer, 
penalty 
Officer allowing escape, 
penalty 
Officer refusing to receive 
or arrest prisoner, penalty 
Compounding offense, penalty 
Conspiracy in general, penalty 
Conspiring to bring about 
receivership 




Maintenance, penalty, exception 
Unlawful to solicit personal 
injury claims 
Misdemeanor, soliciting personal 
injury claims 
Judge or officer receiving 
reward, penalty 
Taking illegal fees, penalty 
Officer taking reward for omis-
sion of duty 
Malfeasance in office, removal 
Public officer violating oath, 
penalty 
Refusing to aid in arrest, 
penalty 
Persons under life sentence, 
assault during escape, death 
penalty 
Persons under less than life 
sentence, assault during 
escape, penalty 
Holding hostage during escape, 
penalty 
State pay costs of prosecution 
Escapes by felons 
OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC PEACE 
Disturbance, jurisdiction of 
county court 
Fighting by agreement, penalty 
Unlawful assembling, penalty 






































































Proposed Penal Law 
Section 
OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC PEACE, contd. 
Riot, penalty 2~-4 
Omitted 
Omitted 
Officers shall prevent dueling 
Publications of abuse for re-
fusal to duel, penalty 
Duel, abettors, penalty 
Dueling, challange, penalty 
Carrying challange, second, 
penalty 
Libel, penalty 
Disturbing peace on Sunday, 
penalty 
Disturbance on Sunday, 
penalty 
Disturbing worship, penalty 
County court, jurisdiction 
Trial by jury, collecting fine 
Appeals allowed 
Vagrancy, arrest, fine 
Vagrancy, trial by jury 
OFFENSES RELATING TO MOAALS 
Bigamy 




















Penalty for incestuous 
marriages 
(Transferred to Chapter 
46, Divorce, Separate 
Maintenance, Annulment) 
17-1 
Father and daughter co-
habiting, penalty 
Seduction, penalty, subsequent 
marriage 
Enticement, chaste women 
Enticement, single persons 
Procurers, penalty 
Prostitution, employee, pimp, 
penalty 
Witnesses 
Not to ~£feet other laws 
Prostitute making display, 
penalty 
Open lewdness, keeping lewd 
house, penalty · 
































Proposed Penal Law 
Section 
OFFENSES RELATING TO MORALS, contd. 










obscene books, penalty 
Mailing obscene books, penalty 
Search warrant for obscene books 
Definitions 
Action, by whom instituted 
Temporary writ of injunction 
Who named defendants 
Actions have precedence 
Violation of injunction, penalty 
Advertising cures for sexual 
diseases 
Penalty, agent Omitted 





















Confidence game, penalty 
Indictment or information, 
sufficiency 
Construed liberally 
Bunco steerer defined 
Fakirs defined 
Penalty if convicted of bunco 
steering, etc. 
Gambling rooms, penalties 
Keeping gaming table, gambling 
for livelihood, penalty 
Wagering upon games, penalty 
Inducing minors to gamble, 
penalty 
Penalty, information, fines, 
informer 
Seizure of property 
Gaming contracts void 
OFFENSES RELATING TO FIREARMS 
Carrying concealed weapons, 
penalty 





Hunting under influence of 
liquor or drugs 






















(1) (2) (3) 
Present Penal Proposed Penal Law 
Law Section Subject Matter Section 
ARTICLE 11 OFFENSES RELATING TO FIREARMS,contd. 
7 Hunting violations, penalty 25-7 
8 Mechanical knives, unlawful 27-1 
9 Violation, mechanical knives, 27-1 
penalty 
10 Possession of firearms or deadly 
weapons by certain felons 
27-1 
OFFENSES RELATING TO PUBLIC 
ARTICLE 12 HEALTH AND SAFETY 
1 Blackmail, penalty 8-1 
2 Bribery of athletes, umpires, 23-1 
judges 
3 Participants, defined 23-1 
4 Violation, bribery of athletes, 23-1 
penalty 
5 Body snatching, penalty 25-8 
6 Public drinking vessels pro- Omitted 
hibited 
7 Violation, public drinking Omitted 
vessels, penalty 
8* Jurisdiction Omitted 
9 Exercise of police powers Omitted 
10 Endurance contests, conducting, 25-10 
time limit 
11 Endurance contests, conducting, 25-10 
number limited 
12 Endurance contests, partici- 25-10 
pants, time limit 
13 Endurance contests, particip- 25-10 
pants, number limited 
14 Violation, physical endurance 25-10 
contests, penalty· 
15 Contests exempt 25-10 
16 Nuisances Omitted 
17 Information, abatement Omitted 
18 Support of parent, penalty Omitted 
19* Jurisdiction, appeal Omitted 
20 Sunday barbering 25-11 
21 Penalty for Sunday barbering 25-11 
22 Polluting streams, penalty 25-12 
23 Unlawful to flow oil into 25-12 
stream, penalty 
25-13 24 Use of white canes 
25 Duty to stop 25-13 








































OFFENSES AGAINST CHILDREN 
Child, health or life endangered 
Cigarettes, sale to children 
Penalty 
Judge may issue warrant 
Penalty for selling or giving 
tobacco to children 
Jurisdiction of county court 
FRAUD IN OBTAINING PROPERTY 
OR SERVICES 
Fraud to delay creditors, in-
dictment 
Obtaining goods or services 
under false pretenses, penalty 
Selling land twice, penalty 
Obtaining vehicle with intent 
not to pay, penalty 
Copy of section 40-10-4 posted 
Jurisdiction of county court 
Purchase under fictitious name, 
penalty 
Unlawful to purchase on credit 
and hypothecate 
Purchase on credit and abscond, 
penalty 
Giving no account check, draft 
or order, penalty 
False weights and scales, penalty 
False weights in making toll at 
mill, penalty 
False pretenses of responsibility, 
penalty 
Fraudulent operation of coin 
machines 
Manuf~cture, sale or gift of 
slug 
Obtaining hospital services 
fraudulently, penalty 
Prima facie evidence of fraud 
Notice to be posted 
County courts to have jurisdic-
tion, appeals 
Short checks, penalty 
Obtaining goods or services by 
fraudulent use of credit devices 
Stealing credit card 








































































FRAUD TO EFFECT SALES 
Misrepresentations to effect 
sale, penalty 
Violation, penalty 




Description of offense 
Defense 
Sections liberally construed 
Foreign produce, reshipment, 
penalty 
Shipping bill, contents 
Violation, penalty 
False statements as to circula-
tion, penalty 
False registration of live-
stock, penalty 
Signing fraudulent stock 
certificate, penalty 
Issuing or transferring stock 
fraudulently, penalty 
Mingling base matter with ore, 
penalty 
Misrepresent fineness of gold 
in article, test 
Use of words "sterling" and 
"coin," penalty 
Unlawful use of "gold plate" 
and "gold filled" 
Unlawful use of "~ilver plate" 
and "silver electro-plate" 
Violation of sections, penalty 
Changing farm machinery serial 
numbers prohibited, penalty 
American Indian handicrafts 
Imitation American Indian 
handicrafts 
Penalty 
LOTTERIES AND TRADING STAMPS 
Lotteries unlawful, penalty 
Lotteries for lands forbidden, 
penalty 
Advertising lottery, penalty 








































































LOTTERIES AND TRADING STAMPS 
Selling tickets, penalty 
Proof, presumption, evidence 
Indictment, when 
Purchaser, competent witness 
Gift enterprise business for-
bidden 
Penalty 
Trading stamps and premium de-
vices unlawful 
Premiums prohibited 
Giving evidences of liability 
prohibited 
Premium devices prohibited 
Redeemable bonuses prohibited 
Violation, penalty 
Municipal regulation 
FALSE IMPERSONATION -- MES-
SAGES -- EMBLEMS 
False impersonation defined 
False impersonation in 
character of relative 
False impersonation, penalty 
Divulging telegraph message, 
penalty 
Sending false message, penalty, 
damages 
Opening message, persona ting 
another, penalty 
Clandestinely reading message, 
penalty, damages 
Bribing operator, penalty 
(3) 

























Unauthorized wearing of insignia, Omitted 
penalty 
Unauthorized use of letters Omitted 
G.A.R., penalty 
Unlawful to counterfeit or sell Omitted 
badge 
Counterfeiting or selling 
penalty 
badge, Omitted 
Unlawful wearing of badge of Omitted 
society, penalty 
Facsimile of badge filed, fees Omitted 
Action for unlawful manufacture, Omitted 
sale or wearing 
Action pn behalf of society Omitted 



































Proposed Penal Law 
Subject Matter Section 
FALSE IMPERSONATION -- MES-
SAGES -- EBLEMS 
Penalty 
Jurisdiction of justice 
Application of law 
FRAUDULENT AND MALICIOUS 
MISCHIEF 
Unlawful to destroy or damage 
property belonging to another person 
Killing, entrapping homing 
pigeons 
False statements of bank's 
solvency unlawful 
Misdemeanor, penalty 
Injuring fences, penalty 
Destroying or injuring jail, 
penalty 
Removal of timber from state 
lands, penalty 
Jurisdiction of courts, 
prosecution 
Firing woods or prairie, 
penalty 
Extinguish camp fire, penalty 
Cemeteries, trespass of 
animals, penalty 
Trespass to injure dam or em-
bankment, penalty 
Trespass upon garden or 
orchard, penalty 
Taking specimens from cave, 
penalty 
Wrecking train, penalty 
Attack on train, penalty 
Stopping or delaying train, 
penalty 
Whoever counsels, aids or 
abets, deemed principal 
Intention, how proved 
Unlawful handling of switches 
Penalty for maliciously turning 
switch 
Jurisdiction, appeal 
Unlawful use of railroad tracks 




































































Proposed Penal Law 
Section 
FRAUDULENT AND MALICIOUS 
MISCHIEF 
Jurisdiction. appeal 
Molesting railroad or mine 
carriage or attachment 
Throwing stones at train. 
penalty 
Removing landmark. penalty 
Destroying landmarks. penalty 
Defacing historical monuments. 
penalty 
Removing guard around shaft. 
penalty 
Effacing instruments, books or 
records, penalty 
Defacing law or proclamation 
posted, penalty 
Injuring animals, penalty 
Liability, triple damages, at-
tachments 
Automobile defined 
Tampering with automobile, 
penalty 
Jurisdiction 
Fire prohibited, highways, 
private lands, penalty 
Dumping trash on private pro-
perty, penalty 
Dumping trash on public pro-
perty, penalty 
OFFENSES INVOLVING PUBLIC 
FUNDS 
State and county officers not 
to deal in warrants, penalty 
County_ and municipal officers not 
to deal in warrants, penalty 
Public funds for private purposes, 
penalty 
Loan of public money, penalty 
No officer to derive benefit from 
contract 
Making unlawful contract, penalty 
Refusing to pay warrant, penalty 
Failure to call warrants, penalty 
Emitting bill or note for circula-
tion, penalty 
Interest in contract prohibited 







































































Proposed Penal Law 
Section 
CRUELTY TO ANIMALS 
Overdriving, starving, penalty 
Care of impounded animals 
Failure to feed impounded 
animals, seizure 
Keeping fowls or animals to 
fight 
Arrest, trial, fine 
Officers shall prevent cruelty 
to animals . 
Bureau agents' to make arrest and 
take animal, action for expense 
Animals detained until expense 
paid 
Officers may take charge of 
abandoned animals 
Injured animals may be killed 
Lien upon animals for care and 
maintenance 
Proceeds of sale, disposition 
Badges and certificates of 
bureau off ice rs 
Bureau may require arrest, fees 
Construction of words 
Sheepherder abandoning sheep 
without notice 
Violation, penalty 
Unlawful to dock horse's tail 
When docked horses may be imported 
Prima facie evidence of docking 
Penalty for docking 
Killing animals in contest 
Violation, penalty 
Dumb animals, malicious use, 
sport or wager 
Spectators held as accessories 
Penalty 
Influencing results of race, 
stimulating or depressing dog 
or horse 
DEFACING NATURAL SCENERY 
Painting, penalty 
Actions for damages, exception 
Effaced by county, expense 
Presumption from benefit 
Using name of another wrongfully, 
penalty 









































Proposed Penal Law 
Section 














Intentional 1nJury to or 
interference with property 
Intentionally defective workman-
ship 
Wrongful discovery of secrets 
Unlawful entry on property 
Questioning and detaining 
suspected persons 
Closing and restricting highway 
Going upon closed highway, 
penaltv 
Rights of labor 
Short title 
Relation to other statutes 
When article is in force 


















Unlawful to display foreign flag, 
exception 
Penalty 
Mutilation of flag, penalty 
Display of red flag prohibited 
Penalty 
Peace officers to enforce 
sections 
Anarchy and sedition defined 
Inciting to destruction of life 
or property 
Anarchistic and seditious 
associations 
Membership in unlawful associa-
tion 
Distribution of literature 
Unlawful conspiracy 
Penalty 
Death caused in violation of 
sections 
Person defined 
Star Spangled Banner, regulations 
Penalty 
ARTICLE 24 CLAIRVOYANCY 

































(1) (2) (3) 
Present Penal Proposed Penal Law 
Law Section Subject Matter Section 
ARTICLE 24 CLAIRVOYANCY 
2 Advertisements barred 22-1 
3 Penalty 22-1 
ARTICLE 25 INCHOATE CRIMES 
1 Criminal attempt 33-1 
2 Conduct in aid of another 33-2 
3 Defenses available, not 33-3 
available 
4 Multiple convictions 33-4 
5 Penalties 33-5 
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